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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the Scottish offence of perverting the course of justice.  
Perverting the course of justice is a well-established and commonly charged offence, but 
one which is poorly understood and whose development has been the subject of sceptical 
treatment in the major work on Scottish criminal law. This thesis traces that development, 
from the institutional writers to the modern day, and asks whether it was in accord with 
the norms of Scots law.  It also asks whether that development has resulted in an offence, 
the elements of which can be described with confidence, or not. Drawing on comparisons 
with corresponding offences from other jurisdictions, this thesis sets out where the 
Scottish offence is unclear on certain questions and suggests possible answers. 
This thesis concludes that the manner in which the offence developed in Scotland, rather 
than being notable for its abnormality, is best understood as a typical example of the 
development of Scottish criminal law, and as an offence which serves an essential function 
in upholding the rule of law.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Perverting the course of justice 
 Perverting the course of justice is a surprisingly glamorous offence. It most often 
comes to our attention when it is alleged to have been committed by those involved 
in politics, media and the law. High-profile allegations have involved politicians like 
Jeffrey Archer,1 Jonathan Aitken2 and Chris Huhne,3  journalists like Rebekah 
Brooks4 and Mazer Mahmood,5 and lawyers like Constance Briscoe6 and Bruce 
Hyman.7 The Australians have an even more thrilling story to tell about perverting 
the course of justice, having convicted a former attorney-general and sitting judge of 
their highest court.8  
 It is a familiar offence. Searches of broadsheet newspapers for the term reveal it to 
be used regularly, and typically without any further explanation of what is meant.9 
It is an evocative phrase: justice is good, and perversion bad. 
                                                          
1 Jeffrey Archer sued the Daily Star for libel when he knew the allegation to be true: ‘The end: Archer goes to 
jail’, The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2001. 
2 Jonathan Aitken prepared false witness statements for his daughter as part of a lawsuit against the 
Guardian: ‘Aitken jailed for 18 months’, The Guardian, 8 June 1999. 
3 Chris Huhne arranged for his wife to claim she was responsible for his driving offence: ‘Guilty, now for 
Chris Huhne the prison bell tolls’, The Times, 4 February 2013. 
4 Rebekah Brooks was accused of concealing documents from police officers investigating phone hacking: 
‘Rebekah Brooks cleared but Andy Coulson guilty in phone hacking trial’, The Daily Telegraph, 24 June 
2014. 
5 Mazer Mahmood altered a statement made by his driver which formed part of the prosecution evidence in 
a trial: ‘'Fake Sheikh' Mazher Mahmood guilty of tampering with Tulisa trial evidence’, The Guardian, 5 
October 2016. 
6 Constance Briscoe concocted evidence during the investigation into Chris Huhne (see fn 3): ‘Constance 
Briscoe found guilty of lying to police’, The Times, 2 May 2014. 
7 Bruce Hyman, a barrister, fabricated precedents and sent them anonymously to a self-represented 
opponent for the purpose of discrediting him when they were used in court: ‘Barrister jailed for trying to 
frame man with fake e mail’, The Times, 20 September 2007. 
8 See para 7.36, infra, for more on this. The corresponding US offence, obstruction of justice, naturally has the 
most thrilling example of all, having been charged in the articles of impeachment against President Richard 
Nixon which led to his resignation. The articles of impeachment adopted by the House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary on July 27, 1974 can be found at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76082 (accessed 12 February 2018). Article 3 of the articles of 
impeachment against President Bill Clinton alleged that he “prevented, obstructed, and impeded the 
administration of justice” (H.Res.611, 105th Congress (1997-1998)). 
9 A Westlaw search of British broadsheet newspapers from 2015, 2016 and 2017 shows that the term was 
used 738 times in those three years: free text search of ("pervert! the course of justice") & (Between 
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 But is its meaning really clear? This thesis asks that question of the offence as it is 
understood in Scotland. More than that, this thesis asks whether it matters. If I 
establish that the origins of the offence in Scots law are unclear and that what the 
offence means today cannot be stated comprehensively or with confidence, does any 
of this matter if there is no evidence of the offence causing difficulty in practice? 
How pure ought an offence to be and how capable of precise definition? Or does it 
matter more, and is it more in keeping with the traditions of Scottish criminal law, 
that it can be effectively and practically deployed in pursuit of a proper interest? 
 There has been no suggestion in any case, in Scotland or in England and Wales, that 
the offence needs reform. Nor has there been any attention paid to the offence 
recently by politicians or law reform bodies.10 But it has been the subject of a 
challenge in Scotland which sought, unsuccessfully, to establish that the offence did 
not even exist.11 The thesis will begin with this case, looking in detail at the 
challenge made and using it as the starting point for examining the offence’s origins. 
After accounting for the offence’s development, I will set out what can be said about 
its current form. What is the scope of the offence, what interests does it appear to 
protect, and what questions about it remain unanswered by Scottish authority? 
 The analysis is then widened, comparing Scotland’s offence to the modern 
development of similar offences from comparable jurisdictions. If Scotland’s offence 
is inadequately defined, is there anything to be learnt from other systems? If not, 
this might suggest that any imprecision is more likely a necessary flexibility.  
 I end the thesis by setting out conclusions, based on this comparative analysis. This 
is, in part, intended as an answer to the wider question I asked above: whether the 
adequacy of the law in principle matters if it works effectively in practice. But it also 
has a narrower scope. It is a straightforward attempt to understand an offence that 
has been insufficiently analysed in Scotland, and to ask and answer some interesting 
questions about it.  
 Because perverting the course of justice is an interesting offence, and this is the best 
reason to write about it at all. Horder cautions against studying the criminal law 
                                                          
01/01/2015 AND 31/12/3017) in the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Independent, Independent on Sunday, 
Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, and the Observer. 
10 The Law Commission of England and Wales considered offences against the course of justice in 1979: Law 
Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Interference with the Course of Justice (Law Com. 96), (London:  
HMSO, 1979). 
11 H.M. Advocate v Harris, 2011 J.C. 125. 
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simply because it is dramatic or excites our imaginations.12 The fact that the stories 
involved in cases of perverting the course of justice – at least the ones that feature in 
the news and the case reports – often feature lurid activity or vivid detail is not itself 
a reason to study the offence. But that fact does speak to something about the 
offence that makes it so interesting: the very human stakes involved. It is tempting 
to think about the offence as involving matters of high principle, such as justice 
itself; or as relating to the impersonal institutions of the justice system: police, 
prosecutors, courts. For the perpetrator, however, there is something very human at 
stake. They are seeking to prevent justice being done when it should be, or to bend 
the system of justice into producing an outcome which it shouldn’t. Often, they are 
just trying to get away with it. For society, the offence protects the fact that justice is 
done. It underpins every other aspect of the law that relies on the institutions of 
justice, including the rest of the criminal law. However much (or however rarely) an 
individual makes use of the justice system, we all benefit from living under the rule 
of law. Would this be the case if those laws weren’t backed up by something to 
ensure their honest implementation? 
 This is why perverting the course of justice is worth writing about. Not because it 
has the colourful appeal of crimes of violence (though many of the cases described 
in this thesis are ironic, vivid, tragic or bizarre), but because it is utterly human 
despite being superficially dry. And not simply because it is under-examined, but 
because it is under-examined despite being so intrinsic to the protection of a value 
as essential as the rule of law.  
A note on terminology 
 There is a preliminary – and potentially meaningful – question of terminology: what 
to call the offence. It has attracted a large number of alternative names, and most of 
the time no difference in meaning is intended. The offence is sometimes called 
attempting to pervert the course of justice, though the offence is not part of the law of 
attempt. Sometimes ‘pervert’ is replaced by ‘defeat’ or ‘obstruct’, and sometimes the 
thing being perverted or defeated or obstructed is the ‘ends’ of justice or its 
‘administration’, rather than its course. 
 These are all, in Scots law, different ways of describing the same thing. A crime need 
not have a single recognised nomen juris to be understood as a single offence with a 
common set of principles attached. However, for the purposes of consistency and 
                                                          
12 Horder J., Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th ed), (Oxford: OUP, 2016), at p 42. 
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intelligibility this thesis will use a single term for the general offence. Except when 
directly quoting from a source, or where it is required for the purposes of textual 
analysis, the term ‘perverting the course of justice’ will be used, regardless of how 
the offence is referred to in any particular case or other source.13  
Scope of the thesis 
 This thesis is focused on the common law offence of perverting the course of justice 
in Scotland. Despite the development of a number of ad hoc and specific statutory 
offences relevant in this area, this offence has proved resilient. Except where 
relevant to my argument, therefore, these statutory offences are outwith scope. 
 As is often the case with Scotland’s common law offences, there is considerable 
overlap between perverting the course of justice and other related offences. These 
other offences will not be a focus of the thesis. In particular, many of the offences 
typically dealt with under the heading of ‘administration of justice offences’, such as 
perjury, contempt of court and prison-breaking will only be covered to the extent 
that they relate to the central analysis. Partial exceptions will be the offences of 
wasting police time and (attempted) subornation of perjury which, in Scotland, 
enjoy such a close relationship to perverting the course of justice that they need 
properly to be considered together. 
 This thesis is also not strictly or principally an exercise in comparative law. Other 
countries and jurisdictions’ laws are considered only to the extent that they assist in 
addressing perverting the course of justice in Scotland, and answering my central 
questions. 
Literature 
 Sir Gerald Gordon has been sceptical about the development of the offence of 
perverting the course of justice since at least 195914 with doubts about the propriety 
of the way the Scottish courts expanded the offence featuring in the general part of 
all three editions of Gordon’s Criminal Law.15 These doubts are also reflected in the 
                                                          
13 The same practice is adopted in the Law Commission, Working Paper No. 62, Criminal Law: Offences Relating 
to the Administration of Justice, (London: HMSO, 1975); para 10 contains their justification. 
14 Gordon G., Criminal Responsibility in Scots Law, PhD Thesis, (Glasgow: 1959), at pp 33 to 39. 
15 Most recently in Gordon, Sir G., The Criminal Law of Scotland (3rd ed) (ed: Michael Christie), (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2000) at paras 1.32 to 1.38. The core thesis – that the creation of perverting the course of justice was an 
unacknowledged exercise of the declaratory power – appears in Sir Gerald’s PhD thesis and all three 
editions, with the text largely updated only to take account of new case law. 
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special part of the book, with the authors and editors only feeling able to describe 
the offence as “not fully crystallised” in all four editions, from 1967 to 2017.16  
 While the textbooks cover the offence, none engages with the questions Sir Gerald 
raises about its creation, and few attempt a direct definition.17 There has been no 
academic treatment of the offence in Scotland nor any recent commentary on the 
corresponding offence in England and Wales.  
                                                          
16 Gordon, G., The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1967) at para 48.01; Gordon, G., The 
Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd ed), (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1980) at para 48.01; Gordon (3rd ed) at para 47.01; 
Gordon, Sir G., The Criminal Law of Scotland (4th ed), Volume 2 (eds: James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick), 
(Edinburgh: W. Green, 2017) at para 55.01. Clearly, the offence’s crystallisation is a slow process. 
17 See paras 5.4 to 5.15, infra, for a discussion of the approach taken by the textbooks to defining the offence. 
WHAT WAS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
6 
 
 WHAT WAS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
 Doubts over the origins of the offence 
The questions raised by Harris 
 In May and June 2010, the High Court of Justiciary was asked whether, in Scotland, 
there was such a crime as perverting the course of justice. In H.M. Advocate v 
Harris, the Crown appealed against the sustaining by the sheriff at Dundee of pleas 
to the relevancy of charges libelling perversions of the course of justice.18 The 
respondent’s argument was bold: not simply that the facts averred did not amount 
to a perversion of the course of justice, but that there was no such crime known to 
the common law. If such a crime did exist, it was alternatively argued, its scope was 
limited to behaviour that involved “the destruction or concealment of evidence”.19  
It was also argued that the scope of the purported offence was unclear enough to be 
incompatible with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Lord 
Advocate’s insistence on the charges being accordingly unlawful. For the Crown, 
the Solicitor General argued that the crime’s origins could be found in both Hume 
and Alison and that its scope was not restricted to the destruction of evidence. It 
was also submitted that the case law described the crime with a precision sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of Article 7. 
 Even in the turbulent years for Scots criminal law following the incorporation of the 
ECHR into domestic law, challenging the very existence of an offence which had 
been charged, by that name, for at least 60 years20 and which was covered without 
sceptical commentary in textbooks was unusual.21 The Solicitor General noted in his 
reply that in 2008/09 2,500 charges of perverting the course of justice had been taken. 
It was the novel nature of the respondent’s conduct that enabled the existence of the 
offence to be challenged in this case. He was alleged to have deliberately driven a 
car past a speed camera, aiming to cause the registered keeper of the vehicle to be 
                                                          
18 H.M. Advocate v Harris, 2011 J.C. 125. The appeal also concerned charges of breach of the peace. 
19 Harris, at 132. 
20 The earliest reported case in Scotland involving a discrete charge of “attempting to pervert the course of 
justice” is Scott v H.M. Advocate, 1946 J.C. 90, though the phrase does feature in the narrative of some 
earlier charges, e.g. Galloway, (1839) 2 Swin 465 (producing a forged bill in court, and illegally obstructing 
the administration of justice); H.M. Advocate v Rae and Little (1845) 2 Broun 476 (false personation, 
intended to defeat the ends of justice); Millar (1847) Ark 355 (falsehood, fraud and willful imposition 
committed for the purpose of perverting the administration of public justice); Marr v Stuart, (1881) 8 R(J) 21 
(conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice by means of perjury). 
21 Though not without more successful precursors: Webster v Dominick, 2005 1 J.C. 65. 
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issued with a fine and points on his license. He was also alleged to have intimidated 
two police officers at interview and over the phone with a view to dissuading them 
from continuing investigations.22 
 There is a tension in the respondent’s arguments. Were his alternative theory 
correct, and perverting the course of justice restricted to offences connected to 
evidence, then the crime is more precisely described than the Crown suggests, and 
the offence more likely to survive an Article 7 challenge. If, conversely, the Crown 
were correct that the offence had a broader description (with, as will become clear, a 
near-unlimited scope in conduct) then the argument that the offence is described 
with sufficient legal certainty would be harder to make. This would have mattered 
little to Harris who, it must be assumed, would cheerfully have been acquitted on 
either basis. 
 The challenge made to the existence of the offence was straightforward: it is not 
mentioned as a crime by the institutional writers, so must have its origins later. If it 
has its origins in the post-war case law cited by the Crown, then that development 
was an unacknowledged and illegitimate use of the declaratory power. The only 
aspect of the offence as commonly charged, the defence argued, that had historical 
support in the works of the institutional writers or the case law concerned the 
destruction or concealment of evidence.23  
 The High Court rejected this. Noting the bench’s lack of surprise at a charge of 
perverting the course of justice in Scott v H.M. Advocate, a case from 1946, and the 
expanding scope of the behaviour charged as such in reported cases leading up to 
H.M. Advocate v Mannion from 1961,24 the court concluded that “by not later than 
1961 it had been authoritatively recognised that attempting to pervert (or to defeat) 
the ends of justice was a crime according to the common law of Scotland and that 
the commission of that crime might take various forms”.25 This was not an 
endorsement, however, of the respondent’s theory that these cases were examples of 
a use of the declaratory power, nor any support for the idea that this was an 
                                                          
22 The two charges relating to intimidation of the police had originally been libeled as breaches of the peace, 
but a successful plea to the relevancy of those charges was upheld by a full bench of the High Court of 
Justiciary: Harris v H.M. Advocate 2010 J.C. 245, where the court suggested that alternative charges of an 
attempt to pervert the course of justice or threats might well be relevant. A second indictment was raised in 
respect of the same conduct, this time libeling attempts to pervert the course of justice. 
23 Harris, at 131 to 132. 
24 H.M. Advocate v Mannion, 1961 J.C. 79. 
25 Harris, at 136. 
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illegitimate use of that power. “It matters not”, the court concluded, whether the 
offence “originally came to be so through the operation of the ‘declaratory power’ of 
the High Court of Justiciary — although there is no express reference to that power 
in the authorities cited”.26 And with that, the appeal was dismissed. 
 The decision in Harris raises more questions than it answers. It confirms only that 
the High Court is comfortable with the way in which the offence was being used in 
2010, without providing a principled defence of it. The essence of the challenge was 
this: if the court cannot explain how an offence legitimately came into being, how 
can it explain the current nature of the offence? The only ways in which a challenge 
of that sort could be addressed would be (i) to set out the origin of the offence, (ii) to 
explain its development as satisfactory despite any uncertainty surrounding its 
origin, or (iii) to explain the basis on which an offence can be accurately described 
despite uncertainty surrounding its origin.  
 The court does not set out its understanding of the origin of the offence according to 
the practice or principles of Scots criminal law. The Solicitor General, in his reply for 
the Crown, raised the possibility that these crimes are presaged in the institutional 
writings. He identified certain passages in Hume and Alison that suggest an offence 
involving conduct falling short of subornation of perjury.27 The opinion of the court 
does not discuss this argument, so we cannot know whether this was accepted. The 
respondent addressed the court on Gordon’s view that the development of the 
offence was an implicit use of the declaratory power,28 and the court was addressed 
by both the Crown and the respondent on the modern law concerning the use of 
that power.29 Despite this, the court refused to be drawn on whether the declaratory 
power was used. 
 The court is right that, from the perspective of legal certainty, it doesn’t matter. 
Whether the offence was created in 1946 or earlier, and how, scarcely matters to 
someone charged in the 21st century. Even if the exact basis for its creation is murky, 
all that matters in Article 7 terms is its predictability and certainty at the time it was 
being applied. But if this is the court’s answer to the Article 7 question, it does not 
                                                          
26 Harris, at 137. 
27 Harris, at 132. See paras 3.2 to 3.9, infra, for discussion of the institutional writers’ views on offences 
against the administration of justice. 
28 Harris, at 131 and 135. 
29 Harris, at 131 and 132. The cases cited to the court include Webster v Dominick, 2005 1 J.C. 65, Strathern v 
Seaforth, 1926 J.C. 100, Khaliq v HM Advocate, 1984 J.C. 23, and Ulhaq v HM Advocate, 1991 S.L.T.614. 
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explicitly set this out in the decision. There is no theory set out of how an offence’s 
legitimacy can be ‘cured’ through regular use, or whether and why this might be 
fair. And if an offence has an uncertain starting point, then surely it is much more 
important that its development should be characterised by certainty if it is to be, at a 
later point, accurately and confidently described? This is the connection, not made 
in the judgment, between doubt cast over the offence’s origins in the 20th century 
and arguments concerning its lack of specificity in the 21st century. 
 This part will attempt to address the questions left unanswered by the court’s 
decision in Harris: when this offence was created, by whom and how, and whether 
that development was legitimate. 
 The origins of the offence 
The institutional writers 
 The institutional writers are a source of law in Scotland, having collected, codified 
and commented on law in a way that has come to be regarded as authoritative in the 
courts as to the law at the time of writing.30 It is not normally necessary to look 
behind an assertion made by an institutional writer to state what the law was at a 
particular time, particularly in respect of writing which is comprehensive in its 
treatment of a subject,31 such as books by Mackenzie,32 Hume,33 Alison,34 and 
Macdonald.35 
                                                          
30 For a “tentative analysis” of the authority of the institutional writers and their reception in Scottish courts, 
see Smith, T.B., ‘Authors and Authority’, (1972-1973) 12 JSPTL 3.  Smith links, at p 10, the decline of the 
authority of jurists with the rise of the use of precedent in Scotland’s courts. See also Walker, D.M., The 
Scottish Jurists, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1985) at pp 329 – 333. I take the approach of starting my analysis with 
the institutional writings before, reflecting the rise in the use of precedent, moving on to the modern case 
law. 
31 Though see Cairns, ‘Institutional Writings in Scotland Reconsidered’, Journal of Legal History (1983), 4, pp 
76 to 117 for a more sceptical view, and Ferguson, P.R. and McDiarmid, C., Scots Criminal Law: A Critical 
Analysis (2nd ed) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp 117 to 121 for criticism of the authority 
afforded to the institutional writers in the criminal law. 
32 Mackenzie, Sir G., The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (2nd ed), (Edin: 1699). 
33 Baron Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes (4th ed), (ed. B.R. Bell), 2 Vols (Edin: 
1844). 
34 Alison, A.J., Principles and Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland (Vol i, Principles (Edin: 1832), Vol ii, 
Practice) (Edin: 1833)). 
35 Macdonald, J.H.A. (Lord Kingsburgh), A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (5th ed), (eds: 
Walker, J. and Stevenson D.J.), (Edin: 1948). 
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 Mackenzie covers crimes of falsehood in title 27 and perjury in title 29. While he 
accepts that there are categories of falsehood which are punishable though they fall 
short of amounting to perjury,36 he nowhere catalogues a crime consisting of 
perverting the course of justice otherwise.  
 No crime called anything like perverting the course of justice is discussed by Hume. 
There are, however, in the section on offences against the course of justice, a number 
of comments which suggest that the criminal law captures a broader range of 
behaviour than simply the offences he names. Hume confirms, early in his 
discussion, that an attempt to suborn perjury is a crime.37 It is clear that, to Hume, 
the subject of an attempt to suborn had to be of a trial or proof at which perjury was 
being encouraged.38 
 Having established the limits on the offence of subornation, in his next paragraph, 
side-noted “all practices to procure false evidence are punishable”, Hume goes 
further: 
“It is easy to imagine other cases of the procuring of falsehood, in which, if 
there be some doubt of the propriety of a charge of subornation, there shall, 
however, be none, of competently and severely punishing the offence, as a 
falsehood, or a conspiracy and machination, or under some other more detailed 
description, such as may suit the circumstances of the case.”39 
 There is more than one way to interpret this.40 If the side-note is correct, and the 
context provided by the preceding paragraphs taken into account, then even this 
observation is still confined to the procurement of falsehoods, and limited to 
falsehoods connected to evidence (that is, oral testimony at trial or proof). Does 
Hume mean to suggest that falsehoods that interfere in some other way with the 
                                                          
36 Mackenzie, at p 280. 
37 Hume, at pp 157 and 158. This pre-dates the rule that an attempt to commit any indictable crime was itself 
a crime: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, s. 61 (now found in the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 294). He notes that, without evidence of actual perjury to support a charge 
of subornation, a charge of attempt requires to disclose behaviour of “such an overt and palpable shape, as 
testifies the earnest and serious determination of the panel to seduce”. 
38 The three examples given all concern false testimony intended to be given in customs prosecutions or 
criminal prosecutions. 
39 Hume, at p 160. 
40 The example given is the case of Campbell of Burbank, about which Hume offers no further detail. Alison 
tells us that the case involved the contriving of “deceitful evidence” against a married woman, with the aim 
of inducing her divorce, but we do not know at which stage divorce proceedings had reached or what it was 
intended should be done with the fabricated evidence. Mr Campbell was transported: Alison, at p 488. 
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course of justice are punishable, such as those where the falsehood was intended to 
be given outside of court (for example, to an officer of the law, as part of an 
investigation, or in contemplation of prospective proceedings)? Put another way, 
which part of the preceding idea is Hume expanding on here? Is a wider scope 
being given, in some way, to falsehood, or are we to read in a broader way the 
things that might be the object of such a falsehood? Which limit on the offence of 
subornation is being elided: the requirement of false testimony, or the requirement 
of a prospective trial? Perhaps the vagueness of the assertion is deliberate, and 
Hume means to suggest that both theories are correct. Hume may really be 
describing a residual category of offence here, one intended to capture behaviour 
which for any reason does not fall within the four corners of perjury or subornation, 
but which relates, more remotely, to falsehood. Hume considers that "other like 
proceedings, tending to corrupt the sources of evidence"41 and "any evil practice, 
tending to mislead, constrain, or corrupt the witnesses, or to destroy, suppress, or 
alter evidence of any kind" are criminal examples of "an interference with the course 
of justice".42  
 There is no hook in Hume for an offence directed at perverting the course of justice, 
but unconnected to the procuring of falsehood. There are clearly a set of offences 
with a common theme: they protect the substance of a trial, and at the time of Hume 
a trial comprised almost exclusively oral testimony. But it does not follow from the 
fact that certain offences have a common theme, that the common theme itself is the 
subject of a criminal offence. 
 Alison repeats Hume’s assertion that “all practices tending to procure false evidence 
are punishable, though not falling exactly under the description of subornation or 
attempt at subornation”.43  
 Macdonald does not suggest any catch-all offence relating to the administration of 
justice.44 
                                                          
41 Hume, at p 382. 
42 Hume, at p 384. 
43 Alison, at p 486, where he regards the subornation of perjury as perhaps “more base, cowardly and 
detestable” than perjury itself, and accepts that attempted subornation is a crime. “Alison merely repeats 
Hume with the addition of a few English cases”: Gordon (PhD thesis), at p v. 
44 Under the heading ‘conspiracy’, he suggests that as conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a 
separate, substantive offence, the crime of subornation of perjury is perhaps best understood as “being a 
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 If the offence is to have its origins in and derive its legitimacy from institutional 
writing, then perhaps the most that can be said is that the writers support an offence 
which consists of behaviour similar to (but less than) that which can form a charge 
of subornation of perjury. Both Hume and Alison raise this possibility in relation to 
behaviour involving the destruction or concealment of evidence but which falls 
short of the destruction of a potential production or subornation of perjury. This 
submission was put to the court in Harris, but rejected. The court said that “the 
cases on analysis are not restricted to such a narrow scope. Attempting to pervert 
the course of justice can foreseeably take a number of forms”.45 Given that the 
submission was that the later development of the offence to expand it beyond 
simple destruction of evidence cases was illegitimate, it is circular and question-
begging of the court to point to subsequent examples of such a development as 
evidence of its legitimacy. 
The emergence of the offence 
 The Solicitor General, in his reply in Harris, cited the case of Rae and Little from 
1845 as an “even earlier example of” a charge of perverting the course of justice.46 
This characterisation is a little disingenuous, as the Lord Justice-General’s opinion 
acknowledges. The charge is long, narrating an inventive conspiracy involving Rae 
and Little pretending to be each other in order to avoid convictions. The 
instrumental parts of the charge however set out, in various different ways and with 
slightly different formulas each time, that the accused did “wickedly and 
feloniously conspire”, or “wickedly, fraudulently and feloniously personate” 
another. 47 The charge against the co-accused is that he “did aid and abet the said 
wicked and felonious personation; and did contrive and perpetrate, or assist in 
contriving and perpetrating, the said fraud”. Inasmuch as charges of this era can be 
scrutinised for technical evidence of individual offences,48 the crimes libelled here 
                                                          
special instance of criminal conspiracy, perjury being the object agreed upon”: Macdonald, at p 186. 
“Macdonald is little more than a digest; and is confused and inaccurate”: Gordon (PhD thesis), at p v. 
45 H.M. Advocate v Harris, 2011 J.C. 125 at 137. 
46 Rae and Little, (1845) 2 Broun 476. He meant earlier than the case of Scott v H.M. Advocate, 1946 J.C. 90, 
which is typically identified as the first modern charge of perverting the course of justice. 
47 Rae and Little, at 478. 
48 The major premise of the indictment is not reported. The reporter describes the case as involving accused 
who “were charged with Illegal Conspiracy, particularly the wickedly and feloniously Conspiring, 
Confederating, and Agreeing to Defeat or Obstruct the Administration of Justice, especially when Justice is 
thereby defeated or obstructed”. The side-note in the report calls this “false personation” and the rubric 
describes it as “fraud”. 
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appear to be conspiracy (to commit fraud), and wicked and felonious personation (a 
particular way of committing fraud). Perverting the course of justice is narrated only 
as motive. The language, and the substance of the charge, are both redolent of 
Hume’s categorisation of offences. This may be an “other case of the procuring of 
falsehood”, not easily categorised but undoubtedly involving “conspiracy and 
machination”, and it has been charged “under some other more detailed description 
[…] as may suit the circumstances of the case”.49 This is not necessarily an example 
of an early charge of perverting the course of justice, but an example of a sort of 
charge, falsehood, specifically contemplated by Hume. Alternatively, it is a 
straightforward fraud: the accused conspired (a mode of criminality) to commit 
fraud (an offence) with the intention to defeat the administration of justice (a doleful 
intent). 
 The reference to perverting the course of justice in the narrative part of the charge is 
about intention, not action: the accused did their wicked and felonious conspiring 
“for the purpose and with the intent of defeating or obstructing the administration 
of justice”. It is not surprising in such a comprehensive charge and in that era that 
the purpose of the accused’s conduct should be set out, and this might be expected 
in a charge of conspiracy anyway. 
 In Harris the court stated that Scott v H.M. Advocate50 was the first time that 
perverting the course of justice had been charged as a separate crime.51  
 At first, the facts suggest that a charge of attempted subornation of perjury would 
be appropriate. A driver involved in a crash had tried to convince two women to 
claim to his lawyer that he was in their house at the relevant time.52 The court in 
Harris commented that this “might, no doubt, have been charged as subornation of 
                                                          
49 See para 3.4, supra. Though see also the discussion of Rae and Little in Gill, B., Crime of fraud: a comparative 
study, PhD thesis, (Edinburgh: 1975) at pp 138 to 143, where the author considers that Rae and Little cannot 
be considered a form of fraud, since no economic interest was prejudiced. 
50 Scott v H.M. Advocate, 1946 J.C. 90. 
51 This claim is also made in Criminal Law (Reissue), Stair Memorial Encyclopedia (Edin: Butterworths, 2005), at 
para 466. I have not found any earlier case featuring such a charge (but see fn 20). The headnote in the 
Justiciary Cases report categorises the case under the heading “attempt to pervert the course of justice by 
inducing to give false evidence” and narrates that the accused was “charged with attempting to pervert the 
course of justice by attempting to induce two women to give false evidence on his behalf”. 
52 There is no requirement for an indictment to be served or a trial fixed before subornation can take place. If 
the object of the attempt to suborn was, ultimately, a trial then that is sufficient: Hume, i, 383; Macdonald p 
167; Angus v H.M. Advocate, 1935 J.C. 1. 
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perjury”.53 The indictment sets out the circumstances, concluding, “which evidence 
you knew to be false and this you did with intent to pervert the course of justice and 
you thus did attempt to pervert the course of justice”.54 Up until the final words, it 
might still have been describing an attempted subornation of perjury, but the framer 
of the charge had a reason for choosing something different. His concern was 
probably about the evidence which would likely emerge in support of the charge. 
The two women whose evidence the accused hoped to influence were “inconsistent 
in regard to whether the false story was to be given in evidence or told to his lawyer 
or to the police”. Apprehensive that proving even an attempt to suborn would 
require evidence that the accused contemplated the ultimate commission of perjury 
(rather than misleading the police), the drafter of the charge has attempted to 
capture a wider class of behaviour. This was not necessarily an attempt to procure 
false evidence (using Hume’s phrase):  evidence is oral testimony given on oath, and 
the accused may have intended the deceit to end when the women lied to police, 
avoiding the need to go to court at all.  
 There are two possible routes to this behaviour being criminal. The theory could be 
a bold one: that it is criminal to solicit a falsehood for use during any part of the 
criminal process, with no specific intention that false evidence should ultimately be 
given. Alternatively, it might simply be an expanded understanding of the attempt 
element of attempted subornation of perjury: the police gather information, in part, 
in contemplation of decisions about whether to prosecute, and for potential use in a 
prosecution. Behaviour which denies the police accurate information has an 
inevitable effect on whether a trial is held, and whether accurate evidence is led at it. 
Even if this charge represented an expansion of the law, it would be one made by 
analogy and one with some support in the institutional writings. Here there is, as 
Hume envisaged, a clear “doubt as to the propriety of a charge of subornation” and 
perhaps, as Hume recommended, therefore a charge was made “under some other 
more detailed description, such as may suit the circumstances of the case”.55 The 
prosecutor may simply have used the phrase “attempt to pervert the course of 
justice”, an existing technique to describe a way of aggravating an offence or 
                                                          
53 Harris, at 135. 
54 Scott, at 91. 
55 Hume, at p 160. 
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE 
15 
 
describing intention,56 as an appropriate descriptor (or, to be uncharitable, a 
convenient cloak) for either proposed wider understanding of an existing offence. 
 It was argued for the appellant that the charge was actually one of subornation of 
perjury, and therefore the trial judge’s direction that the appellant could commit this 
crime by intending for the two women to give false statements to his lawyer was a 
misdirection.  
 The Crown’s case at appeal on this point rested on two propositions, which are best 
understood as alternatives. Firstly, it was argued that the solicitation of false 
statements as part of the criminal process was itself illegal (and that therefore the 
judge had properly charged the jury about a crime that existed, rather than 
improperly charged a subornation of perjury). Secondly, it was argued that in any 
event it was reasonable to infer from the accused’s behaviour an intention that false 
evidence might ultimately be given at trial: that the evidence disclosed behaviour 
that was preliminary to such conduct (and that therefore, even if procuring false 
statements to be made to the police was not a crime, the judge had properly charged 
attempted subornation). The second is best understood as a fall-back position: that 
there was a clearly demonstrated intention on the facts sufficient to engage the law 
of attempt in relation to a known crime, subornation. 
 Lord Carmont had no difficulty with the term used in the indictment: 
“two [of the charges] were attempted murder, and the third an attempt to 
pervert the course of justice”57 
The lack of surprise in these words was later interpreted as evidence of the existence 
of the offence at that time.58 This was perhaps over-interpretation, given that Scott 
involved an explicit challenge to the offence as charged, and in the first reported 
charge of its kind. It is therefore difficult to use anything in Scott to support the 
proposition that the offence was uncontroversial: how many genuinely 
uncontroversial charges are the subject of a challenge of this sort, so early in their 
                                                          
56 See fn 20. 
57 Scott, at 93.  
58 Harris, at 135. 
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recorded use?59 It also fails to account for the more flexible methods used to describe 
offences then, when adherence to an explicit nomen juris was less common.60  
 The conviction was quashed, though principally for reasons relating to the fairness 
of the way in which the trial judge’s charge to the jury presented prosecution 
evidence. Only Lord Carmont addressed the relevancy of the charge. He accepted 
that the Crown’s first theory of the case might in principle be right: 
“I do not suggest that attempts to pervert the course of justice, as a crime, might 
not be constituted by inducing persons to make false statements outwith the 
witness box – to the police or even in certain circumstances to others …”61 
He does not explain why the crime might be constituted in this way, and does not 
explicitly reject the idea that it is because procuring a statement to be made falsely to 
the police satisfies the legal requirements of an attempt to suborn. He avoids having 
to answer the question by restricting his judgment to the facts of the case: the 
indictment itself libelled an intention that false evidence should be given while the 
facts disclosed only that false statements were made to officers. This particular 
charge was therefore flawed on either theory (but a differently-worded charge 
might not have been). It was, as a result, unnecessary for the court to reach a 
concluded view on any contended-for wider understanding of the crime.  
 Later in his opinion, and perhaps inconsistently, Lord Carmont absolves the trial 
judge of having misdirected the jury in the way argued for by the appellant. We are 
told that the judge’s charge did make clear that it is “a different matter” to induce 
falsehoods in a court of law and outwith one.62 The nature and relevance of that 
difference is unexplored, since the conviction was quashed on other grounds. But 
that difference is the key to this case. If they are different because one is a crime and 
the other not, then we know what the ratio of this case is and Harris is misleading. If 
they are different for some other reason – perhaps because one is a crime in its own 
                                                          
59 And how often are the decisions in those challenges themselves challenged within five years? See para 
3.21, infra. 
60 See, for example, the view of Lord Clyde in McLaughlan v Boyd 1934 JC 19 at 22: “It would be a mistake to 
imagine that the criminal common law of Scotland countenances any precise and exact categorisation of the 
forms of conduct which amount to crime. It has been pointed out many times in this Court that such is not 
the nature or quality of the criminal law of Scotland. I need only refer to the well-known passage in the 
opening of Baron Hume's institutional work, in which the broad definition of crime—a doleful or wilful 
offence against society in the matter of ‘violence, dishonesty, falsehood, indecency, irreligion’ is laid down.” 
61 Scott, at 93. 
62 Scott, at 95 and 97. 
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right, while the other engages the law of attempt – then it is a difference left 
unanalysed by the court’s opinions. 
 Scott may be the first reported case where the charge is one of perverting the course 
of justice, but it is hard to interpret it as a meaningful development of the law. It 
asks two questions: is it criminal in general to solicit false statements during any 
part of the criminal process, or should our understanding of attempted subornation 
be expanded to include false statements made earlier in the criminal process? It 
answers neither. The practice of charging this behaviour as perverting the course of 
justice is accepted, but it is nowhere suggested that the behaviour libelled might be 
criminal purely because of an intent to pervert the course of justice (or even that 
such intent is required). The phrase might simply be an example of the flexibility 
afforded to the prosecution to describe a crime however they like, as long as a crime 
known to Scots law is, somehow, properly described.63 The tone of the charge and 
the judgment still focus on falsehood and evidence. The administration of justice is 
only the background against which falseness is analysed, rather than the core 
concern. 
 Dalton v H.M. Advocate was heard on appeal in March 1951.64 Dalton was charged 
with attempting to dissuade a witness from identifying at a police parade a person 
accused of theft. The charge originally narrated that he had threatened the witness 
that she would be assaulted if she made the identification, and ended with the 
words “and you did thus attempt to intimidate her and pervert the course of 
justice”. He was convicted, but under deletion of the threatened assault and the 
words “intimidate her”. The conviction was therefore for a bare charge of perverting 
the course of justice by attempting to persuade a witness not to cooperate with an 
investigation.  
 One of the grounds of appeal was that the accused had not been convicted of a 
crime under the law of Scotland, either because the offence did not relate to a 
“course of justice” which existed at the time – no trial being in active preparation – 
or because the facts did not amount to a crime, Scott being unclear on this point. 
                                                          
63 See Hume, p 155, describing the second part of the pre-1877 style syllogistic indictment: “the major or 
leading proposition states the appellation of the crime meant to be charged, or, if it have no proper name, 
describes it at large, and characterises it as a crime that is severely punishable”. The requirement to describe 
or name a crime in the major premise of an indictment was ended by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, s. 2. 
64 Dalton v H.M. Advocate, 1951 J.C. 76. 
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 The Lord Justice Clerk barely completes his summary of the facts before 
proclaiming, “I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that these facts do 
constitute a crime”. The accused was “charged with and found guilty of taking steps 
to destroy in advance evidence which might lead to the detection of a serious 
crime”.65 His analysis ends there. 
 Lord Mackay gives an opinion more interesting as a case study in Parliament House 
Kremlinology than as a principled decision about relevancy. It was his own charge 
in Scott which was held to have been defective and he relishes the opportunity to 
subject Lord Carmont’s judgment on it to a similarly withering brand of judicial 
analysis. He claims that, whatever other criticisms there might have been, he was 
“emphatically” absolved of misstating the law. The passage from Scott he cites in 
support of this makes a different point: that it was unnecessary to settle the question 
in that appeal. Referring to the distinction made in Scott between the evidence led 
and the conviction obtained, Lord Mackay concludes that he “cannot appreciate 
what Lord Carmont meant, if indeed he meant to indicate a distinction between 
cases”. This misunderstands the judgment, an impression which is bolstered when 
later in his opinion, after conducting a detailed (and irrelevant) defence of his 
charge in Scott, Lord Mackay concludes that his “decision … on the law was … 
really affirmed”.66 It was not.  
 Lord Patrick echoes the Lord Justice Clerk’s judgment; the accused’s behaviour: 
 “amounted to an attempt to eliminate evidence which might tend to 
incriminate a person in a future criminal charge, and that is quite clearly a 
crime, and a serious crime, in the law of Scotland.”67 
 “Amounted to an attempt to eliminate evidence” is an admission that this case did 
not involve a classic elimination of evidence or procurement of falsehood. Yet the 
only justification offered for why this behaviour amounts to a crime is the reference 
to it being criminal to eliminate or destroy evidence. Confirming that the evidence is 
that which “might tend to incriminate a person in a future criminal charge” would 
seem to endorse the second theory identified above about what Scott v H.M. 
Advocate meant: there is no separate offence involved when an attempt to suborn or 
pervert takes place at the investigative stage. Instead, such behaviour can be 
                                                          
65 Dalton, at 79. 
66 Dalton, at 80. 
67 Dalton, at 81. 
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legitimately interpreted as an attack, ultimately, on the justice which might take 
place at a trial – and therefore as engaging the law of attempt. 
 Even if we assume that Dalton is a further step in the development of a discrete 
offence, traceable through the institutional writers and Scott, all it is authority for is 
that: 
 by analogy with it being criminal to procure false evidence, it is criminal to 
attempt to dissuade someone from giving evidence, 
 that the requirements of attempt are met both in respect of a trial 
immediately in contemplation and in respect of a criminal investigation 
which might lead to a trial, and  
 that this behaviour can be properly charged as an attempt to pervert the 
course of justice. 
 Understood in this way, the development of this offence by these cases is presaged 
by propositions in institutional writings, but is restricted to the destruction or 
alteration of evidence and behaviour analogous to that. As unsatisfying as the 
analyses in the cases considered so far might be, this is a defensible expansion of the 
scope of the offence. These decisions might – even at this point – simply be 
clarifications of the way that the law of attempt interacts with the offence of 
suborning perjury.   
 Pausing at this point, it seems as if the words “attempt to pervert the course of 
justice” has been used in these charges only as a narration of the intention at play, or 
the relevant type of dole, much as they were in Rae and Little. Neither case is a 
satisfactory foundation for a discrete crime of perverting the course of justice, with 
the principal element being specific intent, as suggested by Harris. 
The development of the offence until 1961 
 In Kenny and Kenny v H.M. Advocate, in June 1951,68  two men were charged with 
threatening someone with violence with the “intent to intimidate him and to deter 
him from giving evidence” against them. This, the charge concluded, meant that 
they “did thus attempt to pervert the course of justice”. The jury deleted the 
references to the upcoming trial, no evidence having been led of a reference by the 
men to the trial. The men were therefore convicted of a bare threat. 
                                                          
68 Kenny and Kenny v H.M. Advocate, 1951 J.C. 104. 
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 The convictions were quashed, it not being an offence in Scotland simply to make a 
threat. But Lord Russell did suggest that it would have been an offence had the 
deleted words remained:  
“the verbal threat libelled […] was clearly serious and criminal by reason of the 
purpose or intent with which the threat was alleged to have been made, that 
purpose being to intimidate the victim so as to deter him from giving 
evidence”.69 
 The charge here ends very similarly to the charges in Scott and Dalton: “… and you 
did thus attempt to pervert the course of justice”. This is not, though, treated by the 
court as an aspect of the law of perverting the course of justice: it is treated as a 
species of threat. A threat is only criminal of itself if it is highly serious; otherwise it 
needs to be done with a particular sort of intention to be criminal.70 One sort of 
intention that will render a threat criminal, this case tells us, is a threat made to 
dissuade a witness from giving evidence. In these sorts of cases “the charge will 
probably be one of attempt to pervert the course of justice”.71 Even for threats which 
are criminal in and of themselves, the case of Margaret McDaniel suggests that it is 
an aggravation to make that threat to prevent a victim from giving evidence.72 
 Kenny and Kenny supports the idea that, early in its development, perverting the 
course of justice was not necessarily a description of behaviour being criminalised. 
Instead, it was a sort of criminal purpose, a standard of wrongdoing or an 
aggravation. In modern terms, it might form part of the mens rea of an offence 
otherwise described by reference to a type of action. In the language of the period, it 
is a sort of dole, an unlawful intention capable of transforming otherwise non-
criminal acts into criminal ones.  
 It is not only in the penumbra of subornation of perjury that we see the emergence 
of perverting the course of justice. In H.M. Advocate v Martin,73 prisoners escaped 
from custody while being escorted to work in the admiralty yard in Peterhead. The 
charge was not prison-breaking, a known offence, but that “having conceived the 
felonious intention of defeating the ends of justice by escaping from legal custody … 
                                                          
69 Kenny and Kenny, at 106. 
70 Gordon (4th ed), at para 48.01. 
71 Gordon (4th ed), at para 48.02. 
72 Margaret McDaniel, (1876) 3 Couper 271. 
73 H.M. Advocate v Martin, 1956 J.C. 1. 
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[Martin] did abscond from legal custody and remain at large … and … did attempt 
to defeat the ends of justice.”74 
 A plea to the relevancy was taken, following a by-now familiar formula: the actions 
of the appellants fell outwith the scope of the established crime of prison-breaking 
(because the prisoners were not within the prison walls when they absconded), a 
bare charge of perverting the course of justice did not in these circumstances 
disclose a crime known to the law of Scotland, and the court could not now declare 
it to be so. The court rejected these arguments: the charge was, to use the 
categorisations in Lord Cockburn’s dissent in Bernard Greenhuff,75 an old crime 
being committed in a new way, falling within an established general principle of 
Scots criminal law:  
“the offence of escaping from lawful custody, as lawful custody is nowadays 
defined in section 12 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act of 1952 (15 and 16 Geo. VI 
and 1 Eliz. II, cap. 61), is an offence which falls within an established general 
principle, even although there might not be a precise precedent directly in 
point.”76 
 The judgment is therefore confirming that there is a new way of committing the old 
offence of prison-breaking. After establishing that it is not necessary to use a 
discrete nomen juris in a charge, as long as the behaviour narrated reveals a crime, 
Lord Cameron explains why it is acceptable to bring this novel behaviour within the 
ambit of the older offence: 
“It is significant that [the institutional writers] were writing at a time when 
modern ideas of places of confinement for persons under sentence had not been 
developed and when prisons, in the words of Alison, were in the main “gloomy 
abodes.”77 
 It should not be surprising, as a society’s understanding of what a prison is 
develops, that its law of prison-breaking should (within reason) adapt alongside it. 
                                                          
74 Martin, at. 1. 
75 Bernard Greenhuff, (1838), 2 Swin. 236. 
76 Martin, at 3. 
77 Martin, at 2. The extract from Alison is worth setting out in full: “The act of prison-breaking, however 
natural to the inmates of those gloomy abodes, cannot be overlooked by the law, as being a violation of the 
order and course of justice, and a direct infringement of regulations essential to the peace and well-being of 
society.” (Alison, vol i, p 555). I am sure that by modern standards, prisons in 1950s Scotland were fairly 
gloomy themselves. 
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It would be absurd if we required to understand the penal law of Hume’s time in 
order to describe the substance of the modern offence of prison-breaking (or if, say, 
the law of murder did not capture weapons invented after its crystallisation). All 
this judgment is authority for is that (i) it is competent to charge the behaviour 
caught by the offence of prison-breaking as an attempt to defeat the ends of justice 
by escaping lawful custody, and (ii) that the behaviour caught includes prison 
escapes taking place outwith prison, it not being necessary to actually breach prison 
walls.78 
 Though this is the only case where the court was directly confronted with the 
question whether it was exercising the declaratory power, it does not take the law 
any further towards the pure intention, any-act theory of perverting the course of 
justice. Lord Cameron accepts as much: 
“What is libelled in this indictment is very plainly an attempt to hinder the 
course of justice and frustrate its ends by seeking to assist a sentenced criminal 
to escape or evade the penalty of his crime. That is an offence against public 
order and against the course of justice. … what is libelled here is but one species 
of a well-recognised and undoubted genus of crime.”79 
 The underlined sentence is descriptive, not normative: this is a crime because it 
offends against public order and the course of justice, not a crime of offending public 
order and the course of justice. The approach adopted by the court in Martin could 
easily have been applied to the task in Scott or Dalton. The relevant general 
principle might have been the offences concerned with the procurement of 
falsehood, and the adaptations required those needed to ensure that the offence of 
subornation of perjury responded to contemporary developments in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime. 
 For all of the judgments discussed so far, the case could be made – convincingly or 
otherwise – that they involved only the application of existing principles, the 
clarification of the elements of an offence or the logical extension of identified 
crimes. None is authority for a proposition that anything done in order to pervert the 
course of justice is criminal. Each involves a reference to falsehoods, a suggestion of 
misleading evidence being ultimately led, or a direct analogy with prison-breaking. 
In fact, by discussing the behaviour of the accused in the context of existing modes 
                                                          
78 See also Turnbull v H.M. Advocate, 1953 J.C. 59, cited by Lord Cameron in his judgment. In Turnbull, the 
charge was of “effecting an escape to the hindrance of the course of justice”. 
79 Martin, at 3. My emphasis. 
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of criminal behaviour (subornation of perjury, threat, procurement of falsehood, 
escaping lawful custody), these cases strongly suggest that the judges deciding them 
did not believe that they were doing anything peculiar.  
 In 1961 something peculiar did happen. H.M. Advocate v Mannion80 involved two 
accused charged with going into hiding to avoid being cited to give evidence. The 
indictment does not mess around and its drafter was not afraid to repeat for 
emphasis: it narrates that they “did form a criminal purpose to hinder and frustrate 
the course of justice”, that when they hid they did so “with intent to hinder and 
frustrate the course of justice” and that by doing so they “did attempt to defeat the 
ends of justice”. A plea to the relevancy was taken. 
 The Lord Justice Clerk’s opinion is short. It congratulates the “ingenious”81 
argument of counsel for the accused but holds that the charge was sound: 
“It seems to me clear that if a man, with the evil intention of defeating the ends 
of justice, takes steps to prevent evidence being available, that is a crime by the 
law of Scotland.” 
 Again, two features are present: perverting the course of justice is analysed in terms 
of intention, and there is an attempt to describe the relevant conduct by analogy 
with the elimination of evidence. We are not told that taking any step is criminal; 
only a step which would prevent evidence from being available. Here, though, the 
facts are particularly remote from any physical destruction of evidence or 
intimidation of witnesses such that their evidence would be denied to the course of 
justice. The two accused wished to avoid being cited. Had they been cited, they 
would have become obliged to give evidence and (while one might speculate about 
what their attitude to being cited would have been) there is no suggestion – there 
could not be – that they would not have conformed to any citation. It is not a crime 
to be unavailable to be cited; is it a crime to make yourself unavailable?82 There is no 
                                                          
80 H.M. Advocate v Mannion, 1961 J.C. 79. 
81 Mannion, at 80. The word is used in its judicial sense, meaning ‘nice try’. 
82 Consider Vaughan v Griffiths, 2004 S.C.C.R. 357, where the accused refused to consent to an invasive 
medical examination and was charged with attempting to “defeat the ends of justice”. In terms of the 
warrant, however, the appellant’s cooperation was irrelevant: an attempt to enforce it despite his lack of 
consent should have been made before the offence was properly made out, so refusing to cooperate in the 
execution of a warrant could not be a crime, if your cooperation was irrelevant under the terms of the 
warrant. It is hard to reconcile this with Mannion. It would be extraordinary if an accused was entitled to be 
tested under an existing warrant before an offence was committed; but where no warrant had yet been 
enforced, speculation about an accused’s attitude to it was sufficient. 
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link to an existing crime here: this behaviour does not sit in the shadow of perjury, 
threat or prison-breaking. The steps by the accused taken related only to themselves. 
They were entitled, in general, to go into hiding. The criminal act was going into 
hiding for this purpose, in this situation. Here is the first hint of an any-act, pure-
intention understanding of perverting the course of justice. 
 Yet even this decision, expansive though it might seem to be, does not claim to be 
authority for a novel idea. In fact, the Lord Justice Clerk specifically disclaims this: 
“I do not think I am doing anything revolutionary”.83 He is careful to get in a 
reference to preventing evidence being available. Though no authority is cited in the 
decision, this is presumably an attempt to link the behavioural element of this 
charge to the line of cases discussed above. And although the decision is short, the 
case is strong support for the idea of an intention to pervert being a form of dole 
which can be attached to a criminal action, rather than a free-standing description of 
criminality: 
“Evil intention, of course, is of the essence of the matter and must be 
established. This indictment clearly narrates the evil intention of the accused to 
avoid being called upon to give evidence, and that is sufficient to make the 
indictment relevant.”84 
We are still talking about evidence here, and still reasoning by analogy. Previous 
cases involved a person doing something wrong to another in order to prevent 
evidence being given. This case involves a person taking steps which could not, of 
themselves, harm anybody.  
 Although the behaviour caught by the offence is expanding and the analogy with 
false evidence straining at the seams, we have not yet reached a position where 
anything done to pervert the course of justice – however “evil” or otherwise – is 
established as an offence. There is still only authority for that proposition in relation 
to behaviour that is itself threatening, behaviour that might eliminate evidence or, at 
the reaches, behaviour that would deny evidence to a court which ought to have 
been entitled to it. 
 The decision in Mannion was identified in Harris as the point by which the offence 
had cohered. By the date of this decision two things were clear, the court said: that 
attempting to pervert the course of justice was a crime (and it is clear that what was 
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meant was a distinct crime), and that the crime could be committed in many 
different ways. Given that the argument being rejected in Harris was that the scope 
of the offence was limited to behaviour which prevented evidence from being led, 
the court might be expected to explain why the Mannion decision was inconsistent 
with this argument. It did not. In the context of the challenge made to the offence, 
the conclusion that the offence can be committed in many different ways must mean 
that it can be committed in ways which have nothing to with the destruction or 
concealment of evidence. But the court in Mannion was scrupulous in describing the 
offence, at each point of its analysis, in terms of the destruction of evidence.  
 By 1961 then, far from the offence having settled as described in Harris, there was 
no support in the case law for any understanding of the crime that involved non-
evidence-related conduct. Similarly, there is nothing in the cases which is an 
analytic departure from Hume’s conception of it being criminal to procure 
falsehoods.  Every case is only one leap or development away from an attempt to 
suborn perjury or another established offence against the administration of justice. 
The modern development of the offence 
 By the 1980s, however, it is clear that a broad understanding of the crime had 
become common. In Fletcher v Tudhope,85 the Appeal Court dismissed without 
giving reasons a plea to the relevancy of a charge of perverting the course of justice. 
Fletcher had been charged on that he did “encourage and assist” a man in evading 
officers who had been summoned to a public house to arrest him. The charge ends 
by explaining that Fletcher did this “with the intention of perverting the course of 
justice and [he] did attempt to pervert the course of justice”. 
 All we have is Sheriff Lockhart’s report to the Appeal Court on the plea to the 
relevancy, which he repelled at trial. The argument for the appellant was that, it not 
being a crime to run away from the police – Gordon was cited as authority for this86 
– and it not being a crime to induce someone to do something non-criminal – again, 
as if it were needed, Gordon was cited as authority87 – then it could not be a crime to 
assist someone to run away from the police. The Crown Office library had a copy of 
Gordon’s Criminal Law as well, however, and the prosecutor cited his statement 
                                                          
85 Fletcher v Tudhope, 1984 S.C.C.R. 267. 
86 Gordon (2nd ed), p 1084, although the footnote to this paragraph does mention the “protean crime” of 
attempting to pervert. 
87 Gordon (2nd ed), p 1076. It is a testament to the scope of the text and the imagination of its author that such 
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that “in recent years, […] attempt to pervert or defeat the course of justice has come 
to be regarded as a particular known crime”.88 This is only barely authority for the 
idea that attempting to pervert the course of justice is a crime and tells the court 
nothing about the central question of whether the facts in question amount to that 
crime, however described. It is also ignores the doubts about this development 
expressed by the author earlier in his book.89 
 From this statement and, apparently, without any analysis of the case law discussed 
above, the prosecution felt able to submit that the nomen juris which had become 
attached to this offence during the middle years of the 20th century was now to be 
regarded as a complete description of the elements of the offence, with nothing 
more needing to be said: 
“It was submitted that it is now recognised as criminal to attempt to pervert the 
course of justice and the question here was whether the facts specified 
amounted to such an attempt. 
[…] 
The procurator fiscal submitted that there were two questions here, namely, (1) 
was there a course of justice, and (2) was there an attempt to pervert it being 
followed?”90 
This is undoubtedly true, but does not take us far: the question whether someone 
has attempted to pervert the course of justice can be answered by examining 
whether that person attempted to pervert the course of justice. 
 It is regrettable that the Appeal Court did not produce a decision in this appeal since 
the reasoning of the sheriff in repelling the plea is nowhere set out in his note. A 
number of questions are left unaddressed. Is this decision intended to conflict with 
or adjust the principle that an accused is entitled to evade the police? If it does not, 
is this scenario an exception, somehow, to the rule that it is not criminal to assist 
someone in a non-criminal act? Most of the previous judgments suggested at least 
some connection with the crimes relating to evidence that might (or might be able to 
be) one day be led at trial. Is this any element of this decision? It is hard to see how 
it could be, since whether the accused was arrested or not, he would be entitled to 
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stay silent, both during investigation and at trial: no evidence is at stake. His being 
arrested, or not arrested, strikes at the possibility of a trial entirely, rather than at 
any particular piece of evidence involved in that trial, or at the range of possible 
outcomes at trial. Only the procedures of criminal justice are disrupted, not the 
substance of a trial or proof. Why is there no reference to the offence of wasting 
police time? If a person is entitled to attempt to evade arrest, then the worst that 
perhaps can be said for that person’s assistants is that they have seriously 
inconvenienced the police. 
 A decision was given by the Appeal Court in McElhinney v Normand.91 The 
appellant was charged with assisting a man to evade apprehension, knowing that he 
was being pursued by police officers. No evidence of the petition warrant under 
which the police were pursuing the man was led at trial and so McElhinney 
appealed. The court focused on the question of when the course of justice began, 
and whether answering this question properly required the presentation at trial of 
the warrant. They concluded that it did not. The only analysis of the content of the 
charge is to note the similarity with the facts in Fletcher and to observe that the 
court felt able to dismiss that appeal without giving a decision. The focus is on 
whether there was a course of justice and, if so, whether it has been deliberately 
interfered with, not whether the sorts of interference that are criminal are in any 
way limited by behaviour, or whether the facts of the case fell within those 
categories of behaviour. 
 In McFarlane v Jessop,92 an appeal was taken against a charge of perverting the 
course of justice which narrated that two police officers had falsely charged 
someone with a breach of the peace and prepared a false report to the procurator 
fiscal relating to this. The appropriateness of the charge was not commented on. 
Obviously, any attempt to frame a person for a crime, particularly one made by 
police officers, would perforce involve the fabrication of evidence or the preparation 
of false testimony. 
 Johnstone v Lees93 from 1995 contained the most explicit confirmation yet that this is 
a crime of pure intention, with no requirement for the acts involved to relate to 
evidence. Johnstone was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice by 
replying to a summary complaint not simply by pleading not guilty (as he was 
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entitled to do) but also – and falsely – stating in his reply that he knew nothing 
about the offence. The court clearly had some sympathy for the indignant 
Johnstone, calling the charge “unusual” and hoping that “some latitude” might be 
given to people who complete such forms without legal advice. But the court was 
nevertheless clear that the charge amounted to an offence in Scotland: 
“[T]he assertion that somebody who puts information on the form with the 
intention of dissuading the prosecutor from taking further proceedings against 
him cannot be guilty of the crime of attempting to pervert the course of justice 
seems to us to be untenable.”94 
 On one reading the court has shown its hand here: it seems to be saying that 
because lying to prosecutors is bad that this simply must be a crime, no reasoning 
required. But it cannot be that simply seeking to dissuade a prosecutor from 
charging you is criminal: people are entitled to a defence and to put a prosecutor to 
the test, and a range of behaviour is protected by (in some cases, positively required 
by) the law to facilitate this. The Lord Justice General concludes that “it all depends 
what the intention was with which the form was completed, and that in the end 
depends upon the inferences which can properly be drawn in the light of the 
evidence.”95 It is the intention of the accused that is all-important. But nowhere does 
the court address, as might be thought to be necessary in a plea to the relevancy, 
what that intention must be. If “it all depends” on a certain type of intention, one 
would expect the court to be able to describe that intention. The reference, common 
in earlier cases, to evil intention has disappeared, replaced with what seems like a 
bare but specific intention to commit the crime in question. However, the statement 
that “it all depends” on intention confirms what we suspected: the only necessary 
element of the offence is intention. 
 The only two cases that appear to have been cited to the court – Dalton and Waddell 
v MacPhail96 – are not exactly on point, both having the sort of connection to the 
gathering and preparation of evidence for investigation or trial that was typical of 
earlier charges of perverting the course of justice. It is hard to see how stating that 
you “know nothing” of a charge could ever colourably be connected to evidence 
which could be given at trial. Johnstone would have been entitled not to give 
evidence. Simply saying that you know nothing of a charge is hardly much of an 
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advance on the bare denial that a plea of not guilty amounts to, and the court 
accepted that the accused was entitled to plead not guilty.97 It is scarcely even a false 
alibi, containing no specific alternative claims. It would not have wasted the police’s 
time for more than the second it took to read, since it was incapable of providing 
any misleading lines of enquiry that they might feel required to pursue. In his 
commentary on this appeal, Gordon says that “we have virtually created a crime of 
making false statements to officials with intent to pervert the course of justice”.98 
This is a comment that only makes sense if you don’t already think that anything 
done with such an intent is, in law, criminal. 
 All we are left with is the centrality of intention and the name of the crime. Since no 
opinion was produced in Fletcher, this case is the best candidate for leading 
authority for this proposition: the crime of attempting to pervert the course of justice 
can be committed by doing any act with the intention to pervert the course of 
justice, whatever is meant by that. 
Wasting police time 
 The offence of wasting police time has such a close relationship to perverting the 
course of justice that it is necessary to consider its development alongside these 
cases. 
 Hume considered it a crime to make a false accusation that a particular, named 
individual had committed a crime. He considers it not in his chapters on offences 
against the course of justice but in the chapter ‘of offences against reputation’.99 It is 
clear from his discussion of the offence, and especially the focus given to the naming 
of an identifiable individual, that the calumny involved in the crime was damaging 
someone’s reputation, not misusing the institutions of criminal justice. The chapter 
covers other offences with the same justification, including the slandering of judges, 
casting aspersions on the King’s character, and moving jealousy between the King 
and his nobles. 
 Hume recognises that there are wrongs involved in a false accusation of criminality 
that go beyond damage to reputation. Of calumnious pursuit (meaning 
‘prosecution’) of a crime, he says: 
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“The wrong in such a case is not a pure slander, or injury to fame, but also in 
some sense a real injury, as tending to endanger the accused in law, and put 
him in fear of the issue.”100 
 When the offence simply consists of an accusation, orally or writing, rather than an 
attempted prosecution, Hume calls this calumnious information of a crime and 
accepts that it is a “sort of slander” often better suited to being pursued in the civil 
courts.101 The relevant part of the major proposition in an indictment narrated by 
Hume describes an offence of “the wilful and malicious slandering and detracting 
from the fame, good name and reputation of any of her Majesty’s lieges”.102 Writing 
before anything resembling modern policing existed in Scotland,103 it would have 
been impossible for Hume to justify the offence by reference to a waste of police 
time, but there is no focus even on the improper use of the courts or the waste of 
their time, or on the conception of the course of justice he relies on in his later 
chapters on perjury and subornation of perjury.  
 The modern offence, by contrast, is uninterested in the identity of the person 
wrongfully accused, or even if there is a person wrongfully accused at all.  It is 
committed by giving the police any false information, the mental element is the 
knowledge that the story is untrue, and the justification is the need to protect the 
police from wasteful investigations into false stories. It is hard to see the connection 
with the offence as described by Hume. 
 To start with, there is no need for an individual to be named, and therefore for there 
to be the possibility of any injury to their reputation. In Kerr v Hill104 a bus driver 
falsely alleged that a rival company’s bus had hit a cyclist. No person was named, 
and on appeal it was argued that “a false accusation against someone was essential 
for the commission of the offence”. Lord Morison tried his best to square the facts 
with the offence, telling the petitioner that: 
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“I do not agree with that argument, because it sufficiently appears that the 
suggested criminal or criminals could easily have been ascertained.”105 
It is true that a category or description of person who did exist was identified 
(drivers of rival buses) and may have fallen under suspicion. 
 The Lord Justice General had no such qualms about adherence to principle, and 
provided an entirely new justification for the criminalisation of this behaviour. He 
stated: 
“In my opinion, the giving to the police of information known to be false, for the 
purpose of causing them to institute an investigation with a view to criminal 
proceedings, is in itself a crime. 
Great injury and damage may be caused to the public interest, which is mainly 
to be regarded, by a false accusation, although no individual is named or 
pointed at by the informer. A charge which is perfectly general, and leaves the 
public at large open to suspicion, does nevertheless constitute a crime if it is 
falsely made.”106 
The interest protected by this offence has moved from being the reputation of the 
individual to the risk caused to the public at large by the making of a false 
accusation. A false accusation, though general, could lead to the system of justice 
producing an incorrect or unjust outcome: what if someone ended up being 
prosecuted for the invented crime? The justification for the offence is based on the 
importance of the course of justice following its proper path, but because of the risk 
to the public of an incorrect outcome, not necessarily because of the risk of waste or 
misuse of institutional actors in the justice system following from their being misled. 
 Lord Fleming is even bolder: 
“The case might perhaps have been charged as a false accusation of crime. It 
was, however, charged as making a false statement to the police, and so causing 
them to devote their time and service to the investigation of that false statement. 
The nomen juris of a charge is, however, immaterial. I am prepared to hold that, 
if a person maliciously makes a statement, known to be false, to the police 
authorities, with the intention and effect of causing them to make inquiries into it, he 
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commits a criminal offence. It is immaterial that no particular person or persons 
are pointed at in the false statement.”107 
This justification for the offence does not mention the risk to the public of coming 
under suspicion from a non-particularised accusation of criminality. The offence is 
committed when the criminal authorities are set in motion, regardless of any risk of 
causing an unjust outcome.  
 By the time that Gray v Morrison108 was decided, in 1954, it seems that the crime 
could be committed by almost any lie given to the police, regardless of the riskiness 
or possible consequences of the lie. Mr Gray refused a lift home from a friend by 
pretending that he had a bicycle.109 When his persistent friend could find no bicycle, 
Mr Gray ended up reporting a theft to the police in order to maintain his story. For 
this, the sheriff-substitute at Berwickshire sentenced him to 14 days’ imprisonment. 
 Mr Gray pled guilty, and the appeal was against sentence alone. The complaint had 
alleged that our hero: 
“did cause officers of the Berwick, Roxburgh and Selkirk Constabulary, 
maintained at the public expense for the public benefit, to devote their time and 
service in the investigation of said false story told by you and did temporarily 
deprive the public of the services of said officers, and did render the lieges 
liable to suspicion and to accusations of theft.” 
 There are three wrongs described, two of which (devoting police time to a folly; 
denying police resources to more productive efforts) are focused on the protection 
of justice institutions, and one of which (rendering others liable to suspicion) is 
concerned with the risk of unjust outcomes. The Lord Justice General confirms that 
the core of the crime is giving information, known to be false, to the police causing 
them to begin an investigation. The risk to others of falling under suspicion is not 
essential. 
 The investigation embarked on in Gray v Morrison was, presumably, nugatory 
rather than wasteful and even the Lord Justice General describes the lie involved as 
“more foolish than malicious”.110 Mr Gray even tried to dissuade the police from 
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conducting an investigation. The only thing we are left with is that the appellant 
knew his words to be false and – even without a specific intention that they should 
result in an investigation – the police investigated. There need not even be a 
theoretical possibility of suspicion falling on someone. Unless we assume that there 
are some falsehoods which the police would entirely ignore – a claim of an alien 
invasion perhaps (though presumably even these would require some minor effort 
on the part of officers to consider, and dismiss) – then have we effectively 
criminalised knowingly lying to the police for any purpose, however blameless or 
understandable the motive?111 
 The offence – if indeed we are dealing with the development of the criminal law, 
rather than a distinct criminalisation – has moved from being one of damaging 
reputation by making a false accusation of crime, to risking injustice by making a 
false accusation, to wasting the police’s time by lying. This is not simply the 
justification for an offence evolving in accordance with society’s expectations of the 
criminal law; as we can see from Kerr v Hill and Gray v Morrison, behaviour that 
would not be criminal under one justification is caught by another. 
Relationship between perverting the course of justice and wasting police time 
 While the offence of making a false allegation, or wasting police time, may not 
always have shared a character with offences against the course of justice, it now 
does so. In Harris, the appellant drove another’s car past speed cameras with the 
intention of causing the registered keeper to be prosecuted: a charge which might 
have been one of wasting police time by making a false accusation. Again, it seems 
likely that the prosecutors chose the wider charge rather than the more specific one 
out of anxiety about the novelty of the method employed by Harris: did fabricating 
a scenario where another would likely be charged amount to a false accusation? 
Could you waste the police’s time in the way you choose to commit an offence 
yourself?112 The pattern identified in Dalton and Martin repeats itself: rather than 
confront liminal questions about the proper scope of a nominate offence concerned 
with the course of justice, the broader proposition that everything which obstructs 
the course of justice is criminal is preferred. 
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 Wasting police time is now typically covered in the literature as one of the offences 
against the course of justice.113 This is right. There are two concerns expressed about 
behaviour which wastes police time which we also can see in perverting the course 
of justice: the public interest in protecting justice institutions from waste and effort 
caused by falsehood, and the possibility of those justice institutions being used to 
secure an improper outcome, in this case the conviction of an innocent person. 
 The development of the offence 
Answers to the questions raised by Harris 
 The decision in Harris raised three questions about the development of the offence 
of perverting the course of justice: when was it created, by whom, and how? The 
court’s incomplete and unsatisfying answers were: before 1961, we do not know, 
and it does not matter. In fact, the court’s overall conclusion was that none of these 
questions mattered when answering the principal challenge before it, that the 
offence did not exist. 
 Turning first to the answer ‘before 1961’, if the position set out in the decision is that 
the offence can be committed in ways which have no relation to the prevention of 
evidence being properly led in court, then that answer cannot be correct. The four 
main cases before that year – Scott, Dalton, Kenny, and Mannion – all concerned 
behaviour which sought to prevent evidence being known to the prosecution or led 
at trial. Scott, Dalton and Kenny concerned attempts made to threaten, intimidate or 
otherwise dissuade someone who should give evidence or give statements to the 
police from doing so. Parallels with the subornation of perjury can be made. In an 
investigation or trial, silence in the face of a duty to speak to a fact is as false (in a 
relevant sense) as an explicit lie. Attempting to induce that silence, even by bringing 
about the absence of the person with a duty to speak, is qualitatively 
indistinguishable to attempting to induce a lie. In each case a different technical 
reason was advanced for the argument that the charge could not be attempted 
subornation. In Scott and Dalton, the attempts related to criminal investigations that 
could lead to a trial, rather than a trial. Kenny went further, the threat being made 
there without a trial even being in contemplation. In each case, however, the courts 
produced opinions that focused on the elimination of prospective or possible 
evidence, and that being done for the purpose of perverting the course of justice.  
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 Even in Mannion, which did not relate to the possible evidence of another (so there 
could be no question of subornation) but rather to the evidence of the accused 
themselves, the court was at pains to explain the offence using the elimination of 
evidence as the central idea: it was taking steps to prevent evidence being available 
that was the crime, and perverting the course of justice the intent required by law. 
 So up until 1961 there are two principal extensions of the criminal law demonstrated 
by the cases. The first is that as well as it being criminal to induce people to give 
false evidence at trial it is criminal to induce people to give false testimony to 
officials in the investigative processes leading up to trials, or potential trials. The 
second is that as well as it being criminal to take steps to prevent the evidence of 
others being led as trial, it is criminal to take steps to prevent yourself being 
required to give evidence. Both of these developments are consistent with Hume’s 
proposition that that all practices to procure false evidence are punishable. Even to 
the extent that they amount to the imaginative or unexamined development of the 
law in this area, they are not the sort of bold or unpredictable development that 
requires the declaratory power of the High Court of Justiciary to have been 
engaged. 
 While the Crown submitted – and the court accepted – in 1984 in Fletcher v 
Tudhope that any behaviour intended to interfere with a course of justice was 
sufficient,114 the first reported case where the accused’s conduct lacks any 
connection to the elimination of evidence (with a decision of the court which 
analyses that conduct in such terms) is Johnstone v Lees, from 1995.115  
 It is therefore suggested that, if it is possible to identify when the offence of 
perverting the course of justice expanded in the way addressed in H.M. Advocate v 
Harris, it is probably better to identify that as having occurred some time between 
1961 and 1995, rather than earlier. 
 Turning to the question of by ‘whom’, if we accept that an expansion did take place 
between the time of the institutional writers and either 1961 and 1995, there can only 
be one answer: the criminal courts of Scotland, and more specifically the High Court 
of Justiciary Appeal Court. Whether the declaratory power was used or not, in the 
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absence of legislative intervention the development of the criminal law is the 
responsibility of that court. 
 The only question left is the legal basis for that development: was this normal 
maturation of the criminal law in Scotland, something more radical, or even 
something in some way illegitimate? As far as ‘how’ is answered by ‘it does not 
matter’, we must accept that this is correct for the purposes of an Article 7 challenge. 
Article 7 only requires that the criminal law conform to the principle of legality, that 
offences are capable of description with sufficient precision, and that any 
development of the law by the courts is foreseeable and principled.116 In this respect, 
then, no challenge to the legitimacy of an offence’s creation matters, if at the time of 
the accused’s conduct, the use of the offence in the way it was applied to the 
offender was foreseeable. Even an abnormal development in the criminal law, or 
one illegitimate ab initio, can be cured by use, as far as an Article 7 challenge is 
concerned.117 
 It is nevertheless worth analysing what we can say about the offence’s development, 
and how it fits within the norms of criminalisation in Scots law, since it would assist 
our understanding of the offence as it is currently constituted. If the development of 
the offence does not amount to an unacknowledged use of the declaratory power, 
then we must be looking at new ways of committing old offences, at expansions (to 
fit a changing society) of existing modes of criminality. I should therefore begin with 
the content of, and justifications for, these old offences: how has the law of evidence 
changed, and what effect should that have on the ways in which a person can 
commit subornation? Which of the new forms of criminal disposal have the 
characteristics required to engage the law of prison-breaking? Conversely, if we are 
satisfied that the court was, in cases like Mannion and Martin, criminalising new 
categories of behaviour altogether, the questions would be different: what 
characteristics do these new forms of behaviour (which we know can be charged as 
                                                          
116 See, for example, SW v United Kingdom; CR v United Kingdom (1995)  21 EHRR 363 (challenge to 
‘retrospective’ criminalisation of marital rape). 
117 See also H.M. Advocate v L, 2009 S.L.T. 127 at 132 per Lord Wheatley, where the challenge was to the 
accessibility of the law of incest, which dated from the 16th Century and, ex facie, required the interpretation 
of Verse 17 of the 18th Chapter of Leviticus: “… we were satisfied that there was no difficulty in 
understanding either the law or the text. There was clear authority in the textbooks available at the material 
time this offence was committed, and the appropriate legal advice from a competent source would have 
presented no difficulty to the respondent had he inquired about the legitimacy of his conduct.” 
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perverting the course of justice) have, and what does that tell us about the elements 
of this new offence and therefore the exercise of the power?  
An unacknowledged exercise of the declaratory power 
 There have been, since the time of the institutional writers, a range of offences 
which protect the course of justice. Each has a separate historical origin, and each 
protects a different part of the course of justice in a different way. As the justice 
system developed in Scotland, each responded in a different way. The primacy of 
parole evidence in Scottish courts, for example, has been resilient throughout the 
20th century, even against considerable statutory law-making in this respect. The 
development of the law of perjury therefore, has been relatively measured: as the 
rules on competency and relevance changed, the law of perjury adapted to those 
changes.118  
 In respect of other offences against the course of justice, such flexibility has proved 
more difficult. What a course of justice looked like in Hume’s time is very different 
to what a 20th century course of justice looked like.119 In the 1790s, the role of 
publicly-funded official investigators, with special powers of investigation and 
arrest, was almost non-existent; the forms and forums of criminal procedure very 
different; the range of disposals available to the court less numerous but more 
severe. It seems that, without police investigators and with criminal trials consisting 
exclusively of parole evidence, the range of crimes described in Hume was, at that 
time, sufficient to provide complete, start-to-finish protection to the course of justice, 
from its initial stages to its determination and execution. By the mid-20th century 
however the form which the course of justice could take, and the range of human 
activity caught by the course of justice, had expanded. In particular, the role of the 
police and public prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of crime had 
become central. How was the criminal law of Scotland to respond to this? 
 In his dissent in Bernard Greenhuff, which at least in part contains a sound 
exposition of the law concerning development of offences absent the use of the 
declaratory power, Lord Cockburn described the role of the criminal courts when 
presented with exactly this problem: how to adapt old law to new facts and to 
                                                          
118 See Gordon (4th ed), at paras 55.13 to 55.16 for an account of the offence of perjury’s relationship to the 
law on relevancy and competency. 
119 See paras 6.1 to 6.38, infra, for what is meant by a ‘course of justice’. 
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ensure that obviously criminal behaviour didn’t escape the scope of the law simply 
because of its novelty: 
“I may only say at present, that I am far from holding that the Court can never 
deal with any thing as a crime, unless there be a fixed nomen juris for the 
specific act, or unless there be a direct precedent. An old crime may certainly be 
committed in a new way; and a case, though never occurring before in its facts, 
may fall within the spirit of a previous decision, or within an 
established general principle. And such is the comprehensiveness of our 
common law, that it is no easy matter for any newly invented guilt to escape 
it.”120 
 The courts could have responded to the challenge of the 20th century by adapting the 
range of existing offences to the rapidly-developing criminal justice system, by 
identifying the broader “spirit” of the decisions concerning subornation or by more 
creatively analysing the “general principle” lying behind the offences against the 
administration of justice. They could even have done so with a mind to maintain the 
“comprehensiveness of our common law”, it being obviously desirable that the 
offences designed to protect the course of justice should keep pace with the 
development of, and expanded understanding of, the course of justice. If the totality 
of the course of justice was protected by the offences set out by Hume, should the 
reach of the criminal law not expand to ensure that this remains the case?  
 It would have been in keeping with such a principle for the courts to decide in Scott, 
Dalton, or Kenny that the offences of destroying evidence, procuring false evidence 
or of attempted subornation of perjury could be committed in respect of police 
investigations. The premise could have been that the purpose of such investigations 
was to establish whether court proceedings should be initiated, to gather evidence 
for use in court and to provide prosecutors with the evidence they might expect to 
come out at trial. This would not have done any particular damage to the law of 
attempt, or to the offences concerned. Similarly, Martin might only be a recognition 
that the offence of prison-breaking was intended to ensure that sentences were seen 
through in full, not evaded, and as the manner in which a sentence was served 
evolved, so too did the ways in which prison-breaking could be committed.  
 In this way, the virtue of the “comprehensiveness” of Scots criminal law, which in 
this context means the comprehensive protection of as much of the course of justice 
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as the law has an interest in protecting, might have been achieved. But this is not 
what happened. 
 Instead, a new crime was created to cover new behaviour; the bases of the criminal 
law expanded, not simply its breadth. Perhaps in Hume’s time the criminal law did 
catch everything which was then capable of perverting the course of justice, but it 
was not a crime to do anything which perverted the course of justice. That X and Y 
are criminal because Z does not make it criminal to seek Z: 
“To treat an act as a species of genus of crime is not, it is submitted, the same as 
to treat it as a new way of committing an old crime. 
Hypnotising someone to drown himself would be a crime because it would be a 
new way of committing murder [a crime against the person], not because it 
would be a species of the genus of crimes against the person.”121 
 Of course, the expanded ways of obstructing the course of justice that became 
possible as our justice system developed might have been protected in other ways. If 
a general offence of misleading the police, for example, is to be created, the logical 
place to find it, and the appropriate way to do it, would be in the legislation 
establishing the police and regulating the public’s interaction with the police. 
Certain specific falsehoods are criminal when given to the police in certain contexts: 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 13,122 an offence that looks a little bizarre 
if even the most trivial lie told to the police is otherwise criminalised. A general 
offence of lying to police could easily have been created at the same time, but 
wasn’t: “where Parliament fears to tread it is not for the courts to rush in”.123 It 
might be seen as a usurpation of the function of Parliament for the courts to step in 
to complete the task of reflecting changes to the justice system in the criminal laws; 
to prevent gaps occurring in the law’s protection of the course of justice when the 
nature of that course is itself changed by legislation. 
 The traditional critique of radical judicial expansion of the scope of the criminal law, 
and of the declaratory power specifically, is that it does not conform to the principle 
of legality.124 The principle of legality might have been compromised by the 
                                                          
121 Gordon (3rd ed), para 1.36. 
122 Containing the power of a constable who has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has 
committed or is committing an offence to have certain questions answered. 
123 Lord Reid’s dissent in Shaw v D.P.P. [1962] A.C. 220 at 275. 
124 For example, Gordon (3rd ed), para 1.16. 
WHAT WAS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
40 
 
development of perverting the course of justice, if what we are dealing with is truly 
retrospective criminalisation. But is it really the case that the High Court was 
declaring things to be crimes which weren’t criminal at the time they were done? Or 
is the objection more subtle: that the manner in which the High Court declared them 
to be crimes seems doubtful, rather than the fact that certain behaviour was 
criminalised at all? I have shown how Scott, for example, might have been 
understood as a decision concerning the law of attempted subornation and how 
Martin is really a decision concerning the offence of prison-breaking. Instead, they 
have come to be considered decisions about a discrete offence of perverting the 
course of justice. In many cases of perverting the course of justice what we are 
considering is not truly a case of non-criminal behaviour being retrospectively 
declared to be so; it is a case of behaviour which might have been criminal on one 
basis being declared to be criminal on a different, at that point unknown, unnamed 
basis. As far as the most common methods of committing the offence of perverting 
the course of justice – evidence tampering, or witness intimidation – there is no 
reason to conclude that the declaratory power was used. The court was resolving a 
grey area in the law. That it did so by adopting a new nomen juris rather than 
utilising existing means of describing crimes does not change the substance of what 
was being done: behaviour already arguably contemplated by the criminal law was 
confirmed to be within its scope. 
 But the High Court has held explicitly that the offence is not restricted to the 
elimination of evidence. What is the basis for criminalising this behaviour? Gordon 
calls this an extension of the criminal law “without explicit reference to the 
declaratory power”.125 I have set out the case for there being an unacknowledged 
use of the declaratory power, at some point between 1946 and 1995, in respect of 
acts intended to pervert the course of justice but which do not involve tampering 
with or destroying evidence, or intimidating witnesses. If Mannion is not the first 
demonstration of this in 1961, then Johnston v Lees demonstrates that it was 
orthodoxy by 1995. That the court in Harris was directly asked whether the 
declaratory power was used and refused to answer the question seems almost to 
confirm that it was. Presumably, if there were a clear basis for criminalising non-
evidence-related conducted that could be traced backwards through the case law 
without resort to the declaratory power, then the court would have articulated it.  
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 But does the extension of the criminal law even in this way really contravene the 
principle of legality, as it may have applied before the incorporation into domestic 
law of Article 7 and since? Gordon acknowledges that the principle of legality “has 
much less cogency when applied to acts which arouse wide and strong disapproval. 
A good part of the strength of the principle relies on the assumption that had the 
accused known his act was criminal he would not have acted as he did”.126 Is 
perverting the course of justice the sort of thing that people should not do, therefore 
it is against the law, or is it the sort of thing that people should not do because it is 
against the law? It is hard, to put it plainly, to feel particularly sorry for any of the 
accused who were the subjects of the criminal law’s extension into non-evidence-
related perversions of the course of justice.127 The course of justice is worth 
protecting from harm, and people who decide to interfere with it will have difficulty 
claiming that they had no expectation that their behaviour was the subject of the 
criminal law. Even the declaratory power, it is worth reminding ourselves, was in 
law limited to being used where behaviour was obviously “wrong”, “wicked”, or 
“grossly immoral and mischievous”,128 or at least to whatever behaviour met that 
test in the eyes of the High Court at any particular point.  
 We may now regard the declaratory power as itself an infringement of the principle 
of legality, and it is considered to be unusable in practice following the 
incorporation of Article 7 into domestic law.129 But it was part of our law during the 
period I have identified as most likely containing the creation of the new offence. It 
would have been best for the court to explicitly acknowledge that the power was 
being used, if for no other reason that this might have encouraged them to set out 
more clearly the elements of the offence, but there is no authority for the proposition 
that the court must state that it is using the declaratory power in order for it to be 
                                                          
126 Gordon (3rd ed), para 1.16. 
127 With the exception, in relation to wasting police time, of the over-polite Mr Gray (para 3.66, supra), 
whose offence Sir Gerald calls “perhaps the least heinous in the whole history of the common law”: (Gordon 
(3rd ed), para 1.37. 
128 Bernard Greenhuff, (1838) 2 Swin. 236. Consider also the reasons given by the court in John Ballantyne, 
(1859) 3 Irv. 352 at 359 to 360) for not invoking the declaratory power to criminalise the celebration of a 
clandestine marriage: “it is difficult to imagine anything less answering the description of malum in se, than 
the mere non-observance, or wrongful and unauthorised use, of a form or ceremony which is required for 
the sake of decency and order, but the omission or wrongful and unauthorised use of which is followed by 
no injurious consequences to person or property, and constitutes no distinct or palpable violation of public 
morals.” 
129 Gordon (3rd ed), para 1.43. 
WHAT WAS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
42 
 
lawfully used. In Strathern v Seaforth,130 for example, clandestine temporary taking 
was declared criminal, though clearly outwith the elements of theft, without the 
court admitting to the use of the power. In fact, it is more common in the 20th 
century for the court to maintain a prudential ambiguity over its use of the power 
than to face up to it.131 We may prefer that the court tell us what it is doing, but it 
cannot infringe our rules of recognition to give legal effect – even retrospective legal 
effect – to a power that the court lawfully has.132 It is hard to categorise completely 
the complaint Gordon makes about the development of perverting the course of 
justice: is it that the declaratory power was used incorrectly; or that the declaratory 
power was used without being acknowledged; or was it simply that the power was 
used at all?133 If Gordon thought that acknowledging the power was being used was 
a condition precedent of its legitimate use he would have said so; but did not. 
 Despite the amount written about the declaratory power, it is difficult to find many 
cases where judges have described what they are doing as a use of the declaratory 
power.134 Farmer identifies three modes adopted by the Scottish courts other than an 
explicit use of the declaratory power: implicit criminalisation while denying the use 
of the power, declining to use the power explicitly, and “perhaps also the most 
common” saying nothing about it “although giving rise to a strong presumption 
that it is using the power”.135 There is a common, normative claim that the Scottish 
courts may declare things to be crimes and a resulting tendency to try to categorise 
developments in Scots criminal law into two discrete categories: (normal) 
incremental, gradual development by analogy and principle, and (abnormal) use of 
the declaratory power, acknowledged or unacknowledged. But a descriptive 
account of the development of the criminal law over the last 150 years would 
                                                          
130 Strathern v Seaforth, 1926 J.C. 100. 
131 For example, McLaughlan v Boyd, 1934 J.C. 19, H.M. Advocate v Wilson, 1984 S.L.T. 117, or Khaliq v 
H.M. Advocate, 1984 J.C. 23.  
132 Called “legality within the system” in Farmer, L., Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1997) at p 25, where the author seeks to describe the Scottish approach to the principle of legality 
rather than impose an external idea of legality on Scots criminal law, and inevitably find it wanting. 
133 Gordon regards the objection as logical, not legal: “there is in fact no sign of any dangerous setting up by 
the Court of itself as the guardian of the public interest; its bark in this matter is worse than its bite, and 
even its bark is not very explicit. But the practice of exercising the declaratory power while not appearing to 
do so – and indeed disclaiming the intention of doing so – by confusing specific crimes with the groups to 
which they belong, or with the reasons for their being made crimes, is logically objectionable and contains in 
itself the seeds of abuse”: Gordon (PhD Thesis), p 39. 
134 Bernard Greenhuff, (1838) 2 Swin. 236 is the best (and perhaps the only) modern example. 
135 Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, p 24. 
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provide few examples of developments that fall neatly into these two categories. Far 
more common is the sort of story shown by the development of perverting the 
course of justice, which falls in a third, intermediate category of development: 
expansion that is not quite a full-throated or undeniable new criminalisation, but 
nor is it a cautious or incremental application of precedent.  
 The way in which perverting the course of justice developed is not exceptional in 
Scottish criminal law, and may even represent the core of the tradition.136 For 
example, the trial judge in Stallard v H.M. Advocate specifically denied that the 
declaratory power was required to criminalise rape in marriage, but the celebrated 
judgment of the appeal court did not engage with the question, presumably 
deliberately.137 The disapplication of the marital rape exemption was justified by the 
court as reflecting a change in society relevant to the definition of the offence: “by 
the second half of the twentieth century […] the status of women, and the status of a 
married woman, in our law have changed quite dramatically”.138 The “index of 
change” 139 was the developments in the law of marriage, which (to maintain the 
coherence and comprehensiveness of our laws) must, the court held, in some way 
flow through into the law of rape, as far as it concerns marriage: “a live system of 
law will always have regard to changing circumstances to test the justification of 
any exception to the application of a general rule”.140 Given these changes to the law 
of marriage, certain changes were necessary to the law of rape: “Nowadays it cannot 
seriously be maintained that by marriage a wife submits herself irrevocably to 
sexual intercourse”.141 What could easily, in other systems, have become a 
principled question of the rules governing the development of the criminal law is 
                                                          
136 See generally the argument in Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, chapter 2, ‘The genius of our 
law: legality and the Scottish legal tradition’. 
137 Stallard v H.M. Advocate, 1989 S.L.T. 469. 
138 Stallard, at 473.  For a discussion of the judicial criminalisation of marital rape compared with its 
legislative criminalisation, see Fus, T., Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative 
Approaches, 39 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 481 (2006); for a discussion of the criminalisation of marital rape as an 
exemplar of the development of the criminal law in Scotland, see Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, 
at pp 49 to 53. 
139 Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, p 50. 
140 Stallard, at 473. 
141 Ibid. 
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instead transformed into a practical one of how the law must have already 
changed.142  
 The same logic has been applied by the High Court to the development of 
perverting the course of justice; the “index of change” in this case being an 
expansion in the ways in which the justice system interacts with people and the 
development of the ways people can obstruct or interfere with it. Before the law 
gave special rights and status to those officially investigating crime on behalf of the 
state, there may have been very little risk to a trial involved in making misleading 
statements outwith court. But (to use the language of Stallard) “nowadays it cannot 
seriously be maintained that”143 trying to persuade someone to lie to the police 
doesn’t meaningfully involve the procuring of false evidence.  
Conclusions about the development of the offence 
 The development of the offence of perverting the course of justice in Scotland is 
hard to account for definitively. It contains examples of both judges claiming to be 
doing something they are not,144 and claiming not to do something which they are.145 
Despite this indeterminacy, perverting the course of justice is best understood as a 
paradigmatic example of the way that the criminal law of Scotland responds to 
change: 
“By the application of our native methods to our native principles it has proved 
possible … to keep the law sufficiently flexible and elastic to enable a just 
discrimination to be applied to the ascertained facts of each case, and 
sufficiently rigid to prevent proved guilt from escaping the just consequences 
on any mere technicality.”146 
 Rather than seeking to separate out the parts of the offence that were the product of 
an unacknowledged exercise of the declaratory power from those that were not – an 
artificial and unsatisfying exercise – we should instead locate the development of 
                                                          
142 What Farmer calls the elevation of “judgment or adjudication over […] legality or rules”: Criminal Law, 
Tradition and Legal Order, p 42. 
143 See fn 141, supra. 
144 For example, Lord Mackay’s opinion in Dalton: para 3.24, supra. 
145 For example, the claim not to be doing something revolutionary in Mannion, which cannot be right if 
Harris is right: see para 3.44, supra. 
146 Lord Cooper, from the Memorandum of Evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, (1949 – 
1953), p 428.  
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perverting the course of justice alongside the rise and fall of shameless indecency147 
and the expansion and contraction of breach of the peace148 as normal examples of 
the practical flexibility of Scottish criminal law, and a demonstration of that 
flexibility promoting modernity rather than being counterpoised to it.149  
 The challenge in Harris was doomed to fail; not because the assertions made were 
not accurate – they all were – but because they were beside the point. It is almost 
meaningless, under the Scottish approach to the flexibility of the criminal law, to 
attack a crime as having an ‘illegitimate’ origin. That presupposes rules of 
legitimacy which can be applied after the fact to a criminalisation. However the 
rules of legitimacy, as we can see them applied in even modern Scottish criminal 
law, allow broad spectrum of types of development to take place: even explicitly 
allowing (at one point) formal retrospective criminalisation to take place. When a 
system’s own rules take this approach to the principle of legality, what value is 
there in imposing an external standard of legality on individual expressions of the 
system?  
 There would be no difference between saying that the development of perverting 
the course of justice was illegitimate, but nevertheless part of our law, and saying 
that it was not illegitimate. The court in Harris therefore had good reason to say, as 
sententious as it sounds, that “it matters not” whether perverting the course of 
justice’s expansion into non-evidence-related conduct was an unacknowledged 
exercise of the declaratory power. Accepting that the courts have a latitude in 
respect of developing the criminal law that extends to the point of declaring things 
to be offences, it would seem churlish to object to that power being used in the way 
set out. But it can still be regretted that the Lord Justice General’s opinion in Harris 
was short on principle. This was an opportunity to set out why, according to the 
standards of the Scottish criminal common law, developments such as those that 
had been put before the court were mainstream, rather than abnormal. It was an 
opportunity to explain the logical error that had been adopted in trying to challenge 
an offence on the basis that the court had (i) created it, using (ii) a power it had to 
create offences. The judgment is flawed. The same end point could have been 
                                                          
147 See the cases from Watt v Annan, 1978 J.C. 84 to Webster v Dominick, 2005 1 J.C. 65, and Chalmers, J. and 
Gane, C., The aftermath of shameless indecency, S.L.P.Q. 2003, 8(4), 310-315, and Burchell, J. and Gane, C., 
Shamelessness scotched: the domain of decency after Dominick, Edin. L.R. 2004, 8(2), 231-248. 
148 See, for example, Young v Heatly, 1959 JC 66; Wilson v Brown, 1982 SLT 361; and Smith v Donnelly, 2001 
SLT 1007. 
149 See Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, pp 28 to 34. 
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reached without pretending that the law had not substantially expanded over the 
relevant period; and the identification of 1961 as the point at which the offence 
crystallised cannot be reconciled with the cases up to that point, all of which relate 
to the procurement of falsehood.  
 Any doubts about the journey taken could be excused if the destination were good 
once we got there. The decision in Harris, as unsatisfying as parts of its reasoning 
are, at least usefully brings finality to vexing questions about the origins and scope 
of the offence: the court of appeal has authoritatively decided that the offence exists 
and that it can be described to the standards expected of the law. We should 
therefore expect to see, at least in the literature post-dating the decision in Harris 
and (if Harris were right) in much of the post-1961 literature as well, a consensus 
about the elements of the offence. We should expect to see the offence and its 
elements described in both a detailed way and in a way which accords with the 
decision in Harris. If that consensus exists, and if we are able to describe the offence 
as comprehensively as Harris suggests we ought to, then we could conclude that the 
offence has matured, despite a troubled adolescence: we may regard the offence has 
having, finally, crystallised.150 If, however there is no such consensus, or if there 
remain significant and unanswerable questions about the elements of the offence in 
Scots law, perhaps the reason for that is connected to the offence’s difficult birth. 
 I shall therefore now turn to asking what the offence presently is, rather than asking 
how it came to be. 
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 WHAT IS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
 The modern consensus on the offence 
Introduction 
 I have set out some aspects of the development of the offence of perverting the 
course of justice in Scotland that are hard to account for. That is to be expected in a 
system with a largely judge-made criminal law, with only a relatively modern 
tradition of criminal law scholarship and in a jurisdiction whose size means that 
relevant questions about criminal offences (in contrast to questions about criminal 
procedure, perhaps) arise only infrequently.151   
 In this part I will address the consequences of this. The most relevant question is 
whether that sort of development has resulted in any contemporary problems in the 
law. It does not follow that piecemeal development leads to incoherence any more 
than it follows that a comprehensive reconsideration necessarily leads to principled 
and coherent law; but when a system has developed gradually there is more need 
for a comprehensive description of it before such questions can be answered. You 
might expect to see gaps in the questions answered by the law, or features that 
appear to conflict. You might see aspects reflect principles which aren’t applied to 
other parts, depending on the period in which the courts addressed them. Again, it 
does not necessarily follow that coherent law is good law, but incoherent law is 
more likely to demonstrate undesirable features such as a lack of predictability, 
arbitrariness, discriminatory characteristics, or opacity. 
 In this part, I will therefore try to describe, comprehensively, what we know about 
the scope and content of the crime in Scotland today. There is a broad consensus on 
the elements of the offence to be found in modern writing. This consensus can be 
analysed.  Is a complete or predictable description of the offence; does it disclose 
any coherent principle? Is it clear which interests are (and are not) protected by the 
offence? Does the offence, however described, have a sensible place in the wider 
suite of offences concerned with the course of justice, and why has the offence 
proved so resilient? If there are things we cannot say with confidence about the 
scope or content of the offence, do these matter? To the extent that these questions 
                                                          
151 In 1967, Gerald Gordon noted that “[t]here has been no extended discussion of the principles of Scots 
criminal law since Hume’s Commentaries.”: Gordon (1st ed), at pp 3 to 4. The publication of the first edition 
of Gordon marked the beginning of the serious academic consideration of Scots criminal law: Gane, C., ‘Sir 
Gerald Gordon: an Appreciation’, in Chalmers, J. Leverick, F. and Farmer, L. (eds), Essays in Criminal Law in 
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are answerable, I shall set out my conclusions in this part; to the extent that they are 
not, I am only able to raise them, and ask whether a fair criminal law requires them 
to be capable of answer. 
The draft criminal code and the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
 The authors of the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland did not intend radical changes 
to the law.152 When they considered that their draft provisions reflected the existing 
common law, they said so. Of their offence of perverting the course of justice, they 
said, “[it] is an offence at common law to pervert (or to attempt to pervert) the 
course of justice. Section 97 reflects the current law.”153 Their proposed section 97 
read: 
“A person who obstructs or perverts the investigation or prosecution of any 
offence, or does any act calculated to pervert the course of justice, is guilty of 
the offence of perverting the course of justice.” 
 This proposed codification suggests two different (but presumably overlapping) 
ways of committing the offence: obstructing or perverting an investigation or 
prosecution or, separately, doing “any act” with the intention of perverting the 
course of justice. You might have expected these words to read “any other act” 
given that the behaviour caught by the first leg is (possibly entirely) contained 
within the second. The second leg of the proposed offence is not limited in any way 
by reference to the accused’s behaviour: “any act calculated” to pervert is sufficient. 
Precisely what is meant by the verb ‘pervert’ in this context is considered, by the 
authors, to be clear; it is used twice, and with no further definition. What the 
intended distinction between ‘pervert’ and ‘obstruct’ is, if one is intended, 
apparently does not need to be spelt out. 
 In the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, the paragraph headed ‘Conduct amounting to 
attempt to pervert the course of justice’ begins: 
“The crime may consist in any conduct that tends to obstruct or hinder the course 
of justice.”154 
                                                          
152 Clive, E., Ferguson, F., Gane, C., McCall Smith, A., A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, (Edin: Scottish Law 
Commission, 2003), at p 3. 
153 Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, p 169. 
154 Criminal Law (Reissue), para. 470; see paras 7.18 to 7.42, infra, for more on the meaning of ‘tend’ in this 
context, and its applicability to the offence in Scotland. 
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 No case is cited as authority for this proposition, the author instead relying on a 
narration of some of the “wide variety of forms of behaviour” which have been the 
subject of charges.  
 The same is said in the Jury Manual,155 the text prepared to assist the Scottish 
judiciary with the task of charging juries, which notes the practice of charging 
perverting the course of justice in situations where another nominate offence 
appears insufficient.156 
Gordon 
 In his commentary on Harris, Gordon said that this is “an offence with no defined 
actus reus – all that matters is the mens rea”.157 Ten years earlier, in the third edition 
of his book, Gordon was more circumspect.158 While in the introductory remarks, he 
concedes that “attempt to pervert or defeat the course of justice has come to be 
regarded as a particular known crime”,159 in the parts of the chapter which deal with 
offences against the course of justice160 Gordon never directly addresses the 
elements of the crime in the way he does other common law crimes in the same 
book. He scrupulously avoids making the bare claim that any conduct intended to 
pervert the course of justice is sufficient to amount to this crime. Instead, he 
addresses a number of categories of action, each of which is a common subject of a 
charge of this type: destruction of real evidence, procuring false evidence, inducing 
persons to give false information to the police, failure to attend as a witness. For 
each he comments in turn about the extent to which this particular form of 
behaviour amounts to (or is now charged as) an attempt to pervert the course of 
justice.  
 It is striking that the constitutive elements of the offence were addressed only 
inferentially in the major text on the criminal law of Scotland, forty years after the 
crime, according to Harris v H.M. Advocate, cohered. The reason for this may be 
connected to reservations about the development of the offence, which Gordon 
                                                          
155 Judicial Institute for Scotland, Jury Manual, (Edin: Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, 2017). 
156 Jury Manual, at part 40. 
157 H.M. Advocate v Harris, 2010 S.C.C.R. 931 at 944 (commentary). 
158 Gordon (3rd ed), chapter 47. 
159 Gordon (3rd ed), para 47.01; “has come to be regarded” is an atypically oblique way of introducing an 
offence, for the author. 
160 Gordon (3rd ed), paras 47.33 to 47.40. 
WHAT IS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
50 
 
expresses in the general part,161 and to the relatively recent development of the 
offence, which he called “not fully crystallised”.162 Certainly at some point between 
his first writing the chapter on perjury and allied offences and 2010 when, in his 
commentary on Harris he wrote that “there is no dispute that attempt to pervert the 
course of justice is a common law crime”,163 Gordon’s view developed. The only 
thing that changed in the intervening years was the decision in Harris, which does 
not claim to, and cannot be read as, an advancement of the law in any way. It 
explicitly locates the development in the law as having occurred “by 1961”: so what 
is behind Gordon’s change in tone?  
 The challenge made by the appellant in Harris was effectively that the scepticism 
expressed by Gordon in 2000 was right; that the offence’s purported development 
was an unacknowledged and improper use of the declaratory power which should 
be disregarded; that it had a more limited actus reus than the modern cases 
suggested (that is, it required the elimination of evidence). This proposition was 
tested and rejected by the High Court on appeal, in a decision given by the Lord 
Justice General. The questions Gordon asked were answered, and authoritatively. 
There is resignation in his comments about Harris in 2010; an acceptance of 
something unwelcome to the author. But even the fact that Gordon’s acceptance of 
the inevitable took place between 2000 and 2010 is a demonstration of the flimsiness 
of the High Court’s claim that the offence had definitively settled “by 1961”. 
 The fourth edition of the special part of Gordon was published in 2017. The chapter 
on perjury and allied offences has been rewritten, though its opening paragraph still 
calls the development of the offence of perverting the course of justice “not fully 
crystallised”.164  
Textbooks 
 The views of the textbook writers are broadly the same, though few authors address 
the subject head on and most couch their discussion in qualifications: there is a 
crime (or there might be a set of crimes) called something like “attempting to 
pervert the course of justice”, constituted by an act the purpose of which was to 
pervert the course of justice, and in practice a wide range of behaviour is. The 
                                                          
161 Gordon (3rd ed), paras 1.32 to 1.38; see para 1.14, supra. 
162 Gordon (3rd ed), para. 47.01. 
163 Harris, at 943. 
164 Gordon (4th ed), para 55.01.  
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treatment by Gane, Chalmers and Stoddart in their Casebook on Scottish Criminal 
Law is typical.165  The section on “perverting or attempting to pervert the course of 
justice” begins, “[t]his is an offence which is capable of covering a wide range of 
conduct” and goes on to discuss the “commonest examples” of ways to commit the 
offence, without attempting a direct, comprehensive statement of the elements of 
the offence.166  The reader must infer that the offence can be committed by any 
conduct accompanied by the required intention (if the text is intended to 
demonstrate that proposition).  
 In the third edition of his book, in 2011, Sheriff Cubie considered that perverting the 
course of justice was “still coalescing into a crime in its own right” but accepted that 
it was “charged as an offence in a number of circumstances”.167 By 2016 any qualms 
held had evaporated in the face of the decision in Harris: “There can now be no 
doubt about the existence of a nominate crime of attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice”.168  He summarises the substance of the offence: 
“The essence of such a crime is as much the hindering or obstruction of justice 
as it is in the actual defeat or perversion”169 
 Jones and Taggart wonder whether a separate offence of this sort exists at all,170 but 
it is hard to reconcile this statement with the authorities cited: Bernard Greenhuff171 
and H.M. Advocate v Martin.172 
Legislation 
 Perverting the course of justice is increasingly commonly dealt with in legislation as 
a nominate offence. The Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011, s. 2, makes reference 
to the category of “offences against the course of justice” when establishing the 
grounds on which an acquittal may be considered tainted. It defines an “offence 
against the course of justice” as: 
                                                          
165 Gane C., Stoddart C. and Chalmers J., A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law (4th ed), (Edin: W. Green, 2009). 
166 A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law (4th ed), at p  619. 
167 Cubie, A., Scots Criminal Law (3rd ed), (West Sussex: Bloomsbury Professional, 2011), at p 312. 
168 Cubie, A., Scots Criminal Law (4th ed), (West Sussex: Bloomsbury Professional, 2016), at p 310. 
169 Scots Criminal Law (4th ed) at p 309. 
170 Jones, T.H. and Taggart, I., Criminal Law (6th ed), (Edin: W. Green, 2015), at p 357. 
171 Bernard Greenhuff, (1838) 2 Swin. 236. 
172 H.M. Advocate v Martin, 1956 J.C. 1.  
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an offence of perverting, or of attempting to pervert, the course of justice (by 
whatever means and however the offence is described) and— 
(a) includes— 
(i) an offence under section 45(1) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) 
(Scotland) Act 1995 (c.39) (aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or 
suborning the commission of an offence under section 44 of that Act), 
(ii) subornation of perjury, and 
(iii) bribery, 
(b) does not include— 
(i) perjury, or 
(ii) an offence under section 44(1) of that Act (statement on oath which is false 
or which the person making it does not believe to be true). 
 This definition almost treats perverting the course of justice as the umbrella offence, 
of which the others are only examples,173 however it is also clearly drafted on the 
basis that a bare reference to perverting the course of justice would be insufficient or 
at least would give rise to doubt. Subornation of perjury needs to be specifically 
included within the definition and perjury itself specifically excluded, for fear that it 
would be caught if it were not. An offence may even fall within the definition 
without being described as such in the charge. 
 The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 takes the approach of 
grouping perverting the course of justice with other inchoate modes of offending. 
The definition of ‘ancillary offence’ includes art and part involvement, incitement, 
attempt and: 
“(d) perverting, or attempting to pervert, the course of justice in connection 
with an offence; or 
(e) defeating, or attempting to defeat, the ends of justice in connection with an 
offence.”174 
                                                          
173 See paras 6.1 to 6.16, infra, for more about the relationship of the offence to other offences against the 
administration of justice. 
174 Article 23.5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted on 17 July 1998 at 
Rome, requires conduct ancillary to genocide to be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Code. 
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 It is now common for lists of offences, often required in legislation, to include a 
reference to perverting the course of justice.175 Lawmakers plainly recognize the 
offence as a discrete one, but one that very considerably overlaps with – or has a 
special relationship with – other common law offences against the course of justice. 
The modern understanding 
 The accepted modern consensus on perverting the course of justice in Scots law 
seems to be that:  
 it is a separate nominate offence, warranting particular treatment, albeit that 
it overlaps considerably (and in some cases perhaps totally) with other 
offences concerned with the administration of justice; 
 the offence is committed when a person does any act (or at least one of a 
very wide range of acts) with the intention to pervert the course of justice; 
 it can therefore be committed in a near-unlimited number of ways: the law 
may impose no requirements on the character of the conduct capable of 
amounting to the offence; 
 what is meant by perverting the course of justice (and what the required 
intention must be) is, as a result, best demonstrated by giving examples, 
rather than by comprehensive description. 
 The phrase ‘attempt to pervert the course of justice’, I suggest, has no natural or 
ordinary meaning, in the way that the words ‘theft’ or ‘murder’ do. It is not obvious 
what the central idea is; each part requires elucidation before you know what it 
means. Without wanting to adopt too reductive or literal an approach to analysing 
what we know about the offence in Scotland, it is worth looking at each part of the 
phrase separately: what it means to attempt; what a perversion is; and when there 
is, and is not, a course of justice. I will, however, address these slightly out of order.  
 What is a ‘course of justice’? 
Offences against the administration of justice 
 We can learn about what a course of justice is by examining the structure of the 
offences said to be concerned with protecting it. There is nothing unusual about 
                                                          
175 For example, Rehabilitation of Offenders (Exclusions and Exceptions) (Scotland) Amendment Order 2013 
Sch B1, para 3; Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 19A; the Procurement (Scotland) Regulations 
2016, reg. 8(1)(e); or the Licensing (Relevant Offences) (Scotland) Regulations 2007, Sch 1, Part 3, para 47. 
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criminal offences overlapping, nor with an individual criminal offence appearing to 
be only a particular way of committing another, more broadly defined offence. But 
it has been suggested that perverting the course of justice has a special relationship 
to the other offences concerned with the administration of justice. Ferguson and 
McDiarmid wonder if it is a sort of umbrella offence, sitting behind every other 
offence protecting the course of justice: 
“There is some uncertainty in Scots law as to whether there is, in fact, a category 
of crimes against the course of justice or whether there is really only one such 
crime – attempting to pervert the course of justice – and all offences which 
would otherwise fall into this category are really just examples of this. A crime 
like perjury, for example, is also an attempt to prevent the course of justice from 
running its proper course”176 
 The suggestion is bolder than simply that these other offences might all be charged 
as perverting the course of justice, given the apparent breadth of that offence. It is 
that perjury and subornation of perjury, deforcement and prison-breaking – all 
treated separately by Hume and the other institutional writers, before there was any 
suggestion of there being a general offence of perverting the course of justice – are 
merely modes of committing the proto-offence of perverting the course of justice.  
 It does not necessarily follow that because there is a broader offence which captures 
all of the conduct criminalised by any narrower offences that the latter are 
“examples” of the former.177 To the extent that it is meaningful to talk about 
individual criminal offences with discrete qualities (rather than just identifying 
behaviour that has been, through one means or another, criminalised) it is hard to 
agree with Ferguson and McDiarmid’s suggestion. Firstly, it does not seem to 
account for the history. I have shown that a range of nominate, discrete offences 
concerned with protecting the administration of justice existed since at least the time 
of Hume, each with different and particular elements and principles applying to 
them. Later, during the mid-to-late 20th Century, these were supplemented or 
complemented by an offence of perverting the course of justice, developed by 
analogy with (among other offences) the subornation of perjury, but capturing a 
range of behaviour ultimately much wider. The gaps between the nominate offences 
were filled by perverting the course of justice. To suggest that offences which pre-
                                                          
176 Ferguson and McDiarmid, at p 399. 
177 Consider the structure of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. Is rape (s. 1) simply an example of 
sexual assault by penetration (s. 2), which is itself an example of sexual assault (s. 3)? 
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date the advent of perverting the course of justice are simply species of it does not 
properly account for the decisions of the last 70 years.  
 The better account is given by Gordon, who addresses the emergence of the offence 
in the interstices of the other offences against the administration of justice: 
“Perjury and the like have not yet been entirely relegated to the status of being 
only modes of the crime of attempting to defeat the course of justice, and must 
still be considered as separate crimes.”178 
Even Gordon, however, contemplates a future where offences like perjury are 
subsumed into perverting the course of justice. 
 The criminal law proscribes behaviour. It proscribes behaviour for reasons (though 
those reasons may sometimes be opaque, and are often disputed), and it often 
proscribes groups of things for common reasons. Where categories of proscribed 
behaviour share a characteristic or a justification, we may look to that characteristic 
or justification to inform our answers to questions about individual offences within 
that class. So, for example, perjury is an offence because it perverts the course of 
justice by misleading courts and risking them producing incorrect outcomes, or 
outcomes tainted by falsehood. Prison-breaking is an offence because it perverts the 
course of justice by preventing one common type of justice outcome, a custodial 
sentence, from being completed. Both offences are therefore concerned with 
protecting the course of justice. But identifying a shared justification for a group of 
offences is not the same as identifying proscribed behaviour: 
“The common feature which distinguished the group of offences against the 
course of justice was that they all constituted attempts to defeat or pervert the 
course of justice. It does not follow logically from that that any attempt to defeat 
or pervert the course of justice is necessarily a crime”179 
 We cannot reason back from the offences of malicious mischief and fire-raising 
(criminal because they damage property) to a general offence of damaging property. 
In individual cases, the elements of each offence require to be satisfied, and singling 
out particularised modes of behaviour, rather than general or purposive ones, is an 
important way in which we ensure that the criminal law does not over-reach. We do 
not regard murder, culpable homicide, drugging or reckless endangerment as mere 
modes of committing assault, simply because the crime of assault, on one view, is 
                                                          
178 Gordon (4th ed), para 55.01. My emphasis. 
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broad enough to encompass the behaviour also caught by them. There are distinct, 
though connected, reasons for the criminalisation of each, which are reflected in the 
elements of the offence and the body of case law that has built up around each 
offence. 
 The same is true for the offences against the course of justice: the differences 
between the offences matter. The essence of perjury, for example, is wilfully giving 
false evidence on oath or affirmation in judicial proceedings.180  If perjury were 
merely a mode of committing the offence of perverting the course of justice, we 
would expect one of the elements of the mens rea of perjury to be an intention to 
pervert the course of justice. Motive, however, is irrelevant to perjury: a lie told 
wilfully in court for an intention unconnected to the course of justice (for example, 
to cover up embarrassment) would be perjury as much as one told specifically in 
order to influence the outcome of a trial or proof. Unless we consider that the fact of 
intending to lie in court is itself conclusive of an intention to pervert the course of 
justice, there must be modes of committing perjury that are not also attempts to 
pervert the course of justice. In the U.S., where a specific intent to obstruct justice is 
required, it has been held that the simple act of giving false evidence cannot amount 
to obstruction of justice since “the function of a trial is to sift the truth from a mass 
of contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact-finding tribunal must hear both 
truthful and false witnesses”.181 
 Conversely, there may be lies told in court that are not perjury but are attempts to 
pervert the course of justice. Whether perjury can be committed by giving 
knowingly false but legally incompetent testimony is a difficult question.182 But if 
perverting the course of justice is a crime of pure mens rea, then a person who gives 
false evidence in court with that intention, even if their testimony was irrelevant 
and incompetent, would commit the offence.183  
                                                          
180 Angus v HM Advocate, 1935 J.C. 1, per Lord Morison at 6; Hume, i, 366; Alison, i, 465. 
181 In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, at 227 to 228, 66 S. Ct. 78, 80 (1945);  see also United States v Williams, 874 F.2d 
968 at 980 (5th Cir. 1989).  
182 See, for example, HM Advocate v Coulson, 2015 S.C.C.R. 254 and the discussion in Gordon (4th ed) at 
paras 55.15 to 55.19. 
183 The accused in H.M. Advocate v Smith, 1934 J.C. 66, for example, probably had the intention to pervert 
the course of justice when he denied, during the trial of two men for corruptly soliciting a bribe, that he had 
been informed of the attempted solicitation and had expressed “that it was a ghastly state of affairs”. 
Nevertheless, he escaped the charge owing to the rule that “statements made by complainers outwith the 
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 If perjury were only a mode of perverting the course of justice, there would be no 
way of committing perjury that did not also amount to its parent offence. 
Alternatively, if the offences are instances of the same thing, might we not expect to 
see some of the case law that applies to individual offences, such as perjury, also 
apply to the proto-offence of perverting the course of justice? Suppose that a person 
went into hiding to avoid a citation to give evidence, as in Mannion, but in fact had 
no evidence to give which could ever have been relevant at trial. The intent 
sufficient for perverting the course of justice is present, but the analogy with the law 
of perjury is not. Does the principled basis for not criminalising those lying when 
invited to give incompetent evidence not apply in relation to perverting the course 
of justice? If not, why not: incompetent evidence cannot (or should not) form part of 
the course of justice, so why should destroying or preventing it from reaching court 
ever pervert that course of justice, whatever intention is present? 
 Rather than try to craft a unified theory of the administration of justice offences, 
tying them together in principle and in substance, the more satisfying and 
historically sound thing to do is to recognise and account for their similarities and 
their differences. Perverting the course of justice is neither an umbrella offence, 
sitting behind and informing the other offences against the administration of justice 
(as Ferguson and McDiarmid suggest); nor are the other administration of justice 
offences inevitably becoming subsumed by perverting the course of justice (as 
Gordon fears). Rather, I consider that the case law describes a sort of residual 
offence.  
 There are individual offences against the administration of justice which are specific 
enough and resilient enough to have survived, and which have a central idea strong 
enough to be easily adapted to the changing procedures and principles of the justice 
system. Consider how, in Logue v H.M. Advocate,184 the court concluded that the 
offence of bribing judges was sufficiently broad to include bribing a member of a 
licensing board. The court specifically rejected the idea that it might have to have 
deploy the declaratory power: the common law offence could be easily adapted by 
analogy, there being no principle applying to judges that should not also apply to 
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184 Logue v H.M. Advocate, 1932 J.C. 1. 
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board members. The offence of bribing judges proved resilient, and there was no 
need to have recourse to the gap-filling offence of perverting the course of justice.185  
 Perjury may be the best example. Though the rules of evidence changed 
significantly during the 20th century, in both civil and criminal contexts, the central 
idea that testimony given in court should be protected from deliberate falsehood has 
never been seriously doubted, and there has never been any real difficulty in 
adapting it to the changing rules of evidence.186 The offence is also clearly distinct 
enough to have generated a number of appeals on questions unique to the law of 
perjury. Its proven flexibility protected it from prosecutors who might otherwise 
have felt that they had to have recourse to a more general charge of perverting the 
course of justice; and its uniqueness has protected it from being otherwise 
subsumed into the more general offence. 
 In other parts of the law, less flexible or less unique offences have not demonstrated 
such resilience. I have shown that early appeals on perverting the course of justice 
might easily have been interpreted as judgments on the elements of attempted 
subornation of perjury. Instead they became understood as judgments on a new 
offence, which filled the gaps between offences or, perhaps, occupied the grey areas 
that existed at the edge of offences. This can be seen most clearly in Martin, a 
decision which can be read as either an expansion of the offence of prison-breaking 
or a case about perverting the course of justice. Which it is doesn’t matter, of course, 
to the would-be absconder, though it matters to later courts seeking to identify 
limits in the offence of perverting the course of justice.  
 There are a variety of statutory offences concerned with protecting specific aspects 
of the justice system. In H.M. Advocate v Keegan,187 a charge of perverting the 
course of justice by giving a false name to the police when detained was accepted 
without comment: at the time, this was a specific offence under s. 1(5) of the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.188 Sections 44 to 46 of the Criminal Law 
                                                          
185 Though it is hard to imagine any bribe to a judicial official that would not have the purpose of intending 
to pervert the course of justice. 
186 Cf. John Barr, (1839) 2 Swin 282, where the declaratory power was used to criminalise false oaths in 
election declarations (though Lord Cockburn considered that it was a crime already, falling under the 
principle that the obstruction of legal proceedings “by the solemn asservation of falsehood” was criminal); 
see Gordon (3rd ed) at para 1.23 for a discussion. 
187 H.M. Advocate v Keegan, 1981 S.L.T. (Notes) 35; see also H.M. Advocate v Davies, 1994 S.L.T. 296. 
188 Now found in s13(6) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
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(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, containing offences of making false oaths, are 
rarely used, with charges under the common law of perjury apparently preferred.189 
 In Waddell v MacPhail,190 the court confirmed the legality of choosing a charge of 
perverting the course of justice where a statutory alternative was possible.  In this 
case the two accused had misled the police about the identity of the driver of a 
vehicle.191 The reasons why general charges of perverting the course of justice might 
be preferred to specific statutory offences are the same as the reasons for preferring 
them to more specific common law offences. 
 Perverting the course of justice is a residual offence, occupying the edges of and the 
spaces in-between the other offences against the course of justice. When the 
definition of one of these offences is too strict or ambiguous, or where the behaviour 
in question is too novel, perverting the course of justice is there to fill the gaps. It is 
true that plenty of (but by no means all) behaviour caught by the individual offences 
against the course of justice is also caught by perverting the course of justice. But it 
is not the case that these offences have lost their separate existence as a result. 
Perverting the course of justice keeps pace with and avoids gaps created either by 
the expansion of the system of justice into new areas, or by limits on existing 
offences proving unsuitable to modern methods. 
The course of justice 
 If perverting the course of justice were the background offence behind every other 
offence concerned with the course of justice, then it would be essential to know 
precisely what was meant by the offence, since its elements would also necessarily 
be part of the elements of the other offences. There would, for example, be no 
perjury without an intention to pervert the course of justice. Conversely, if the 
alternative theory is correct, and perverting the course of justice is a residual 
offence, filling the gaps in between a suite of more specific offences, then it is 
essential to understand what those offences have in common, where their 
boundaries begin and end, and what is required to stitch them together and protect 
the course of justice when the other, more specific offences are insufficient. Either 
way, it is necessary to identify the theme or story told by a consideration of all of 
                                                          
189 Gordon (4th ed), para 55.23. 
190 Waddell v MacPhail, 1986 S.C.C.R. 593. 
191 An offence under the Road Traffic Act 1972, s. 168. 
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these offences together: given what we know, and what we know about the scope of 
perverting the course of justice in particular, what is the ‘course of justice’? 
 A perverted or defeated or un-administered course of justice must be the harm 
sitting behind the wasting of police time, subornation, perjury, deforcement and 
prison-breaking. This invites us to imagine an un-perverted or undefeated or fully 
administered course of justice: in “all cases, the essence of the charge is the 
interference with what would otherwise be expected to have come to pass in the 
ordinary and uninterrupted course of justice in the particular case.”192 A good course 
of justice is one where no offences against the course of justice are committed: an act 
which is the subject of the law occurs, and the consequences envisaged by the law 
follow: 
 only honest allegations are made to investigating authorities (therefore, no 
offence of wasting police time occurs);193  
 those who might be required by the authorities make themselves available 
(therefore, no attempt to pervert the course of justice occurs);194  
 no one influences the facts told to the authorities or the evidence which 
might emerge (therefore, no attempt to pervert the course of justice 
occurs);195 
 no one influences the evidence that is to be given in court (therefore, no 
subornation of perjury occurs); 
 the truth is told in court (therefore, no perjury is committed); and 
 the court’s decision is given effect: either by a sentence being served in full 
(therefore no prison-breaking occurs), or diligence being executed on the 
decree (therefore, no deforcement occurs). 
 This is to take a pure or complete approach to what a course of justice consists of. 
Many things which might or should be the subject of the law in some way are taken 
no further: an offence is not reported to the police by the victim, or a delict not 
pursued by the injured party. But it would not necessarily pervert the course of 
                                                          
192 Hanley v H.M. Advocate, [2018] HCJAC 29. 
193 See paras 3.58 to 3.72, supra. 
194 As in Mannion; see paras 3.41 to 3.44, supra. 
195 As in Scott; see paras 3.12 to 3.20, supra. 
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justice to fail to report an offence. The law allows for considerable discretion on the 
part of various actors in the justice system: the police who can drop an investigation, 
or the prosecutor who can decide not to pursue a charge. These decisions are part of 
the course of justice and may result in an outcome other than that that which could 
lawfully follow: an un-investigated offence or an un-prosecuted offender. Clearly, 
therefore, while the law protects every stage of the process of justice, the law does 
not expect every stage to be followed in every case. There must be a sort of lawful 
discretion exercisable without committing an offence. The good course of justice I 
invited us to consider can properly be interrupted at any point, as long as it does so 
in an ordinary way, positively contemplated by the law.  
 An intention to pervert can only exist where the subject of the intention is a course 
of justice recognised by the law. If I mistakenly believed that, for example, my 
application to extend a deadline for submission of a thesis was the subject of 
possible criminal investigation, this would not make it a perversion of the course of 
justice for me to lie in that application.  The courts have held that the existence of a 
course of justice is required for the offence to be committed.196 It has always been 
clear that attempted subornation can take place in respect of a trial which is only 
ever in prospect or a possibility.197 It would be reasonable to infer that a course of 
justice, in general, may be prospective or speculative, as long as what is in prospect 
or what is speculated does in fact amount to a course of justice. Scott and Dalton 
made it clear that the investigative stage of a criminal inquiry which might lead to a 
trial is part of the course of justice (and, therefore, that prospective or speculative 
investigations are caught). Martin confirmed that the course of justice extends past a 
trial, and encompasses the orders of the court disposing of the trial, including orders 
of imprisonment. Harris, confirming that engineering a wrongful driving record is 
perverting the course of justice, established that the creation of a course of justice is 
itself part of the course of justice. The things that may be the subject of a charge of 
perverting the course of justice are broad. 
 Two questions arise: to what extent does a course of justice have to be in place, or in 
prospect, for the offence to be committed; and to what extent does the offender have 
to have adverted to it or be aware of it? If in the knowledge that the police are 
investigating an offence, a person seeks to prevent someone from giving the police 
relevant information (for example, by intimidating a witness), then there is an actual 
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course of justice in motion. If, having committed an offence, a person takes steps to 
prevent it from being discovered (for example, by destroying a murder weapon) 
then there is a prospective or contingent course of justice. What if a person simply 
takes prudent steps in the actual commission of an offence to minimise their chances 
of discovery (for example, by taking the murder weapon with them, rather than 
leaving it at the scene): are we really implying some sort of duty on criminals not to 
minimise their chances of conviction? What if, before the commission of a planned 
offence, a would-be criminal takes perfectly lawful steps to prevent their later 
exposure (for example, by blocking the view of a security camera): if apprehended 
at that point, without an offence having been committed, is there even a prospective 
course of justice? What if, without any particular offence planned, a habitual 
criminal takes steps designed to minimise their risk of ever being detected (for 
example, by having their fingerprints burnt off): is a general intention sufficient, or 
does the offender have to have a particular course of justice in mind?  
England and Wales 
 Other jurisdictions have devoted a great deal of judicial effort to the question of 
when a course of justice exists. In R v Vreones,198 the defendant was convicted of 
perverting the course of justice by altering samples which were to be used as 
evidence in an arbitration. On appeal the defendant argued that no crime had been 
committed, since there never was an arbitration established and the samples were 
never led in evidence. The conviction was upheld, the court having no difficulty 
with the idea that the crime could be committed in respect of proceedings which 
were in active contemplation but which never materialised. 
 In R v Selvage and Morgan,199 the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of the 
defendants, one of whom worked at the DVLC and had improperly purged from its 
records endorsements on the driving license of the other. Rather than prosecute 
under a specific statutory provision, s101(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1972, the Crown 
charged them with attempts to pervert the course of justice and they pled guilty, 
following preliminary rulings by the trial judge concerning the nature of the offence.  
 Their convictions were quashed for a number of reasons, principally because of the 
Crown’s failure to demonstrate the necessary intention. The court, though, took the 
opportunity to resolve the question whether this offence could be committed where, 
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as in this case, “there was not the slightest suggestion that criminal proceedings 
were pending or imminent or being investigated”.200 The court was satisfied that the 
existence of a course of justice was necessary for the offence to be capable of 
commission. It called this “one of the vital tests or principles” of the offence,201 but 
settled on a broad definition of what constituted a necessary course of justice: 
“[A] course of justice must have been embarked upon in the sense that 
proceedings of some kind are in being or are imminent or investigations which 
could or might bring proceedings about are in progress”202 
 A course of justice, therefore, existed not only when proceedings were active or 
pending, but when investigations preliminary to those proceedings were active or 
pending also. However, this test does not permit speculation. It is not sufficient that 
the offender did something with an intention that, should there be a relevant course 
of justice, it would be perverted. Whether proceedings are “in being” or “imminent” 
and whether investigations “could or might” bring those proceedings about are 
both testable facts. 
 In R v Rafique,203 the court cast the net further back in time, catching conduct that 
took place before any investigation had even begun. Rafique had accidentally shot a 
friend then immediately hidden the shotgun. On appeal, he contended that, no 
investigation having yet begun, the offence could not be committed. The court was 
not impressed by this submission, holding that “whether an act has a tendency to 
pervert the course of justice cannot depend upon whether investigation of the 
matter which may become the subject of court proceedings has begun”.204 Instead, 
the court held, what was relevant was that “the possibility of judicial proceedings 
must have been in the contemplation of the appellants”.205 This returns us to the idea 
of a sufficient intention on the part of the offender, rather than a sufficient real-
world possibility of there being a course of justice. Even in situations where no 
investigation of judicial proceedings was likely, a person might take actions with a 
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view to ensuring they were perverted should they come about; and under the 
Rafique test, that would suffice. 
 In English law, therefore, while it is necessary for there to be a course of justice for 
the offence to be capable of commission, the definition of ‘course of justice’ has been 
expanded such as to provide no real or temporal limit on the offence at all. Consider 
the scenarios of the person apprehended blocking security cameras or burning off 
their fingerprint: these would be perversions of the course of justice because of the 
contemplation, by the offender alone, of something that would be such a course of 
justice.  
Australia 
 In Australia, the requirement for an existing course of justice remains a meaningful 
limitation on the scope of the offence. In R v Rogerson,206 the High Court of 
Australia held that “police investigations do not themselves form part of the course 
of justice”207 and therefore attempts to mislead an investigation alone do not amount 
to the offence. The reason for this was that “neither the police nor other 
investigative agencies administer justice in any relevant sense”.208 This does not, 
however mean that interfering with a police investigation cannot amount to 
perverting the course of justice if that interference was “an act which has a tendency 
to deflect the police from prosecuting a criminal offence”,209 the logic being that 
affecting a police decision whether to prosecute invokes institutions which 
administer justice in a relevant sense.  
 The practical effect of this is to require the Crown not simply to prove an intention 
to deceive the police, but also to prove that the accused believed that further 
proceedings were possible and that their actions were likely to affect those 
proceedings, rather than just the investigation: 
“it is necessary, in a case involving alleged conduct to divert or frustrate police 
inquiries, to identify some actual or potential relationship between the alleged 
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conduct and some pending, probable or possible curial proceedings whose 
course the accused intended to pervert.”210 
 This is a different from the English law on this subject and in particular from 
Selvage where an investigation was specifically identified as a stage by which “a 
course of justice must have been embarked on”.211 The High Court specifically 
disclaims that passage in Selvage, stating that there is “no historical support for an 
extension” of the concept in that way.212 But the High Court’s differences with the 
Court of Appeal are more principled than practical. The extension of the law in 
Selvage is limited to “investigations which could or might bring proceedings 
about”. What difference there is between this position and the High Court of 
Australia’s concession that investigations might be caught when there is an “actual 
or potential relationship” with “pending, probable or possible” proceedings is 
perhaps more a matter of focus and approach than end result. Whether we choose to 
define a course of justice in terms which include potential investigations or whether 
we adopt a more limited definition but concede the attempt can relate to a 
“potential relationship” with “possible” proceedings, the net result is likely similar. 
 This decision might therefore seem like it conflicts with Rafique, but its effect on the 
question whether a course of justice is on-going is similar. Both decisions invite us 
to focus first on the offender’s reasons for doing what he did. In both cases the 
relevant intention can be present even where the behaviour involved is directed at 
pre-proceedings investigations.  
 Rogerson did not settle the question in Australia. In R v Beckett,213 the appellant’s 
case included a challenge to the prosecution on the grounds that no course of justice 
existed when interviews took place, at which falsified cheques were produced. The 
argument, considered “jejune” by the High Court,214 was that one effect of R v 
Murphy215 was to establish a “universal principle” that a course of justice must have 
been embarked on and that the incorporation of the offence into the Crimes Act 1900 
(New South Wales) in 1990 post-dated the decision in Murphy. The High held that 
the definition in the Crimes Act of a perversion of the course of justice included 
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“preventing … the course of justice”, which was “eloquent of a legislative intention 
that liability extend to acts done with the proscribed intention in relation to 
contemplated proceedings”.216 
United States 
 In the United States, obstruction of justice is a federal offence under sections 1501 
through 1520 of Title 18 U.S.C. As well as setting out a host of specific ways in 
which justice can be obstructed,217 there is a “catchall” omnibus clause,218 in section 
1503, which criminalises “whoever […] endeavours to influence, obstruct or impede 
the due administration of justice”.219  It is a requirement of the offence that there 
should be pending judicial proceedings.220 
 The general rule is that an investigation does not amount to a pending judicial 
proceeding, though there are a number of specific offences in Title 18 which 
criminalise the obstruction of certain forms of investigation.221 However, the courts 
have been clear that there is no “rigid rule” governing when a judicial proceeding 
can be said to be pending,222 and have held that where an investigation is capable of 
“ripening” into a judicial proceeding the requirement can be met.223 So, for example, 
in United States v Vesich there was a pending proceeding where the defendant 
sought to encourage false testimony from a witness who had not yet been 
                                                          
216 Beckett, at para 35. 
217 Including "assault on a process server,"' (§ 1501), "resistance to extradition agent," (§ 1502) "influencing or 
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subpoenaed.224 The court analysed the likelihood that there would, ultimately, be 
false testimony generated by the defendant’s conduct, and though the conduct in 
this case was “perhaps at the outer edge of the required pendency”, the fact that the 
defendant and witness expected the witness to testify satisfied the requirement for a 
pending proceeding.225 There are two similarities with the Australian approach: first, 
an insistence that the rule is a limited one, followed by qualifications which, in 
practice, may render the limit less meaningful than it first appears. And second, the 
requirement for a pending course of justice can be satisfied, at least in part, by an 
examination of the mental state of the accused. An intention relating to a thing that 
is properly part of the course of justice can overcome inconvenient facts about 
whether such a course has actually begun. 
Whether a course of justice is necessary 
 It seems common to begin the analysis of this question by insisting that the existence 
of a course of justice is a necessary element of the offence, but end it by having 
defined existence in terms so broad as to make it a hardly meaningful limitation on 
the offence. The course of justice can cover all stage of proceedings, including any 
preliminary stages; and it can exist even though it might only be prospective, 
contingent or possible.  
 This must be right. It would be absurd for the existence of criminal liability to 
depend on whether steps had or had not been taken by particular justice institutions 
(the police, prosecutors, the courts), steps which take place entirely outwith the 
control of the accused. A perverted course of justice is every bit as much risked by 
someone conspiring against it before investigations begin as after; and whether the 
offender knows about investigations, or not. The only meaningful limit identified is 
the one implied by the decision in Selvage: that there had to be a factual possibility 
of a prospective course of justice, rather than a speculative one. This standard 
would, for example, catch the man who adjusted security cameras before 
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committing an armed robbery, but might not catch the man who erased his own 
fingerprints, if he had no specific criminal act in mind to follow.226  
 In U.S. law, knowledge of the pending proceedings is essential.227 Federal law also 
has a more developed approach to ascertaining whether proceedings are pending or 
not; their version of the question whether a course of justice exists. The question is 
whether there was a prospect of a course of justice ultimately arising, and it is 
relevant, in answering this question, to look at the expectations of the participants in 
the possible obstruction.228 In other words, the relevant question is whether the 
subject of the actions of the defendant was something that was, would be, or could 
be a course of justice, regardless of the actual stage of development of the 
proceedings (or prospective proceedings) in question. This is a useful way to 
analyse the question, and perhaps only amounts to a more principled way of 
reaching the same conclusion as the English and Australian courts have. Answering 
the question whether a course of justice exists (or whether judicial proceedings are 
pending) by reference to actual procedural steps would very quickly risk becoming 
arbitrary, distinguishing between equally culpable acts based on the irrelevant 
factor of whether, for example, a particular notice had been filed by a prosecutor.  
 Analysed in any of the ways set out, this question quickly becomes subsumed in the 
wider issue of what sort of intention is sufficient to amount to the offence. Where 
that intention exists – where the subject of the criminal desire to pervert is 
something that would be a course of justice – it is immaterial whether that course 
has begun, or is in prospect or is likely to come about or not. Even the distinction 
between actions taken in contemplation of a general (fingerprints), rather than a 
specific (security cameras), course of justice could be answered by reference to the 
required intention:  is the offender required to have a specific course of justice in 
mind, or not?  
 Ultimately, this too becomes a question of whether the offence is truly one of pure 
intention. 
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 What sort of ‘attempt’ is required? 
Whether part of the law of attempt 
 In Hanley v H.M. Advocate,229 the appellant argued for the inclusion of elements of 
the law of attempt as part of perverting the course of justice. He had tried to 
convince two associates to intimidate a witness who was likely to identify him. It 
was argued that this was not an “overt act” that could “of itself” interfere with the 
course of justice, and that therefore his actions were not “sufficiently proximate” to 
amount to perverting the course of justice.230 The court concluded that it was 
“unhelpful to look beyond offences against the course of justice in seeking to 
identify the character of” the offence. It did, however, endorse a passage in 
Docherty v Brown,231 holding that it was sufficient to do “an act, or a part of that act, 
by which [a person] meant and expected to perpetrate” an offence.232 The argument 
rejected by the court was that we should be concerning ourselves at all with the 
potential of any action to actually be able to pervert the course of justice. The court 
held instead that the intention and expectation of the accused was conclusive. The 
question raised by Hanley concerns the extent to which we should reason 
backwards from the principles applied to the law of attempt to ‘attempts to’ pervert 
the course of justice. 
 The word ‘attempt’ commonly features in the name of the offence. Perverting the 
course of justice is, however, a completed offence – albeit an offence that is 
completed as soon as some sort of attempt is embarked on. In R v Rowell, Ormrod 
LJ called the use of the word attempt “misleading”.233 The general law of attempts 
does not apply.234 In R v Machin,235 it was said that: 
“the word is convenient for use in the case where it cannot be proved that the 
course of justice was actually perverted but it does no more than describe a 
substantive offence”. 
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 The suggestion seems to be that the word is, or should be, used where the attempt 
in question was ultimately unsuccessful.236 Though this is an attractive idea, it rests 
on slightly circular reasoning: if the authorities have identified the alleged 
perversion and taken steps to prosecute it, it must be the case that the attempt was 
ultimately unsuccessful anyway, since it has been exposed. On this justification, 
could there ever be a prosecution for a plain, non-attempt, perversion of the course 
of justice? Perhaps only in a situation where the perversion was directed to an 
outcome which was irreversibly achieved: if a police officer fabricated evidence 
which was only exposed after a prosecution and a sentence served in full. Even in 
that scenario, however, other legal mechanisms would be available to rectify or 
correct the course of justice: appeal, the prosecution of the relevant offender, 
reference to the SCCRC, public exculpation, damages.  
 The fact that the general law of attempts does not apply does not mean that this is 
not an inchoate offence. Perverting the course of justice has an inherently inchoate 
character: the harm being prevented would not necessarily be achieved by the 
commission of the offence. Inchoate modes other than attempt are encompassed by 
the offence: conspiracies to pervert the course of justice are caught, as are 
incitements.237 In Hanley, the court held that “the primary offence may be 
characterised as a form of conspiracy”.238 On one view, perverting the course of 
justice is an offence of endangerment. Where the offence of culpable and reckless 
conduct protects the public at large from the risk of physical injury, perverting the 
course of justice addresses itself to the risk of justice being perverted by someone’s 
actions. The harm is complete when that risk is created.239  
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 Instead of pointing to the applicability of the law of attempt, the use of the word 
‘attempt’ reveals something about the essence of the crime. It is irrelevant whether 
the attempt is highly successful and a person, for example, evades criminal 
responsibility completely, or whether the attempt is immediately exposed: “an 
attempt to pervert the course of justice is in itself a punishable misdemeanour”.240 
The crime is completed by the commission of acts that attempt or risk the perversion 
of the course of justice, whether successful or not. This is not a description of a 
particular physical action, such as assaulting a person, nor is it an adjectival 
description of a type or class of action, such as sexual touching without consent. It is 
a description of action with a particular quality, or particular potential quality. It 
catches conduct that might, according to a legal test, lead to the perversion of the 
course of justice.  
 But what legal test? We are still left with the question of how to distinguish between 
the criminal and non-criminal: when is an action sufficiently advanced, or when is 
an intention sufficiently demonstrated, to engage the criminal law? Is there any type 
of action so remote from a real-world possibility of perverting the course of justice, 
that it cannot be transformed into a criminal act, no matter the intention? Even on 
the broadest understanding of the any-act theory of perverting the course of justice, 
we are surely not dealing with a crime of pure intention: forming a momentary plan 
in your head to pervert the course of justice, and doing no more, is not an offence. 
Something – though maybe any act at all – needs to be done. We know that the law 
of attempt is not the complete answer, but this problem is the central question 
behind the case law and literature on the law of attempt.241  If the criminal law, as a 
whole, is to reflect a common set of principles or express truths about human 
behaviour and our standard of justice, then there seems no reason why rules that 
apply to a system of criminal law’s rules of attempts ought not also to apply to rules 
regarding attempting to pervert the course of justice – if the question being asked is 
the same. Unless there is some feature of the offence that distinguishes it from the 
general law of attempt, why should the law produce two different answers to the 
question ‘when has a person taken sufficient steps to bring about a proscribed result 
that they should become subject to criminal penalties?’. Without wanting to make 
too glib a point, when the criminal law uses the word ‘attempt’ in two places, 
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should we not assume it means the same thing unless we have a good reason to 
think otherwise? 
 It is not unusual for an offence to be both substantive and have an inchoate or 
preliminary character: for example, the offence of making or supplying articles for 
use in frauds,242 the offence of engaging in any conduct in preparation for giving 
effect to an intention to commit terrorism,243 or the offence of being concerned in the 
supply of a controlled drug.244 Each of these offences – sometimes known as pre-
inchoate offences245 – and perverting the course of justice, share common 
characteristics. The behaviour criminalised is not necessarily harmful of itself, but 
rather is criminalised because it is likely to cause harm further down the road, and it 
is better that the criminal law steps in early (being concerned in the supply of drugs) 
or because there is no good reason for the behaviour other than prospective 
criminality (making articles for use in frauds). The actions being criminalised are not 
limited or described, other than by reference to a type of character or intention (is 
their purpose use in a fraud? Are they doing this action in order to try to supply 
controlled drugs?). They are capable of being committed in an extremely wide 
number of ways. The only limit on the actus reus of making articles for use in frauds 
is ingenuity. 
 Is there a common theme behind the criminalisation of these inchoate-substantive 
offences? In some cases, it is required because the conduct involved would not have 
been criminal already under the general law of attempt: for example, the 
preparation of an article for use in frauds. For particular reasons, it is argued that 
the law is justified in reaching back further into the chain of causation than it 
typically would. A similar rationale underpins many possession offences where, for 
example, possessing a knife in public would not of itself demonstrate a criminal 
attempt to commit an offence, but we have decided that it should be criminal 
regardless, there being no good non-harmful reason to possess such an object.246 
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 In other cases, the conduct caught may often be caught by the law of attempt: for 
example, many things a person does to be concerned in the supply of drugs might 
amount to a criminal attempt to supply drugs. Criminalisation there probably has 
reasons of efficiency or completeness behind it. The law of attempt has been 
considered and found wanting, either because it would too commonly present 
technical problems or because the proof requirements would be too laborious. We 
have decided to dispense with the protections of the law of attempt, with a view to 
comprehensiveness.247  
 All of these offences are concerned with behaviour with a certain character and 
therefore, perhaps, offenders of a certain character. Parliament wants to criminalise 
the sort of person who would become involved in the drugs trade, whatever they 
actually do (so it creates an offence simply of ‘being concerned’); it wants to 
criminalise the sort of person who assists a terrorist, whatever they actually do (so it 
creates the unusually remote offence of engaging in any conduct in preparation for 
giving effect to an intention to commit terrorism).248 These are special rationales for 
criminalisation separate from any general justification that might be given for the 
criminalisation of attempt.249 Whether the criminal law means something different 
by attempt in the context of perverting the course of justice therefore depends on the 
rationale for its criminalisation. Is the law trying to do something different with this 
offence or – if we were able to describe a complete offence of ‘perverting the course 
of justice’ – would it suffice to apply our general law of attempts to it? Or are we 
trying to criminalise the sort of person who would (whatever they actually do) try to 
pervert the course of justice? Is it so important that we should protect the course of 
justice, that we are justified in dispensing with the protections and technicalities 
applied to attempt? These questions inevitably arise when the law moves from 
                                                          
247 This was explicitly done in the U.S. with the offence corresponding to perverting the course of justice, 
where U.S.C. § 1503 requires an “endeavour”, rather than an attempt: “The word of the section is 
‘endeavor’, and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which be urged as besetting the word 
‘attempt’, and it describes any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to 
prevent”, United States v Russell, 255 U.S. 138 at 143 (1921). 
248 Lacey, N., State Punishment, (London: Routledge, 1988), at pp 58 to 73, discusses criminalisation founded 
in an evaluation of character. See also, Duff, R.A., ‘Choice, Character and Criminal Liability’, 12 Law and 
Philosophy (1993) 345-383 for a criticism of character theories as the basis of criminalisation. 
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criminalising a type of act to a state of mind. What are we trying to achieve, and 
why? 
 It is probably impossible to answer this question by reference only to the Scottish 
authorities. The case law has not yet produced challenges to the offence which tease 
out questions about what does and does not amount to the ‘attempt’ element of 
perverting the course of justice.  
An offence of pure intention? 
 Duff suggests three categories of inchoate offence: offences of intention (where the 
intention to cause a harm is punished), offences of explicit endangerment (where the 
risk of causing a real harm is being punished) and offences of implicit 
endangerment (where there is no actual risk of harm, but the behaviour might 
contribute in some other way to harm).250 The best we can probably say of the 
offence in Scotland is that it shows signs of belonging to all three categories. The 
offence is clearly concerned with a particular sort of criminal intention on the part of 
the accused, and it may be that any conduct at all, combined with that intention, is 
enough. That would mean that the conduct in question could have no – or a very 
low – risk of actually causing a perversion in the course of justice, but would be 
criminalised regardless. Is there danger in anything done with the purpose of 
perverting justice in the same way that there is implicit danger in every act of drink-
driving, even where the facts may disclose no risk of harm to anyone at all? If we 
are truly concerned with criminalising the sort of people who would seek to pervert 
the course of justice, that would suggest a harm-blind or risk-blind approach to 
working out when an attempt was sufficient to engage the criminal law; the actual 
risk of causing a perversion would be immaterial.  
 The law of attempt is concerned with where to draw the line: the point at which an 
action becomes subject to the criminal law. But if the proper analysis of perverting 
the course of justice is that it is an offence of pure mens rea, then there is no line to 
draw. Any action suffices, even those that would not amount to an attempt in 
relation to other crimes. Can this be right? If I make notes on a plan to pervert the 
course of justice and leave them on my desk, I have done an act with the required 
intent, but have I really committed the offence? Can I really be said to have intended 
or risked harm when by my own actions I have both raised the possibility of 
perverting the course of justice, and also (by doing nothing further with my notes) 
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ensured that no perversion of the course of justice could ever be committed? There 
are certain positive things that an accused is entitled by our law to do, such as 
pleading not guilty to something they did in order to test the prosecution’s case, that 
are presumably often done with the intent to pervert the course of justice but which 
are not caught by the offence. These questions are perhaps better answered by an 
analysis of what precisely the required intention is – what does it mean to ‘pervert’? 
– rather than by reference to the requirement for some sort of attempt.251  
 There are difficulties caused if the offence is truly constituted by any action 
whatever. The traditional account of attempt requires deliberateness in the sense of 
someone intending to do something that is a crime, rather than intending to do a 
crime: an offender has to intend to [do a thing] which in law is murder; not intend to 
[do murder]. But this account cannot be applied to perverting the course of justice if 
the offence consists solely of mens rea, with no conduct-limited principal offence to 
refer to. There is a difference between intending to do [a thing] which would pervert 
the course of justice, and intending to [pervert the course of justice] by doing a 
thing. A parent who washes a child’s blood-stained jumper following the 
commission of an assault, unworried about any explanation for the blood, would be 
deliberately doing something which would pervert the course of justice, but she 
would have no intention to do so. Suppose that a person was aware that a diary was 
required to be produced as evidence in a trial but – unconnected to the subject of the 
trial – the diary also contained evidence of their having an affair. They destroy the 
diary, not with the intention of obstructing the trial or affecting its outcome, but in 
order to prevent the exposure of their (irrelevant) affair, out of a sense of shame. 
This person has deliberately done something which would pervert the course of 
justice, recklessly as to whether the course of justice was so perverted. But you can 
deliberately do something which would pervert the course of justice while reckless 
about whether it would. When the law requires specific intent, you cannot both 
intend an outcome and be reckless as to its occurring: if this is a crime of pure 
intention, can it criminalise someone for the potential quality of an act that they had 
not adverted to?252 This would require a theory which divided acts into those with 
the capacity to pervert the course of justice, and those without. We do not have such 
a theory in Scotland: it would be supererogatory since the law is that any act can 
constitute the crime, with the required intention. But why should people who do 
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things deliberately, but are reckless as to whether their actions pervert the course of 
justice escape criminal sanction? If the person who destroyed the diary was aware of 
its relevance to the trial in prospect, then regardless of their specific intention, 
should their disregard for the integrity of the trial and their risking the course of 
justice not be punishable? 
 The opposite point is worth considering: should an act with no prospect of ever 
causing a perversion of the course of justice be punishable? This would include both 
impossible attempts (for example, seeking to avoid conviction for something that is 
not actually an offence, or trying to use magic to pervert the course of justice) and 
hopeless attempts (for example, seeking to bribe an honest officer, or to destroy an 
inconsequential piece of evidence). The submission by the appellant in Hanley that 
there had to be an act “capable of achieving” a perversion of the course of justice 
was not accepted by the court.253 Instead the test was whether the steps taken were 
“designed to frustrate” the course of justice.254 If we were truly trying to criminalise 
the sort of person who would commit a perversion of the course of justice, then the 
potential for an act to actually affect the course of justice would be irrelevant. This 
would suggest that entirely private acts are caught, as are acts tainted by legal or 
factual impossibility. It also suggests that there is no de minimus or contextual limit 
to be applied in law. This comes very close to a position where every single offence 
committed would almost inevitably amount in law to an attempt to pervert the 
course of justice, since it is only in very few cases that offenders commit crimes in 
the expectation of being convicted. Every step taken to minimise the risk of a crime’s 
exposure would amount to an attempt to pervert the course of justice. 
 Even if the any-act theory is correct, therefore, there are questions about the 
required standard of attempt that are not answered by the Scottish case law. If we 
take literally the courts’ insistence that the application of the general law of attempt 
is not apt, then we may have to construct a new body of principles to apply to the 
special circumstances of this offence.  
 Many of these questions could be addressed, without having to have recourse to an 
entirely new theory of attempt, if there were a logical way of limiting the actus reus 
of the offence by reference to some standard or description of behaviour. In other 
jurisdictions, the courts have developed a body of law concerned with separating 
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out those acts which have the relevant potential quality – of being capable of 
perverting the course of justice – from those that do not. 
A tendency to pervert the course of justice 
 In England and Wales the offence “consists of conduct which has a tendency and is 
intended to pervert the course of justice”.255 In a large proportion of cases it will be 
obvious that the conduct alleged, if proved, had such a tendency. There are 
categories of conduct that so commonly charged as perverting the course of justice 
that they can be assumed to be good examples of such a tendency: concealing the 
commission of an offence, obstructing police investigations, or interfering with 
witnesses or evidence. But these categories are not closed.256 R v Rowell257 involved 
the making of a false complaint to the police which did not specifically incriminate 
another, about which the Court of Appeal conceded that there was “no reported 
English case where such conduct has been held to be an attempt to pervert the 
course of justice”.258 It was, however, the “nature of the conduct” not previous 
practice which mattered and the court was satisfied, after examination of both 
English and Scottish authority,259 that a false report to the police, though not 
identifying any particular person, had the required tendency.  
 In R v Britton,260 the quick-thinking defendant had been stopped on suspicion of 
drunk-driving, but delayed the taking of a sample until after he had been able to 
find and drink a beer in front of the police, frustrating their efforts to use the sample 
in evidence. He argued that the offence of perverting the course of justice involved 
well-established categories of conduct, largely concerned with “deception of some 
kind”, which ought not to be extended. He argued that his ingenious actions were 
the product of a statutory loophole he was entitled to exploit and did not fall into 
one of these existing categories.261  The appeal was not successful, the court 
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preferring the view that any action which “tampers with […] or interferes with” the 
course of justice was sufficient.262 This appeal is interesting, since there is no 
suggestion that the sample produced would be false; on the contrary, it was that it 
would truthfully reveal the defendant to have drunk alcohol that was the problem. 
Without deceit or falsehood involved, the defendant had taken an otherwise lawful 
step that denied the authorities evidence they would normally expect to be able to 
secure. That this was done in order to avoid the consequences of normal legal 
process, and did avoid those consequences, was enough. 
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘tendency’ as “the fact or quality of tending 
to something; a constant disposition to move or act in some direction or toward 
some point, end, or purpose; leaning, inclination, bias, or bent toward some object, 
effect, or result.”263 This is not quite the law of attempt, but it involves the same 
ideas. The act must have a disposition towards the perversion of the course of 
justice or it must suggest a course or direction that leads to such a perversion. But 
the English courts have only occasionally attempted to describe in detail what is 
meant by ‘tendency’.  
 In R v Murray,264 the defendant tampered with a blood sample provided to him by 
the police in connection with prosecution under the Road Traffic Act 1972. His 
tampering was discovered when he gave the sample to his solicitor who, noticing 
the discrepancy with the police’s sample, alerted prosecutors. He was convicted and 
appealed on the grounds that to commit this offence a person has to do something 
more than “mere private action”.265 Mr Murray had not yet taken any positive steps 
to introduce the sample into the investigation and his clumsy actions were 
discovered before he could have. The defendant contrasted his situation with that of 
the defendant in Vreones on the basis that in that case there were no further steps 
that needed to be taken by Vreones before samples which he had tampered with 
would be introduced into evidence. Having taken the steps that Vreones did, the 
false evidence becoming part of the proceedings was inevitable. 
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 The court did not accept this “attractive” argument266 and gave some guidance 
about the meaning of tendency: 
“To establish a tendency or a possibility, you do not have to prove that the 
tendency or possibility in fact materialised. If it did, and if there is evidence of 
that, then of course that is powerful argument to show that there was a 
tendency; but it is not necessary.”267 
 It might be thought that the court understates things here. If something materialises, 
that is more than an “argument” that the thing was possible. But instead of 
something actually happening, the court held that what mattered was whether the 
prosecution established: 
“that the appellant has done enough for there to be a risk, without further action 
by him, that injustice will result. In other words, there must be a possibility that 
what he has done ‘without more’ might lead to injustice.”268 
 In this case that possibility or risk was created by the prospect of the sample being 
sent by the laboratory that analysed it to the prosecution or police. There are two 
points to take from this. First, tendency is defined as a risk, without reference to a 
particular threshold. Second, the risk is created when it no longer requires further 
action by the defendant for that risk to occur. The risk has to be present, absent any 
suppositions that might be made about the defendant’s motives or likely further 
actions. In this case the court was satisfied that the risk existed because the 
defendant had put the sample outwith his control when he sent it to his solicitor. 
But what if further action was required by the defendant for the risk to be outwith 
his control: what if Mr Murray had tampered with the sample but then never sent it 
to anyone else? 
 In R v Firetto,269 the court reduced the importance of the “without more” 
qualification. The facts were similar to those in Murray, but in discussing the 
presence of the required tendency, the Court of Appeal said that: 
“There was, to say the least, a likelihood that, having taken the trouble to 
adulterate the sample and pay the not inconsiderable cost of analysis, the 
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appellant would endeavour to use the analysis to his own advantage or it 
would find its way into the judicial system by other means.”270 
 This represents at least an expansion on Murray and possibly even conflicts with it. 
If the fact-finder is entitled to speculate about the defendant’s likely further actions, 
this decision is an exception to the general position that acts preparatory to the 
commission of a crime do not amount to a crime. Are fact-finders entitled to infer 
from the purchase of a gun alone that a person has attempted murder, because there 
is a “likelihood” that they will go on to use the gun? Particularly given that an 
intention to pervert the course of justice also needs to be established, it seems unfair 
that that intent can then be also used against the defendant in speculating about 
what their further actions might have been. If intent is enough to imbue an action 
with the quality of ‘tendency’, then why consider the mental elements of the crime 
separately from the physical ones at all? The test instead ought to be whether the 
acts in question exhibit that tendency, not whether a person intended at any point 
for such a risk to arise. In Vreones, part of the offence was that “all that the 
defendant could do to commit the offence he did”,271 a qualification which is not 
effective if speculation about further steps is permissible. The Firetto approach is 
indistinguishable from an any-act, pure-intention approach to the offence. 
 The law of England and Wales requires the demonstration of a tendency, meaning a 
level of risk, but has said little about the level of risk required. Is any risk at all 
sufficient, no matter how remote or theoretical? 
Tendency: practical and theoretical risk 
 Foord v Whiddet involved a district judge in New South Wales who it was alleged 
had tried to influence the decision of a magistrate in committal proceedings.272 Judge 
Foord had, however, approached the wrong magistrate: one who was not actually 
involved in the case and would have never had any intention of being influenced by 
the Foord’s approach anyway. Foord was charged under section 43 of the Crimes 
Act 1914, federal legislation which provided that an offence was committed by “any 
person who attempts, in any way not specifically defined in this Act, to obstruct, 
prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice in relation to the judicial power of the 
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Commonwealth”. The court accepted that English authority on the meaning of 
tendency was relevant to the interpretation of this offence.273 
 It was argued, in a judicial review of the decision to commit Foord, that no tendency 
had been demonstrated by the evidence since the magistrate involved never in fact 
had any intention to further communicate with the magistrate who was actually 
hearing the case which Foord intended to interfere with. Even if the evidence 
involved showed behaviour that could have had the sort of tendency identified in a 
case like Murray, the actual risk involved was nil. There was never any possibility of 
a miscarriage of justice resulting from the steps taken.  
 The court rejected this argument, holding that despite the inevitable failure of 
Foord’s attempt to exert his influence, an examination of his conduct revealed that, 
when he finished his attempt to corrupt the magistrate: 
 “at that moment in time, however momentary it was, there was the possibility 
or risk that what the applicant had asked might lead to injustice. Until [the 
magistrate]’s reaction to the applicant’s words became manifest, the risk was 
there.”274 
 What sort of possibility is the court talking about here? It cannot be an actual 
possibility, since the magistrate gave evidence, which was accepted, that he would 
never have acted in the way he was asked. But by identifying the relevant moment 
as being between the judge concluding his plea and it becoming clear that it would 
never be relied on, the court appears to be suggesting that the tendency is to be 
identified in one of two places: in the mind of Judge Foord, who did not know 
whether and must have hoped that he would be successful; or in a speculative 
reality, since the judge had created a state of affairs where a less scrupulous 
magistrate might well have been convinced to alter his decision-making. Neither is a 
particularly satisfying explanation for this decision. If seeking to corrupt a 
corruptible judge is an attempt to pervert the course of justice, should seeking to 
corrupt an honest one be an attempt to attempt to pervert the course of justice?275 
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 The first option, that the possibility or risk existed subjectively in the mind of the 
judge, should be rejected for the same reasons that I criticised the decision in Firetto. 
If we mean to have an effective conduct limit on the offence, the intention of the 
accused should not be both determinative of the characterisation of his actions and 
the necessary mental element of the offence. The second option, which suggests that 
the possibility or risk both existed and did not until the magistrate made it clear that 
he was not to be so convinced, can also be rejected. It amounts to little more than a 
more abstracted way of looking at the intention of the accused, since in many cases – 
including this one – it will be established in evidence that an attempt was never 
going to be successful. Without wanting to raise questions of determinism, the fact 
that a person is being prosecuted for the attempt to pervert suggests that it did not, 
ultimately, succeed and – on one view – never could have. To pretend otherwise 
and to pretend not to have established something, for the purpose of confecting risk, 
involves taking account of the accused’s subjective ignorance and preferring it to a 
state of affairs that has been evidentially established. 
 It would, however, be unsatisfactory if the accused, in situations like this one, were 
able to benefit from the fact that he had selected an honest would-be conspirator. 
The difficulty has been caused by the court focusing too much on risk as the sole 
determiner of tendency. Risk is an incident of tendency, but not the only way that it 
expresses itself. An assessment of risk involves the weighing up of information 
about the act itself (i.e.  improperly asking a magistrate to change his decision) and 
information about the context or environment (i.e. the fact that the magistrate was 
honest). Both need to be given weight. In Firetto, the assessment also involved 
information about the state of mind of the accused (i.e. the fact that he had the 
intention to pervert the course of justice meant that he was likely to take further 
steps to do so). But is this a coherent way to achieve our aim of describing and 
limiting an actus reus?  
 Rowell encouraged an analysis of the “nature of the conduct”, not a probabilistic 
assessment of likely success. The OED defines tendency in terms of a “fact or 
quality” or a “disposition”. The assessment of tendency should not concentrate on 
either the possible actions or motive of the accused or on the likely responses of 
anyone else. The focus should be on the quality or nature of the conduct alleged, 
looked at objectively. Is it behaviour that could, absent any speculation about future 
actions, lead to a perversion of the course of justice? Is it the type of behaviour that, 
without the accused doing anything further and with a reasonable set of 
assumptions about the way the world works, could create the possibility of a 
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perversion of the course of justice? The question should not be whether a risk was in 
fact caused – that ought to be as irrelevant as whether the course of justice was 
perverted, and for the same reasons – but whether the behaviour of the accused was 
by its nature risky. On the facts of Foord v Whiddet, therefore, the court should not 
have asked whether a perversion of the course of justice was actually risked, if only 
for a moment. It should instead have asked whether the act of pressuring a 
magistrate to change a judicial decision is a description of behaviour that, generally 
speaking, risks perverting the course of justice. Which, of course, it is. 
Tendency: whether a necessary element 
 There is a line of Australian authority that has doubted the existence of a 
requirement to demonstrate tendency. In these cases, the court has either disputed 
whether this is an element of the crime at all, or has identified the relevant tendency 
as being demonstrated by the accused’s intention to pervert the course of justice 
when doing the act charged.  
 In R v Murphy,276 the High Court of Australia had to deal with another allegation of 
judicial misbehaviour, of the most serious kind. One of their own judges, Lionel 
Murphy, was convicted of perverting the course of justice by seeking to influence 
the same committal proceedings that were the subject of Foord v Whiddet.277 For 
Justice Murphy it was argued that tendency should be equated with likelihood and 
that likelihood, here, meant a real possibility.278 The court did not accept this and, 
quoting the parts of the OED definition of tendency which require a “leaning […] or 
bent towards some object, effect or result”, the court concluded that tendency did 
not mean “tending to achieve the end of perverting but tending to fulfil the purpose 
of perverting”.279 Any act, the court held, which has as its purpose the perversion of 
a course of justice had the required tendency. The High Court considered that 
support for this approach could be found in the English authority on the common 
law offence. Of Vreones, it said that “the conduct […] was sufficient to support the 
conviction […] not primarily because of any relation it bore to possible or probable 
                                                          
276 R v Murphy [1985] HCA 50. 
277 Justice Murphy’s conviction for perverting the course of justice was overturned on appeal. He was 
acquitted at a second trial. He died before an official investigation into his fitness for judicial office reported. 
Lionel Murphy was a celebrated judicial radical and a former Attorney-General of Austrlaia. For more 
details of this extraordinary saga, see Cowdery, N., Reflections on the Murphy trials, (2008) 27 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 5. 
278 R v Murphy, at 58. 
279 R v Murphy, at 59. 
WHAT IS THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
84 
 
consequences but because of its relation to the accused’s intentions or purposes.”280  
The court cited Machin in support of this, but the quote used does not accord with 
Machin.281 The High Court concluded: 
“conduct will amount to an attempt if it has a tendency to fulfil the guilty 
intention, that is to say if it is a step directed to or aimed at fulfilling that 
intention. Whether the conduct has a prospect of producing a perversion of 
justice is not a necessary element of the offence.”282 
 This defines the requirement for tendency all but out of existence. If there is no 
requirement for the behaviour to produce a prospect, even a theoretical one, of the 
course of justice being perverted then this is an any-act crime: the position is 
indistinguishable from that in Scotland. If the mental element is present then the 
conduct element perforce must be as well. The most factually or theoretically 
impossible attempt would, if made in earnest, be sufficient.  
 Australian cases on perverting the course of justice, the reader might notice, 
themselves demonstrate a tendency: they are more exciting than domestic ones. In R 
v Meissner, the appellant had been convicted of improperly seeking to influence a 
sex worker to plead guilty where she was accused of making a false statutory 
declaration in connection with photos that allegedly existed of her and a state 
Minister naked together on a boat.283 One of the questions for the court concerned 
whether the charge was properly made in circumstances where there was no 
evidence of what the ‘correct’ result would have been: a plea of guilty or not guilty. 
The tendency which the court identified here was present whether or not the person 
being influenced ought properly to have pled guilty or not guilty. Does trying to 
convince a guilty person to plead guilty tend to pervert the course of justice? It is 
hard to say, but the requirement for tendency, the court held, was met by the nature 
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and quality of the conduct, absent any analysis of whether it would factually lead to 
a perversion of the course of justice. To this extent, this decision accords with 
Murphy: it is not necessary for there actually to be a “prospect” of the course of 
justice being perverted. Obviously that prospect could not exist if someone was 
being influenced, even improperly, to plead guilty in a situation where guilty was 
the ‘correct’ plea. But where this decision departs from Murphy is in its analysis of 
tendency: 
“The course of justice that was put at risk by the alleged conduct of the 
appellant was not the entry of a plea of guilty by someone who was not guilty 
but the entry of a plea of guilty otherwise than by exercise of a free choice in the 
interests of the person entering the plea. If the conduct of the appellant had the 
tendency to produce that result, the actus reus was established. The mens rea 
was simply an intention to induce the entry of the plea of guilty when Ms 
Perger would not or might not have entered that plea if she had exercised a free 
choice in her own interests. The motive of the appellant – to protect his political 
associates, for example – is not an element of the offence, but it is material to the 
ascertainment of the intention with which he engaged in the conduct he did.”284 
 What the court seems to be doing here is reconciling the risk-based approach to 
tendency in Foord v Whiddet and the intention-based approach in Murphy. The 
court does not attempt a probabilistic enquiry into whether and for how long a risk 
was created of the course of justice being perverted, nor does it really ask what the 
nature of the perversion would have been had the tendency materialised. Instead, it 
analyses the character of what was done and asks whether that sort of conduct has 
the potential to pervert of the course of justice. When the court talks of a “tendency 
to produce that result”, the relevant result is not a perversion of the course of justice 
but “the entry of a plea of guilty otherwise than by exercise of a free choice”. This is 
perhaps a two-stage analysis of what ‘tendency’ means. First, you categorise the 
behaviour that the accused is charged with in terms of what it might mean for the 
course of justice. This is done objectively, without reference to the particular facts of 
the case: for example, is the course of justice perverted when people are influenced 
to plea otherwise than by free choice, or is the course of justice perverted when 
evidence is tampered with? If the answer is yes, you ask whether the accused’s 
behaviour tending towards that end.  
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 The High Court of Australia recently had the opportunity, in R v Beckett,285 to 
resolve the tensions in these various authorities on the meaning of tendency. In 
Meissner, the accused had been charged with a common law attempt to pervert the 
course of justice, the relevant conduct having taken place before the commencement 
of section 319 (creating the statutory felony of perverting the course of justice) and 
section 341 (abolishing the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course 
of justice) of the Crimes Act 1900.286 In Beckett, the accused was a solicitor alleged to 
have produced false photocopies of bank cheques during an interview with officials 
in a tax investigation. It was accepted that proof of tendency was an element of the 
crime, despite the phrase not appearing in section 319. But the accused argued that 
the proof of tendency required was of the Murphy kind, that is tendency not as “an 
objective quality of the act” but “tendency to fulfil the proscribed intention”.287 The 
four-judge majority accepted this and said that the effect of Murphy was that the 
offence had only two elements: the accused doing the act charged, and doing that 
act with the intention to pervert the course of justice.288 Any act is sufficient, and 
tendency is an aspect of the accused’s intention, not a limit on the conduct that can 
constitute the offence. 
 Nettle J dissented. He considered that there was a third element to the offence: “that 
the act or omission had a tendency to pervert the course of justice”.289 He accepted 
that on a bare reading of the words of the Crimes Act 1900, either interpretation 
could be correct.290 He identified a number of cases, including R v Charles,291 where 
the court had clearly operated on the assumption that, in incorporating the offence 
into the Act as it did, the legislature intended to incorporate all aspects of the 
common law offence, including the requirement for a factual, rather than purposive, 
tendency to be demonstrated. Ultimately, his argument was principled: an 
ambiguous penal statute should be interpreted so as not to restrict liberty as much 
as possible, and the reading contended for by the majority “would potentially result 
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in a very wide range of conduct, including conduct that was not previously 
unlawful, being criminalised as a perversion of the course of justice”.292 
Tendency: the level of risk, practical impossibility and legal impossibility 
 No matter which version of tendency is preferred a question remains. Is a threshold 
applied to the tendency and if so, what is it? If tendency is of the Murray kind and 
an actual possibility or risk requires to be established, is it any possible risk, even a 
remote one, or should the law require a more substantial risk to be demonstrated? 
Even if tendency is interpreted in the way suggested in Murphy, and we are seeking 
to establish that tendency in the purpose of the accused, the question still needs to 
be asked. Someone can do something with a purpose which poses an insubstantial 
risk to the course of justice as much as they can with more serious intent. English 
authorities only talk about “a risk” or “a possibility”, suggesting that any non-zero 
level of risk is sufficient. 
 There is at least one Australian case, Healy v R, where the court has held that a more 
than insubstantial risk needs to be present for a tendency to be demonstrated.293 The 
Supreme Court of Western Australia cited Foord v Whidett and Murray as authority 
for the proposition that a tendency was present where “there was a risk, without 
further action from the appellant, that what he had said or done might lead to an 
injustice in the sense that there was a real possibility that we he had said or done 
might lead to injustice”.294 This is in any event a difficult proposition to follow and is 
not supported by the authorities it cites. Murray simply talks about “a risk … that 
injustice will result”295 and Foord v Whiddet simply talks about “a risk”.296 
 In R v Foord in the Supreme Court of New South Wales,297 the judge was invited to 
direct the jury that they could only find an action to have a tendency when it 
produced “a substantial tendency as distinct from a mere theoretical possibility or 
remote possibility”. The Supreme Court rejected this submission without needing to 
“further dilate” on the subject, saying that there was no “warrant or justification” 
for it.  
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 It seems, then, that all that is required in New South Wales and England at least, is 
for the evidence to demonstrate a non-zero possibility of behaviour leading to a 
perversion of the course of justice. But what if the evidence is of behaviour of a 
character or class that ordinarily would pervert the course of justice but which, for 
some reason inherent to the specific actions alleged, in fact demonstrates no 
possibility of such a perversion? This is not the sort of question raised by Foord v 
Whiddet where it was the character of the accused’s would-be conspirator that it 
was suggested reduced the risk to nil; the question here is about a situation where 
the character of the behaviour itself suggests a nil risk, such as the factually 
impossible attempt: what if I try to pervert the course of justice by magical 
incantation?298 
 In R v Scholes,299 a suspended driver had killed his brother and another woman after 
driving dangerously. Immediately following the crash, he dragged the fatally 
injured woman into the driver’s seat and told bystanders that she had been driving. 
This attempt to evade the consequences of his actions was, however, doomed to fail. 
Witnesses had seen the entire pitiful charade unfold and the injuries suffered by the 
woman would always have demonstrated that she had not been in the driver’s seat. 
The court considered, in an appeal by the D.P.P. against sentence, that the 
respondent’s “post-accident conduct would not have warranted a conviction for the 
offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice”. Rather than having the 
required tendency, the respondent’s behaviour “amounted […] to no more than a 
vain and pathetic attempt […] to avoid reality.”300 Whether tendency was 
extinguished because a vain attempt cannot produce the right sort of tendency or 
because vain attempts demonstrate insufficient intention is not clear from the 
judgment. 
 It seems at first as if the court has held that any “vain” attempts to pervert the 
course of justice will inevitably fail to demonstrate the requisite tendency, and some 
commentators have interpreted this in that way, saying that the reasoning 
suggested that “if it is impossible for the conduct to succeed in perverting the course 
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of justice, the offence is not established”.301 Courts in Australia had, of course, 
already rejected one strain of impossibility-based argument in Foord v Whiddett 
and similar cases. The Victorian Court of Appeal has perhaps been misunderstood 
here. Impossibility can attach to an attempt in two ways: because of the context of 
the attempt, or because of the inherent qualities of the attempt. As the same court 
said in a different case, R v Aydin: 
“practical impossibility is irrelevant if [a theoretical] tendency is present. It 
would not be present if, for example, a person attempted to pervert the course 
of justice by sticking pins into a wax model of the prosecutor; but it would be 
present, again by way of example, if the accused wrote an intimidating letter in 
Portuguese to a judicial officer whom the accused wrongly believed to 
understand that language.”302 
 This is an analysis very close to the one I suggest based on the court’s reasoning in 
Meissner.303 Tendency should require an analysis of the character of the conduct, 
objectively considered. If we understand the court in Scholes to be talking about 
factual impossibility, then their judgment can be criticised on the basis that it 
produces the unwelcome result that whether an offence is committed or not could 
depend on whether witnesses were present.304 But if one prefers the question asked 
by the same court in Aydin – does the behaviour have an inherent tendency to 
pervert? – then the result is more understandable. What the respondent was accused 
of could never have resulted in a perversion of the course of justice, the steps taken 
being simply too pathetic. Crucially, it doesn’t matter whether the witnesses were 
present or not: we are not required to speculate about any third parties’ possible 
actions, attitudes, honesty or next steps. All we have to do is assess the character of 
the behaviour itself, against the background of the world as we reasonably know it 
to be. There is a difference between something being “doomed to fail for reasons 
that are unconnected with the accused’s act”305 and doomed to fail because of the 
nature of the accused’s act. The Court of Appeal in England has taken the inevitable, 
pitiful failure of an attempt to be a relevant mitigatory factor and, in R v Sookoo, 
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suggested that such attempts should not routinely be charged,306 but that such 
attempts do amount to the offence.307  
 In the U.S., impossibility is no defence to the corresponding offence, separately from 
the question whether it is a defence generally in charges of attempt.308 
 In Scotland, the general rule is that impossibility is irrelevant, save where a person 
was aware of it (and therefore would lack the required mens rea).309 It must be 
assumed, following Harris and Hanley, that the same rule applies to perverting the 
course of justice. 
United States: endeavours 
 In the U.S., the actus reus of the offence under section 1503 of Title 18 is anything 
that constitutes an “endeavour” to obstruct justice.310 An endeavour is “less than an 
attempt”,311 but more than any act at all. The act must be “likely to obstruct 
justice”312 or have the “natural and probable effect”313 of doing so. 
 Speculation about intervening steps between the defendant’s endeavour and the 
outcome that would obstruct justice is discouraged. In United States v Aguilar, the 
defendant provided false statements to an FBI agent who was unconnected to the 
relevant grand jury investigation. The Supreme Court held that the possibility of 
this act ever obstructing justice was “speculative”, since there was no evidence of 
what use the statements might have been put to in the circumstances: no offence 
was committed.314 This is a meaningful conduct limit on the offence: an actual risk is 
required, and the offender must have done everything they could to bring about 
that risk. 
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 Justice Scalia dissented.315 It was established law that the required intention had to 
be the specific intent to obstruct justice, rather than (as the government had sought 
to argue in Pettibone v United States) the intent to do a thing which would obstruct 
justice.316 Scalia thought that the majority had over-interpreted one line of the 
decision in Pettibone: 
“Pettibone did acknowledge, however – and here is the point that is distorted to 
produce today's opinion – that the specific intent to obstruct justice could be 
found where the defendant intentionally committed a wrongful act that had 
obstruction of justice as its "natural and probable consequence." 
Today's "nexus" requirement sounds like this, but is in reality quite different. 
Instead of reaffirming that "natural and probable consequence" is one way of 
establishing intent, it substitutes “natural and probable effect" for intent, 
requiring that factor even when intent to obstruct justice is otherwise clear.”317 
 Scalia argues that an endeavour is characterised only by its purpose, not by its 
potential: 
“But while it is quite proper to derive an intent requirement from […] the word 
"endeavor," it is quite impossible to derive a "natural and probable 
consequence" requirement. One would be "endeavoring" to obstruct justice if he 
intentionally set out to do it by means that would only unnaturally and 
improbably be successful.”318 
 It is worth noting that even when a jurisdiction deliberately elides the difficulties 
presented by the law of attempt in this context,319 it ends up presented with the 
same question and the same difficulties: whether there are practical limits on the 
qualities of the action that can form the offence. 
Conclusions about the conduct elements of the offence 
 We create preventive offences for a number of reasons: because attempts can 
themselves be distressing;320 because there is a level of risk of harm that we are not 
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prepared to tolerate, in the interests of bringing about an overall reduction in 
harm;321 and because the culpability of the attempted offender is hard to distinguish 
from the successful.322 All of these justifications are relevant to perverting the course 
of justice. People ought to feel able to participate in a course of justice protected 
from attempts to dissuade or coerce them into doing anything other than their 
normal duties. We cannot tolerate a risk of harm to the course of justice, given the 
stakes involved and the centrality of our system of justice to the fulfilment of other, 
important societal goals. And the sort of person who would attempt to pervert 
justice – who would want to see the law not follow the path it was meant to – has 
clearly demonstrated behaviour worthy of society’s condemnation.  
 There is, however, particular potential for over-reach in preventive 
criminalisation.323 The law imposes special limits on the principal preventive 
offences, reflecting the need for balance between intervention in potentially harmful 
acts, and a preference for not punishing harmless activity: 
“Clearly it is better for harm to be prevented but there must nevertheless be a 
critical point before which official intervention is discounted to reflect the law’s 
overriding commitment to freedom and autonomy”324 
So, in the law of conspiracy we do not criminalise the simple intention to combine 
with another to commit an offence.325 We require there to be an agreement of some 
sort,326 though there may be no further action taken beyond that plain agreement. 
More is needed to constitute an attempt. We require a person to have moved from 
an act of mere preparation to an act of perpetration before the actus reus of attempt 
is established.327  
 Perverting the course of justice would, if any act at all were sufficient, be an outlier 
in the family of inchoate and preventive offences. It would not be a substantive 
possession offence to have a carrot, believing it to be a knife, and no further offence 
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would be committed if you were sufficiently deluded to believe your carrot could be 
used to effect a fraud. I have established no reason of principle why, for example, 
acts preparatory to murder should not be criminalised while acts preparatory to a 
perversion of the course of justice are. As well as addressing the (vertical) question 
of how far down a path a would-be perverter of the course of justice has to go, there 
is the (horizontal) question of what quality of action the offence requires. It is less 
clear that it is inappropriate for the actus reus of perverting the course of justice to 
be limited to actions with an intrinsic tendency to pervert the course of justice. This 
would be an exception to the general rule regarding the law of attempt in 
Scotland,328 where impossibility is generally irrelevant. It is not required to reflect 
the moral culpability of the person who makes an impossible attempt or who, 
through their futile actions, distresses someone by trying to pervert the course of 
justice.  
 All American jurisdictions contain offences of obstructing justice. In a survey of 
these, Decker identified twenty-four states (and the District of Columbia) as having 
a general offence of obstructing justice that was described in very broad terms.329 Of 
these, seventeen explicitly restrict the means, or actus reus, by which the offence 
may be committed: for example, in Oregon one can only obstruct justice by “means 
of intimidation, force, physical or economic interference or obstacle”.330 In six states, 
and at the federal level, the requirement is for an “endeavour” or for something 
less.331 In three states the general offence of obstruction of justice requires an 
“attempt”.332  
 There is something valuable and meaningful added to the law of perverting the 
course of justice by a requirement that the offender’s actions exhibit a tendency (to 
some standard) to pervert the course of justice. I have argued that perverting the 
course of justice is best understood as an offence of endangerment; limiting its 
conduct element to actions which pose a risk of endangering the course of justice is 
consistent with this. The distinction identified by the Court of Appeal of Victoria in 
Aydin is a useful way of limiting the ambit of the offence to actions which could 
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pervert the course of justice, but without requiring the courts to become engaged in 
abstract philosophising. If we did not include a requirement for actions to have 
moved from preparation to perpetration – and Hanley specifically disclaimed that 
Scots law required this – then the inclusion of a ‘tendency’ requirement might also 
address a number of the other concerns I have expressed about the potential breadth 
of the offence. An entirely private act, such as sketching some plans for a possible 
perversion of the course of justice, would not engage the requirement for tendency. 
The inclusion of an objective standard for the actus reus would also open up the 
possibility of the offence being committed recklessly: the person who deliberately 
does something which has a tendency to pervert the course of justice (such as 
destroying a piece of evidence), without any particular intention to pervert but 
reckless as to the possibility of a perversion occurring, has culpably endangered the 
course of justice in far more significant a manner than someone who does an action 
with a nugatory chance of creating a perversion, but with specific intent. If Scots law 
continues its over-focus on intention, then its criminal law risks arbitrarily not 
catching people who wrongfully cause risks to the course of justice. 
 The inclusion of a requirement for tendency would also make the offence sit more 
neatly alongside the other offences against the course of justice, creating a more 
coherent scheme for protecting the course of justice from harm, and risk of harm. 
For example, there is no need to intend to pervert the course of justice in order to 
commit an offence of perjury or wasting police time. Instead, both of the wrongs 
involved – lying in court, and lying to the police – have been identified and 
categorised by the law as the sort of actions which, of themselves and without 
having to look at the specifics of any individual case, have a tendency to pervert the 
course of justice.333 This is the approach I propose for the general requirement of 
tendency, and can be seen in the Australian law. If the rest of the family of 
administration of justice offences is concerned with the identification of descriptions 
of actions which themselves have the tendency to pervert the course of justice, it 
would be consistent for the residual offence of perverting the course of justice to be 
similarly so concerned. Hanley, after all, invites us to look to the other 
administration of justice offences to better understand perverting the course of 
justice, not to the law of attempt. 
                                                          
333 See paras 6.8 and 6.9 for my consideration of whether perjury does require an intent to pervert the course 
of justice; and para 7.48 for my argument that this is how tendency should be understood, if it is a required 
element of the offence. 
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE 
95 
 
 The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia claims that the actus reus of the offence is “any 
conduct that tends to obstruct or hinder the course of justice”, though there is no 
authority cited.334 The inclusion of a requirement of ‘tendency’ would however 
cohere the administration of justice offences in Scotland. I have asked why, if 
competence and relevance are essential to the analysis of whether perjury has 
occurred, there is no similar analysis of the evidence at stake in a charge of 
perverting the course of justice.335 One way of expressing the justification for not 
criminalising the telling of mistruths in relation to matters not competently before 
the court is that such mistruths could not (or, perhaps, should not) affect the outcome 
of a trial: they have no tendency to pervert the course of justice. The law of perjury 
is already concerned with demonstrating a tendency to pervert the course of justice. 
If we limited the behaviour capable of amounting to perverting the course of justice 
to that which had such a tendency, then we would resolve this difficulty. The 
destruction of ‘incompetent’ evidence would be outwith the ambit of the offence, as 
incapable of demonstrating the required tendency.  
 It might even then be more defensible (though not necessary) to speak of the 
nominate administration of justice offences as being modes of committing 
perverting the course of justice, or of perverting the course of justice as the proto-
offence, sitting behind each of the others.336  
 There is, however, little utility in proposing a requirement that an intention to 
pervert the course of justice should be accompanied by a requirement for actions 
with a tendency to pervert the course of justice unless we can account for precisely 
what it means to pervert it. 
 What does it mean to ‘pervert’? 
Perverting, obstructing, impeding, preventing, influencing, defeating …  
 The subject of someone’s actions is either a course of justice or it is not; and the 
actions they take are either sufficient to amount to an attempt, or they are not. But 
what do they have to intend to achieve in order for it to amount to an attempt to 
pervert the course of justice? The word ‘perversion’ in this context has no obvious 
meaning of its own and the courts have never been attracted to attempting any 
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further or more specific definition of what it means.337 There must, however, be a 
distinction that can be made between things done with the course of justice as their 
subject which are perversions of it, and things which are not. 
 When corresponding offences in other jurisdictions appear in statute, more specific 
words are often used.338 The U.S. federal offence of obstruction of justice requires 
someone to “influence, obstruct or impede … the due administration of justice”.339 
The Australian commonwealth offences requires a person to attempt to “obstruct, to 
prevent, to pervert or to defeat the course of justice”.340 Two things are notable: that 
in both cases the language suggests that the offence is committed both when the 
offender’s behaviour risks the course of justice producing an unjust outcome 
(‘influence’ or ‘defeat’) and where the offender’s behaviour in some lesser way 
disrupts the manner in which the course of justice is proceeding, though without 
necessarily risking the ultimate outcome (‘impede’ or ‘obstruct’).  
 Imagine that three men sought to interfere with a trial. The first wants to go to a 
family gathering instead of giving evidence, so calls in a false bomb threat, delaying 
a day of the trial until later but fully intending to give his evidence truthfully on that 
day. The second, for personal reasons, threatens a witness that they should not 
reveal certain details; details which are relevant but not necessary to establish the 
guilt, or otherwise, of the defendant. The third concocts a crucial piece of evidence, 
without which there would be insufficient evidence to convict the accused. The 
three men have disrupted the trial in qualitatively very different ways. The first has 
affected the efficiency and management of the trial341 but has presented no threat or 
risk to its outcome: all of the same evidence will be heard and the outcome will be 
the same. The second has affected the substance of the trial itself – different 
evidence will be heard than should be – and the fact-finder may arrive at the ‘right’ 
outcome, but will do so on the basis of (some) incorrect facts. Again, however, there 
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is no substantial risk to the trial’s outcome. The third man, in contrast, has caused a 
miscarriage of justice. A person has been convicted when they ought to have been 
acquitted. If all three facts came to light, only the third would, in Scotland, be a 
sound basis for an appeal.342 Did all three men have the intention to pervert the 
course of justice? 
 Consider the two justifications identified as lying behind the criminalisation in 
Scotland of wasting police time:343 that it disrupts the work of the police, and that it 
can lead to criminal suspicion falling on innocent people. One is about protecting 
the integrity and efficiency of justice institutions, and the other is concerned with 
protecting the citizen who is the subject of a course of justice from the harm of an 
incorrect justice outcome.344 In the examples above, the first man has only caused a 
transient interference with the course of justice; the substance of the trial will remain 
identical and its outcome the same. The third man has, equally clearly, tried to cause 
someone harm by interfering with a course of justice; he has sought to create a 
justice outcome (a conviction) which is not justified by law. The harm caused by the 
second man is harder to categorise. His behaviour is not directed simply towards 
the outcome of the trial. But what he has done does affect the integrity and honesty 
of the course of justice. The right outcome might be reached, but in a tainted way. 
This was the court’s concern in Meissner, where improper pressure was put on a 
defendant to plead guilty, in a situation where her guilt was clear.345 No justice 
outcome was at stake in the sense that it was at risk of being different as a result, but 
the court was clear that nevertheless the outcome would have been perverted by 
this conduct: “the entry of a plea of guilty otherwise than by exercise of a free choice 
in the interests of the person entering the plea” was a perversion of the course of 
justice.346 The harm committed by the second man is like this. He has harmed the 
reliability of the justice outcome by harming the process that led up to it. This can 
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(in civil cases) both people who get something they’re not entitled to from an action, and vice versa. 
345 See para 7.38, supra. 
346 Meissner, at para 29. But see the affirmative defence under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 under which a defendant may 
show that her conduct “consisted solely of lawful conduct” and that her “sole intention was to encourage, 
induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully”. This may not extend to pleading, of course, and it is 
difficult to see why this defence was considered necessary, since that conduct could presumably never meet 
the requirement for ‘corrupt intent’ and therefore never be the offence in the first place. 
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have more and less serious forms: it would be trifling and bizarre to try to substitute 
a red jumper for an identical blue one in evidence (but it would introduce falsehood 
into a trial); it would be much more serious to manipulate evidence in a way that 
didn’t affect a justice outcome, but could alter the terms of a plea in mitigation and 
therefore a sentence. 
 Perverting the course of justice has two different, but over-lapping concerns: these 
might be characterised as contempts of court, and miscarriages of justice. It is much 
more serious to try to create a miscarriage of justice than it is to disrupt the police, 
judges or courts staff. But both are criminal and both caught, in Scotland, by the 
same offence. There therefore may be a fair-labelling problem with perverting the 
course of justice.347 Part of the concern of fair labelling is directed at the structure of 
the criminal law: that the distinctions between offences, and their relations with 
each other, should accurately reflect the interests protected, the harms done and the 
relative seriousness of the offences. An over-broad offence could be considered 
unfairly labelled on the grounds that it failed to distinguish between wrongs of 
entirely different character, or that it encompassed similar wrongs but did not make 
the appropriate distinction between their seriousness. The distinctions between the 
different ways of perverting the course of justice are at least as broad as the 
distinctions between some of the other offences against the administration of justice; 
in both character and seriousness.348 Such a distinction may sometimes be hinted at 
by charging ‘attempt to defeat the ends of justice’ in cases where a justice outcome is 
at stake. 
 This breadth is common in common law offences, where distinctions in seriousness 
tend to be expressed at sentence. But the lack of a focus on what it means to pervert 
a course of justice is, I have concluded, both a function of and a cause of the sheer 
breadth of the offence. The reasoning of the major cases in Scotland discussed so far 
can be boiled down to this: the person did something that is self-evidently to be 
disapproved of, and it was concerned with the course of justice.  
                                                          
347 See Chalmers, J. and Leverick, F., Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 Mod. L. Rev. 217 (2008) for an 
overview and analysis of the concept of fair labelling. 
348 It seems instinctively odd that the offenders in both McFarlane v Jessop (para 3.53, supra: police officers 
confecting evidence to secure a false conviction) and Johnstone v Lees (para 3.54, supra: denying knowledge 
of an offence in a reply) were convicted of the same offence.  
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 Does an intent to pervert the course of justice necessarily demonstrate wickedness? 
In Scotland, “evil intent” used to be regarded as required.349 This has largely been 
replaced, in the modern case law, with the more descriptive intent to pervert the 
course of justice. In the U.S., in addition to the intention to obstruct justice there is a 
further requirement in the statute that such intention should be “corrupt”.350 
Working out in which way a corrupt intent to obstruct justice goes further than a 
specific one been a source of confusion for the U.S. judiciary.351 It would be 
preferable to develop an understand of the meaning to pervert that incorporated or 
demonstrated requirements of ‘evil’ or ‘corruption’, rather than seeking to separate 
these out. 
How specific can the meaning of ‘to pervert’ be? 
 The question what it means to pervert is relevant both in working out what the 
required intention is, but also (where necessary) to establish what the conduct 
elements of the offence might be. If the offence is limited to actions which have a 
tendency to pervert the course of justice, then we need to be able to characterise 
what that an action is tending towards: disrupting a trial, influencing its content, or 
altering its outcome? These are three connected types of harm. Which are caught by 
perverting the course of justice will depend on the interests being protected by the 
offence: why should we criminalise the obstruction of justice? Is it because we want 
to ensure that justice is done in a substantive sense, that the right outcomes are the 
result of each course of justice; or is it that we want to protect the way in which 
justice is done, that it can be administered truthfully and efficiently in each case; or 
is it because we want to protect the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutions 
charged with administering justice? 
 The answer is ‘all of the above’. All are legitimate subjects of the criminal law, and 
there may be instances where it would not be easy to categorise behaviour into only 
one of the three cases. We should remember where I have located the development 
                                                          
349 “Evil intention, of course, is of the essence of the matter”:  Mannion, at 80. 
350 This is said by some commentators to be the reason why some of President Trump’s more notorious 
actions, even if otherwise caught by U.S.C. § 1503, would not amount to obstruction of justice. The 
President, when acting within his executive authority (the argument goes) cannot manifest corrupt intent: 
see Blackman, J. ‘Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part I’, Lawfare Blog (5 December 2017), 
accessible at https://www.lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-and-presidency-part-i (accessed 11 
September 2018) and Hemel, D. J. and Posner, E. A., ‘Presidential obstruction of justice’, California Law 
Review 106(4), 1277-1334. 
351 See DeMarco, J., ‘Note: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document 
Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute’, 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev 570 at 576 (1992). 
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of the offence in Scotland: both in the gaps in-between and at the edges of the 
existing offences against the course of justice,352 and also in the centre of the Scottish 
tradition of pragmatic, descriptive development of common law offences.353 When 
trying to provide a residual offence which will catch everything not otherwise 
addressed by a set of crimes, the resulting offence will necessarily be at least equally 
as broad as those crimes. The offences against the administration of justice contain 
crimes which explicitly protect the outcome of a justice process (such as 
deforcement or prison-breaking) as well as offences directed at the integrity of a trial 
(such as perjury, or the judge’s summary jurisdiction in matters of contempt). It was 
inevitable that the residual offence which grew around them would as well. 
 Even the term administration of justice is hard to account for fully. The Victorian 
Parliament Law Reform Committee concluded that it was “often used but seldom 
defined, even in published reports.”354 It would probably not be possible to narrow 
down the breadth of the offence by using more specific, or more descriptive, verbs 
to replace ‘to pervert’ (though it may be possible to tease out and categorise the 
different ways in which the offence can be committed). Where jurisdictions have 
reduced their offences to statute, the drafters have either relied on the breadth and 
ambiguity of ‘to pervert’,355 or they have resorted to a string of overlapping and 
expansive verbs to provide the required breadth.356 The Scots offence is not out of 
step in the breadth of the protection afforded to the course of justice, though it may 
compare poorly with other jurisdictions in the extent to which the meaning of that 
breadth has been analysed.  
                                                          
352 Paras 6.1 to 6.16, supra.  
353 Paras 4.25 to 4.29, supra. 
354 Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, at p 14. 
355 e.g. Crimes Act 1914 (Australian Commonwealth), section 43(1). 
356 e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1503: “influence, impede or obstruct”. 
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 WHAT SHOULD BE THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
 Conclusions 
The state of the offence in Scots law 
 Though other jurisdictions have thought it “unwise to attempt to define [perverting 
the course of justice] exhaustively, as it is impossible to do so”,357 none has failed to 
provide a definition of some sort of the conduct that is caught by the offence and the 
conduct that is not; nor failed to state clearly the mental elements of the offence, 
whatever they may be. The Scots decisions have either never been confronted with 
the sort of facts that might have required them to address such questions, or they 
have preferred broader, more practical answers to them. 
 Nevertheless, the Scots offence is not such an outlier: in all jurisdictions I have 
covered the offence is defined broadly and purposively. Most recognise a near-
unlimited range of ways in which the offence can be committed, though most seek 
to place some limits on the character of the conduct required. Only in a few U.S. 
states are there effective conduct limits on the way in which the offence can be 
committed.358 The corresponding U.S. offence has been challenged unsuccessfully on 
the grounds of vagueness359 and over-breadth,360 the court holding in all cases that 
the requirement for specific and corrupt intent cured the unusual and vague 
breadth of conduct caught. This should not be surprising: the only practical 
limitations on the ways in which a person can pervert the course of justice are, first, 
the range of things which can be the subject of a judicial process and, second, the 
imagination or desperation of those who want to interfere with it. The first is ever-
expanding and the second swells with it. It would be an impossible task to define in 
advance the type of conduct involved. 
 But there are a family of questions relating to the elements of the offence which 
other jurisdictions have addressed, and which Scotland has not: is it right that this 
                                                          
357 R v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268 per Brennan and Toohey JJ, at para 2. See also R v McGee and McGee 
[2008] SASC 328 at para 308. 
358 e.g. in Oregon where the offence can only be committed by “means of intimidation, force, physical or 
economic interference or obstacle”, see fn 330. Even this is a very broad way of describing a kind of 
behaviour, though it does resolve the question whether purely private action is sufficient: paras 7.21 to 7.24, 
supra. 
359 United States v Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 at 632 (7th Cir. 1998); or United States v Tyler, 281 F.3d 84 at 91 to 92 
(3d. Cir. 2002), which is concerned with 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the witness tampering offence. 
360 United States v Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 at 996, (1st Cir. 1987). 
WHAT SHOULD BE THE LAW OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE? 
102 
 
should be a crime of pure intention; why should the standard of attempt required be 
different than in the general part of the criminal law (and what should it be); what is 
the range of intention, and standard of wrongdoing, relevant to the meaning of ‘to 
pervert’?  
 I would only conclude that there was a problem in Scotland’s failure to answer these 
questions if the effect of any ambiguity was harmful in itself. Justifying a preventive 
offence requires “a calculation of benefits and burdens”:361 so what are the burdens 
imposed by having such a broad and ill-defined offence?  
A duty to cooperate with justice institutions 
 It does not take too close a reading of some of the Scots cases to wonder about the 
chilling effect of the offence: does it effectively enforce a duty on citizens to 
cooperate with the authorities, including the police?362 Might we have criminalised 
omission? Omissions offences are unusual, and are said to require the prior 
identification of a duty, recognised by law.363 Perverting the course of justice could 
create a conditional duty-situation, where a person who becomes involved in a 
course of justice (possibly even without having wanted to) has her lawful options 
reduced to one. When the police are investigating an offence, and ask questions of 
someone, are their options not effectively reduced to telling the truth if they want to 
avoid a charge of perverting the course of justice?364 How many options did the 
accused in Fletcher v Tudhope have, when his friend sought to avoid the police via 
his pub? In this situation, it seems, anything short of refusing him passage would 
have amounted to an offence. The decision in Mannion suggests a duty to make 
yourself available for citation where you are aware of it. Offences normally require 
an act; but while it would do some damage to the meaning of, for example, assault 
to contemplate its being done by omission, there is nothing about having an 
intention to pervert that necessarily ties it to the positive doing of an action. This 
                                                          
361 Ashworth, A. and Zedner, L., Preventive Justice, (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at p 103 and, generally, the argument 
in chapter 5.2, ‘Justifying preventive offences’, pp 103 to 108. 
362 There is a particular chilling effect associated with pre-inchoate offences: Ashworth, A. and Zedner, L., 
‘Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and Limits’, (2012) 15 New Criminal Law Review 542. 
363 For example, see Ashworth, A., Positive Obligations in Criminal Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2013) at pp 32 to 37. 
364 If it attempts a perversion of the course of justice to try to convince someone not to identify a person to 
the police (as in Dalton), can we be sure that it would not pervert the course of justice to convince someone 
to refuse to participate in an identification, or even to refuse to participate in such an identification yourself? 
Cf. Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, where it was held that at common law a person is entitled to refuse to 
answer a question put by a police officer. 
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may be a function only of language, rather than morality, but deciding not to 
participate in a police investigation, refusing to give over information that would 
lead to a conviction, or simply failing to disclose relevant information when you 
have the opportunity to are all examples of omissions that a person could very 
deliberately pursue for the specific purpose of perverting the course of justice. Each 
might even colourably constitute an act: some steps would have to be taken to 
refuse to answer question put to you as part of a police inquiry, even if it was 
simply to say that you would not answer.  
 The state’s responsibility to investigate crime and to administer justice would be 
impossible to discharge without some level of cooperation by the public, but is the 
criminal law the appropriate tool to regulate that cooperation? Ashworth identifies 
civic duties as one of the categories of duty-situations recognised by law, and which 
can be shown to translate into criminal offences, though he regards it as “ill-
defined” and “the most contestable” form of duty.365 The justice system already 
generates such duties. The duty to participate in a jury, when cited, is enforced by 
sanction.366 Some jurisdictions recognise a general duty to assist the police in certain 
situations, which can even extend to requiring physical assistance of the police in 
the execution of their duties.367 The lack of a defence of ignorance of the law implies 
a duty to make reasonable efforts to ascertain it.368 
 The first requirement Ashworth identifies as necessary in a duty-situation giving 
rise to criminal liability is that the duty-bearing person must be aware of the 
circumstances giving rise to the duty.369 This would necessarily be satisfied if the 
requirement for an intention to pervert the course of justice was. The second is that 
all the law can properly require of the duty-bearing person is to do what is 
reasonable.370 This condition is compatible, in principle, with the enforcement of a 
duty to cooperate with justice institutions. A person would not be under a duty to 
take all positive steps to ensure that justice was done; but when they or information 
                                                          
365 Positive Obligations in Criminal Law, p 56. 
366 The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 85(6), for example, contains a summary power to fine 
those who fail to attend; for England and Wales see the Juries Act 1974, section 20. 
367 See R v Brown, (1841) Car & M 314 and Nicolson, D., ‘The Citizen’s Duty to Assist the Police’ [1992] Crim 
LR 611. 
368 Ashworth, A., ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid It’, (2011) 74 MLR 1. 
369 Positive Obligations in Criminal Law, p 75. 
370 Positive Obligations in Criminal Law, p 77. 
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they have becomes concerned in a course of justice, the law might require them not 
to stay silent for the purpose of perverting that course of justice.   
 Some non-cooperation, or some right to be silent or do nothing, would always have 
to be protected, and already is. For example, where enforcing such a duty was 
incompatible with a person’s right to silence or non-incrimination, or their right to 
test the prosecution’s case against them.371 There is some U.S. case law from Ohio 
that recognises rights that protect even certain positive acts done in order to pervert 
justice. The courts have held that officials are “expected to tolerate a certain level of 
uncooperativeness, especially in a free society in which the citizenry is not obliged 
to be either blindly or silently obeisant to law enforcement”.372 This can have 
surprising results: it does not obstruct justice to flee the scene of a traffic stop, this 
not being “an affirmative act that directly interfered with the patrolman’s duty”.373 
Nor is it obstruction to refuse to allow a search warrant to be effected.374 
 While it is disputable whether perverting the course of justice implies some duty to 
cooperate with the authorities, it is doubtless part of the legal scheme that allows the 
investigating and judicial authorities to do their work. That offences against the 
administrations of justice are concerned with the regulation of the citizen’s 
relationship with the authorities and compelling cooperation is most clearly 
demonstrated by the offence of wasting police time. There is nothing obviously 
repugnant about this offence. In England and Wales there is a statutory of similar 
character.375 The police have finite resources, devoted to the benefit of the whole of 
society, and there is a need to protect them from waste and mis-application. The 
same could, however, be said of virtually all actors in public service: but there is no 
offence of wasting a policy official’s time. What are the special features of police 
resources that make them worth protecting by using the criminal law? 
                                                          
371 See para 3.55, supra. 
372 State v Davis, 749 N.E.2d 322 at 324 (Ohio Ct. App 2000). 
373 State v Gillenwater, 1998 WL 150354 (Ohio Ct. App 1998). 
374 State v Corrai, 591 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Ct. App 1990). Though, when the police seek to enforce a warrant, it 
does obstruct justice to be overheard by them shouting to your mother “They’re on our property. Can we 
shoot them?”: State v Mattila, 712 P.2d 832 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
375 s.5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967: “Where a person causes any wasteful employment of the police by 
knowingly making to any person a false report tending to show that an offence has been committed, or to 
give rise to apprehension for the safety of any persons or property, or tending to show that he has 
information material to any police inquiry, he shall be liable …”. 
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 The case for criminalisation would be easier to make were the offence restricted – as 
it once was – to behaviour which ran the risk of suspicion falling on the innocent. 
That would restrict the offence (special to law enforcement) to an interest which is 
itself special to law enforcement. On that model, the interests protected by the 
offence are very similar to some protected by the offence of perverting the course of 
justice: the possibility of an incorrect justice outcome, and the moral taint to the 
public justice system of being used for improper ends. But wasting the police’s 
efforts in a non-criminal context (for example, falsely reporting an item missing) is 
also caught by the offence.376 Is there something about the consequences of wasting 
the resources of the police that is different from wasting the resources of the health 
or education systems, also maintained at public expense and performing vital 
functions for society? To falsely report to a government department that someone is 
not entitled to a benefit they are claiming might, in modern public administration, 
run many of the same risks as the false reporting of an offence; to lobby an official 
using falsified data might cause serious waste to the public purse, and risk unwise 
policy decisions being taken, to the detriment of society. In some U.S. states, the 
offence of obstruction of justice extends to a surprising range of government 
officials.377 
 As well as the burdens that flow from the breadth of the offence and the possibility 
that it is compelling cooperation with the authorities, we must consider the 
benefits.378 Administering justice is one of the fundamental duties and functions of 
the state, of benefit both directly to those to whom justice is done, and indirectly to 
everyone who enjoys the rewards of living in a just society. It may not even go far 
enough simply to describe the offence as serving the purpose of preventing injustice; 
should we instead locate it as being required positively to promote justice? 
The state’s positive obligations under article 6 
 Given the importance of the interests protected, the state may have a positive 
obligation to have an offence of perverting the course of justice, or something 
similar. Article 6 ECHR imposes a suite of positive obligations on the state.379 The 
                                                          
376 Bowers v Tudhope, 1987 S.L.T. 748. 
377 For example, in Ohio it is an offence to obstruct “the performance by any public official or any authorized 
act within the public official’s official capacity”: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31 (obstructing official 
business). 
378 See fn 361. 
379 For example, Article 6 (1) taken together with (3) has been held to require states to take positive steps to 
enable the accused to examine or have examined witnesses against him (Trofimov v. Russia, (App no 
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positive obligations on states under the ECHR can extend to requiring the creation 
of criminal offences, where that is the most efficient and typical way of ensuring 
that rights are respected. For example, in X and Y v the Netherlands, a young 
woman was prevented by Dutch law from making a formal complaint of a sex crime 
committed against her.380 The court recognised that alternative ways of securing the 
applicant’s rights would be insufficient: 
“This is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life 
are at stake. Effect deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved 
only by criminal-law provisions; indeed it is by such provisions that the matter 
is normally regulated.”381 
 That the state might have a duty under Article 6 to criminalise interference with the 
course of justice can be seen when one considers how compromised these rights 
would be without the criminal law protecting them. What could be done about 
someone who tried to induce another to give false evidence? If exposed before the 
trial, it would need to become a matter of evidence at the trial, and tested according 
to the appropriate standard; if exposed after trial, we would have to hope that the 
state’s mechanisms for reviewing decisions (appeal, reference to the SCCRC, for 
example) were sufficient. Beyond risks to the outcome of the judicial process, and 
questions of efficiency, there are also questions of redress and punishment. This 
would have to take the form of a private process, for example a claim for damages 
against the person who interfered with the course of justice, or against the relevant 
institution for allowing falsehood to taint its decision-making. 
 In individual instances, some or all of these alternative methods may still be 
required. But when the state criminalises interference with the course of justice, it 
supports Article 6 rights in three essential ways: it punishes interference with the 
course of justice, signalling society’s condemnation of it; it ensures that the same 
protection is afforded to those who are (voluntarily or otherwise) caught up in a 
course of justice, regardless of their ability to privately defend their rights; and it 
                                                          
1111/02) ECHR 4 December 2008, at para 33; Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 1), [2008] ECHR 20, 74318/01 
at para 67). Article 6 (1) imposes on states a duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their 
courts can dispose of business within a reasonable time (Abdoella v. the Netherlands, (App No 12728/87), 25 
November 1992, at para 24; Dobbertin v. France, Application No 13089/87, at para 44). Article 6(3)(e) 
requires states to provide interpreters (Cuscani v United Kingdom, Application no. 32771/96, 24 September 
2002). 
380 X and Y v Netherlands, (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235. 
381 X and Y, at para 27. 
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deters interference in advance, rather than requiring that it is resolved either as part 
of or after the course of justice itself. The court in X and Y recognised this: “effect 
deterrence” was one of the special features of the criminal law that made it 
particularly appropriate as a means of discharging the state’s positive obligations 
under Article 6. 
 The sheer effectiveness of the criminal law is not an argument for resorting to the 
creation of offences, even in the pursuit of laudable aims. Indeed, it might be a good 
reason to be cautious about it.382 In X and Y, it was noted that the interests involved 
were normally regulated by the criminal law, not simply in the Netherlands but 
across Europe. For the criminal law to be required to be invoked by a state, it not 
only has to be effective in securing the exercise of a right, but the offence concerned 
has to also meet whatever standards are typically concerned with distinguishing 
between the criminal and the non-criminal.383 
 The offence of perverting the course of justice clearly meets that standard. The 
protection of the administration of justice is a typical subject of the criminal law, 
both historically in Scotland and the UK, and internationally.384 The seriousness of 
the offence may be as broad as any, or at least as broad as the rest of the criminal 
law. Perverting the course of justice may involve minimally-harmful steps taken to 
interfere with a minor charge of breach of the peace; or it may involve highly 
destructive steps taken to defeat the ends of justice in a charge or murder. As 
Widgery LCJ said: 
“[T]here are few more serious offences possible in the present day […] than 
those which tend to distort the course of public justice and prevent the courts 
from producing true and just results in the cases before them.”385 
                                                          
382 For a sceptical account of the use of the criminal law in the discharge of the state’s duties to its citizens, 
see Lazarus, L., ‘Positive Obligations and Criminal Justice: Duties to Protect or Coerce?’ in Zedner, L. and 
Roberts, J. (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew 
Ashworth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 135 to 156. 
383 See Ashworth, A., Positive Obligations in Criminal Law, at pp 209 and 210. 
384 The use of offences to deter interference with judicial process can be traced back to Roman law. The lex 
Cornelia de falsis criminalised someone who altered, suppressed or counterfeited with intent to harm 
another (Digest of Justinian Vol IV, 48.10.1). Many acts which fell under the lex Cornelia were concerned 
with judicial process: conspiring to give false witness (48.10.1); conspiring to ensnare an innocent person 
(48.10.1.1); accepting money to give evidence (48.10.1.2); or corrupting a judge (48.10.1.2). Fraudulently 
causing a judge to decide other than as he should, or extorting a judge, was a contravention of the lex Julia 
de vi publica (48.11.3). 
385 R v Andrews (1972) 57 Cr App R 254. 
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 If the creation and maintenance of an appropriate set of offences is required to 
discharge the state’s duties under Article 6, then it is as important that those laws 
should be effective as it is that they should be clearly expressed. The approach of the 
Scottish courts has been primarily to promote the effectiveness of the law; but has 
this come at the expense of its clarity? 
What should Scots law do? 
 Farmer has described the equivocal relationship that Scots criminal law has with 
principle.386 The irony is that much as Hume tried to derive the principles applying 
to offences inductively from the decided cases,387 later authors have had to try to 
derive the general principles applying to the criminal law inductively from Hume, 
since he largely failed to spell these out. There is, however, a regularly expressed 
commitment to the idea of principle in Scots criminal law.388 If there are principles to 
be derived from the way that Hume approached the offences against the 
administration of justice, and from the way the courts have developed the offence of 
perverting the course of justice in the years since, then they are these:  
 first, the criminal law is a proper tool for protecting the efficiency, the 
integrity and the outcomes of the judicial process;  
 second, that protection should be as comprehensive as possible, extending to 
every aspect of the course of justice; and  
 third, that in the interests of maintaining as comprehensive a protection as 
possible and given the breadth of the subjects covered by the course of 
justice, over-elaboration or prescriptive definition of the conduct involved in 
the offence should be avoided. 
 This is only unprincipled if you do not consider pragmatism or effectiveness to be 
principles.  
                                                          
386 Farmer, L., ‘The idea of principle in Scots criminal law’, in Chalmers, J., Leverick, F. and Farmer, L. (eds), 
Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon, (Edin: 2010), pp 86 to 102. 
387 In Hume, principles were “inductively drawn from the propositions in different cases […] frequently 
from what the court had done rather than what the judge had said”: Professor D.M. Walker’s introduction 
to Hume. 
388 “If there is a continuity it is perhaps […] the commitment to the idea that the criminal law is based on 
principles – even if those principles are hard to discern to the outside observer – and that it is the role of the 
courts to interpret and apply those principles in such a way that they are accepted by society in general”: 
The idea of principle in Scots criminal law, p 101. 
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 We have seen textbook writers return to the Humean style in trying to explain the 
offence; demonstrating its qualities by example, rather than definition, and leaving 
the reader to induce its elements.389 Perhaps this is simply another feature of the 
offence that points to it being an exemplar of the Scottish criminal law tradition. 
Perhaps the offence will always be considered ‘still crystallising’, because Scottish 
common law crimes never crystallise.  
 I do not think that I have made the case that the Scottish offence of perverting the 
course of justice is so unclear that legislative intervention is required or that its 
judicial development can be condemned as illegitimate. If there is someone in 
Scotland presently, with an intention to pervert the course of justice but who is 
genuinely unsure whether to pursue a particular act because they consider the law 
on the conduct elements of the offence to be uncertain, that perhaps we should 
pause before we encourage them to take advantage of that ambiguity. In all of the 
jurisdictions I have considered, questions which test this aspect of the offence have 
arisen eventually – and largely the same set of questions, with a very similar set of 
answers. There is no reason to think that the Scottish courts will not also one day 
have to grapple with such questions.  
 And when they do, it would be to the benefit of Scots law if there were room to take 
account of the relevant law from comparable jurisdictions. For as long as we try to 
do justice there will be people trying to stop it from being done. That is a human 
failing, not a Scottish one.  
                                                          
389 See paras 5.10 to 5.14. 
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